Pleadings and Particulars in Queensland – Complete Guide

The Function and Purpose of Pleadings and Particulars

The function and purpose of pleadings under the UCPR is settled, strict, and foundational to the integrity of the adversarial process.

Pleadings exist to define the real issues in dispute, give clear advance notice of the case to be met, and thereby secure procedural fairness by preventing surprise at trial.

That function requires the disciplined pleading of material facts, no more and no less, while excluding evidence, argument, irrelevancies, and narrative excess.

Modern case management principles under the UCPR reinforce, rather than dilute, this discipline: pleadings must expose the real issues so that proceedings can be conducted fairly, efficiently, and proportionately, without undue delay, expense, or technicality.

A pleading that fails to perform this defining function is not merely imperfect; it undermines procedural fairness, distorts disclosure and trial preparation, and is liable to be struck out.

The Role of Pleadings in Defining Issues

The function of pleadings under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (“UCPR”) is settled and non-negotiable.

Pleadings exist to define the issues in dispute and to ensure that each party knows, in advance of trial, the case it must meet.

This function is expressly recognised as foundational to procedural fairness.

The courts have repeatedly articulated this purpose. In Gould v Mount Oxide Mines Ltd (in Liq) [1916] HCA 81, Isaacs and Rich JJ stated that pleadings serve to identify the matters in controversy so that the opposing party is not taken by surprise at trial.

In the joint judgment of Isaacs and Rich JJ, the Court said:

Undoubtedly, as a general rule of fair play, and one resting on the fundamental principle that no man ought to be put to loss without having a proper opportunity of meeting the case against him, pleadings should state with sufficient clearness the case of the party whose averments they are. That is their function.

That formulation was adopted and reinforced in Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658, where the High Court held that the function of pleadings is to define the issues and confine the evidence to matters genuinely in dispute. The High Court said:

Pleadings and particulars have a number of functions: they furnish a statement of the case sufficiently clear to allow the other party a fair opportunity to meet it … they define the issues for decision in the litigation and thereby enable the relevance and admissibility of evidence to be determined at the trial … and they give a defendant an understanding of a plaintiff’s claim … The relief which may be granted to a party must be founded on the pleadings.

Queensland courts apply this principle strictly. In Banque Commerciale SA v Akhil Holdings Ltd [1990] HCA 11, Mason CJ and Gaudron J emphasised that pleadings are the mechanism by which procedural fairness is achieved, by giving notice of the case to be answered and preventing ambush. They said:

The function of pleadings is to state with sufficient clarity the case that must be met … In this way, pleadings serve to ensure the basic requirement of procedural fairness that a party should have the opportunity of meeting the case against him or her and, incidentally, to define the issues for decision.

A pleading that fails to perform this function is not merely defective; it undermines the integrity of the adversarial process.

In Chan v Goldenwater LDL Pty Ltd & Ors [2021] QCA 87, Sofronoff P said at [11]:

The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (UCPR) requires a pleading to contain a statement of all the material facts and to state specifically any matter that, if not stated, may take the other party by surprise. That final aspect of the rule does not require a pleader to guarantee that the opposing party will encounter nothing unexpected at the trial. Trials are full of the unexpected. The rule requires a pleading to contain all that is reasonably and fairly necessary to ensure that the opposing party is not met at the trial by an unexpected turn in the case which that party, acting in good faith and reasonably, is unable to meet because of a natural failure to prepare to meet it having regard to the content of the pleading. That is what surprise means in the context of this rule, which has, in one form or another, existed since 1873.

Procedural fairness under the UCPR is therefore achieved at the pleading stage, not remedied later by particulars, disclosure, or evidence. The obligation is front-loaded. The pleading must expose the real issues.

The Distinction Between Pleadings And Evidence

Rule 149(1)(b) of the UCPR mandates a strict separation between material facts and evidence. A pleading must contain “a statement of all the material facts on which the party relies but not the evidence by which the facts are to be proved.” This distinction is structural, not stylistic.

The High Court in Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658 made clear that pleadings are not the place for evidentiary detail. As extracted above, the Court said:

Pleadings and particulars have a number of functions … they define the issues for decision in the litigation and thereby enable the relevance and admissibility of evidence to be determined at the trial.

That principle has been consistently applied in Queensland.

In Melco Engineering Pty Ltd v. Eriez Magnetics Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 198 at [36], Dutney J held that r 166 operates only in respect of facts and not evidence, and that a failure to respond to evidentiary assertions does not result in a deemed admission, stating:

UCPR rule 149 (1)(b) distinguishes between evidence and material facts. Rule 166 is concerned only with facts and not with the evidence by which it is hoped facts can be established.

Queensland authority repeatedly identifies the common pleading error of reciting chains of evidence followed by an “in the premises” conclusion.

Such pleadings breach r 149 because they obscure the material facts and distort the operation of the rules governing admissions, disclosure, and trial preparation.

In Sanrus Pty Ltd & Ors v Monto Coal 2 Pty Ltd & Ors (No 4) [2019] QSC 199 at [11], Bond J restated the orthodox position: pleadings state and particularise material facts; they do not state the evidence by which those facts are to be proved. Evidence belongs at trial, not in pleadings. Bond J stated:

Sometimes compliance with those two requirements will necessitate pleading evidence. However, that apart, a pleading states and particularises material facts: it does not state the evidence by which the material facts are to be proved: UCPR r 149(1)(b).

Efficiency, Proportionality, and Avoidance of Technicality

The UCPR operates within a modern case management framework that prioritises efficiency, proportionality, and the avoidance of unnecessary technicality. Pleadings are assessed accordingly.

In Forrest v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2012] HCA 39 at [25], the High Court emphasised that pleadings must expose the real issues for determination so that proceedings can be conducted efficiently and fairly. French CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Kiefel JJ, said:

This is no pleader’s quibble. It is a point that reflects fundamental requirements for the fair trial of allegations of contravention of law. It is for the party making those allegations (in this case ASIC) to identify the case which it seeks to make and to do that clearly and distinctly. The statement of claim in these matters did not do that.

This paragraph supports the proposition that the pleadings must expose the real issues for determination, so that proceedings can be conducted efficiently and fairly, and not obscured by confusion, contingency, or forensic overreach.

Queensland courts have adopted this approach without diluting pleading discipline.

In Sanrus Pty Ltd & Ors v Monto Coal 2 Pty Ltd & Ors (No 4) [2019] QSC 199, Bond J explained that the traditional purposes of pleadings must be fulfilled within the contemporary context of avoiding undue delay, expense, and technicality. His Honour said:

The purpose of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) … is to facilitate the just and expeditious resolution of the real issues in civil proceedings at a minimum of expense. The Courts are required to apply the UCPR with the objective of avoiding undue delay, expense and technicality.

That context does not excuse prolixity or looseness. It condemns it.

(Prolixity is the quality of using too many words, resulting in speech or writing that is unnecessarily long, wordy, tedious, or boring, similar to verbosity or long-windedness, often dwelling on excessive detail).

Similarly, in Equititrust Limited v Tucker & Ors (No 2) [2019] QSC 248 at [13] to [17], Bowskill J confirmed that pleadings which obscure issues or expand disputes beyond what is necessary are inconsistent with the objectives of the UCPR. Her Honour said at [13]:

… A pleading may be deficient, and liable to be struck out … because it fails to fulfil the function of a pleading, which is to identify the issues which require the court’s attention and determination, provide a structure for the proceeding … and to ensure a fair trial by giving the other parties fair notice of the case they must meet.

Then, reinforcing the UCPR objective at [15]:

Importantly, though, pleadings are not an end in themselves, instead they are a means to the ultimate attainment of justice between the parties to litigation.

How Queensland Courts Assess Adequacy of Pleadings

Queensland courts assess pleadings by reference to substance, not form.

The central inquiry is whether the pleading alleges all material facts necessary to support the cause of action or defence, without pleading evidence, argument, or irrelevancies.

In Thiess Pty Ltd v. FFE Minerals Australia Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 209 at [34], White J held that where a material fact necessary to sustain a cause of action is omitted, the pleading is liable to be struck out, citing Scott LJ in Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697:

If even one material fact necessary to sustain the particular cause of action sought to be made out is omitted, then that part of the claim is liable to be struck out.

Particulars cannot cure the defect. That principle reflects the long-standing rule articulated in Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697, which Queensland courts consistently apply: particulars cannot fill a gap where a material fact has not been pleaded. Scott LJ stated:

The cardinal provision in r. 4 is that the statement of claim must state the material facts … The function of “particulars” under r. 6 is quite different. They are not to be used in order to fill material gaps in a demurrable statement of claim – gaps which ought to have been filled by appropriate statements of the various material facts which together constitute the plaintiff’s cause of action.

Courts also assess whether a pleading prejudices the fair trial of the proceeding.

In Robinson v Laws & Anor [2001] QCA 122, Williams JA held that prolix and repetitious pleadings may be struck out where their structure and length prejudice the fair trial of the proceeding, stating at [65] and [66]:

I am … especially conscious of the requirement under r 149(1)(a) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules that a pleading be ‘as brief as the nature of the case permits’, and the circumstance that this degree of repetition could have been avoided by simple drafting techniques … Even though … this issue remains alive only in relation to the plea of contextual truth … the degree of repetition in that plea alone calls out for correction, warranting its being struck out in its form as presently cast.

The Court of Appeal rejected the notion that repetition aids comprehension when it obscures the issues.

In Fuller v Toms [2010] QCA 283, the Court confirmed that pleadings burdened with unnecessary narrative, editorial comment, and evidentiary material are substantially deficient and inconsistent with the fundamental procedural requirements of the UCPR. Fraser JA said at [18]:

As that typical example illustrates, the appellant’s pleading was far longer than the nature of the case required, it was repetitious, it was burdened with unnecessary adjectival and adverbial flourishes, and such facts as were alleged were often inextricably bound up with editorial comment, argument, and references to evidence. Those problems were not resolved … Upon analysis it is substantially deficient and it is not practicable to separate alleged facts from argument and evidence.

In Robertson v. Hollings & Ors [2009] QCA 303, the Court of Appeal confirmed that self-represented litigants are required to comply with pleading rules, and that an inability to articulate a coherent cause of action may justify striking out pleadings in their entirety.  Keane JA said at [3]:

It is common that self-represented litigants do not understand the importance or purpose of pleadings. And it is said that in circumstances where a litigant is unable to formulate a sensible cause of action to enliven the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court has no option but to strike out the pleadings in their entirety.

Queensland courts therefore assess pleadings by a single controlling standard: whether the pleading defines the real issues, prevents surprise, excludes evidence, and enables the proceeding to be conducted fairly, efficiently, and proportionately in accordance with the UCPR.

Fundamental Pleading Requirements

The formal requirements governing pleadings under the UCPR are mandatory, functional, and strictly enforced.

Rule 146 and the approved forms operate as mechanisms of procedural discipline, ensuring clarity of issues, fairness in response, and the efficient operation of the adversarial process.

Compliance is not a matter of drafting style or convenience; it is a substantive obligation that underpins admissions, denials, case management, and trial preparation.

Structural defects, such as multiple allegations per paragraph, unnumbered narrative, embedded evidence or argument, or departure from approved forms, undermine the defining function of pleadings and routinely attract judicial intervention.

Queensland courts consistently treat non-compliance as a substantive pleading failure, exposing parties to strike-out, re-pleading orders, adverse costs, and, in severe cases, the dismissal of claims or defences in their entirety.

Formal Requirements Under r 146

Rule 146 of the UCPR prescribes mandatory formal requirements for all pleadings. Compliance is not discretionary. A pleading must:

• state the proceeding number.
• state the description of the pleading.
• be filed and state the date of filing.
• be signed by the solicitor for the party or, if self-represented, the party.
• be consecutively numbered on each page.
• be divided into consecutively numbered paragraphs (and subparagraphs if necessary), each containing, as far as practicable, a separate allegation; and
• if settled by counsel, state the counsel’s name.

Each of these requirements serves a functional purpose.

Numbered paragraphs ensure clarity of joinder of issue. Separate allegations prevent conflation of facts, admissions, and denials. Signatures impose professional accountability.

Failure to comply with these requirements is not a technical defect; it impairs the orderly operation of the pleading rules, particularly those governing admissions, denials, and strike-outs.

Rule 146(2) further requires that pleadings (other than a reply) include a notice informing the opposing party of the time for serving pleadings in response under rule 164.

Omitting the notice constitutes a breach of the rule and exposes the pleading to procedural challenge.

Queensland courts enforce r 146 strictly. The rule is not relaxed by the complexity of the dispute or the drafting preferences of the pleader.

Approved Forms and Compliance Risks

Statements of claim, defences, and counterclaims must be in the approved forms. The approved forms are here:

1. Form 016 – Statement of claim.
2. Form 017 – Defence (version 2).
3. Form 018 – Defence and counterclaim.

The forms operate in conjunction with r 146 and r 961, which prescribe layout requirements such as paper size, margins, and formatting.

Departure from approved forms increases the risk of non-compliance findings, particularly where structural defects affect the intelligibility of the pleading.

Courts distinguish between cosmetic non-compliance and substantive structural breaches.

Structural breaches occur where paragraphs contain multiple allegations, embed argument or evidence, or obscure the identification of material facts.

These defects directly undermine the function of pleadings and attract judicial intervention.

In Queensland Harness Racing Ltd v Racing Queensland Ltd [2012] QSC 034 the Court held that paragraphs containing multiple allegations contravened r 146(1)(f). P Lyons J said at [37]:

In those circumstances, it seems to me the pleading of the agreement is unsatisfactory. Part of the difficulty arises from the fact that paragraphs in the pleading contain multiple allegations (see r 146(1)(f) of the UCPR). Moreover, the pleading suggests that there is an act which amounts to the acceptance of the offer; but then alleges that the resulting agreement includes terms not pleaded as part of the offer, without the identification of any legally appropriate basis for doing so.

The Court rejected the proposition that dense drafting could be excused by complexity. The rule requires discipline in allegation, not compression.

Similarly, in Dupois v HJK [2013] QDC 052 at [25], Robin QC DCJ held that unnumbered words in bold placed between paragraphs failed to comply with r 146(1)(f), stating:

As to the following paragraphs, and indeed some earlier material, such as the words in bold between paragraphs 2 and 3 rate and which, being unnumbered, fail to comply with rule 146(1)(f), a general and important vice of the statement of claim (original or amended) is the misuse (probably attributable to some misunderstanding) of “imputations”. Imputations in the context of a defamation proceeding are meanings/charges that the plaintiff contends are conveyed to a reader or hearer by the actual words uttered. I find it difficult to get out of paragraph 4 what are “the following imputations”. None of the lettered sub-paragraphs is restricted to an imputation. A reader of the pleading could not develop any confident understanding of what are the “imputations” or “implications” referred to.

The Court confirmed that while headings may be used in complex pleadings, they cannot replace numbered allegations or introduce ambiguity into the pleading’s structure.

Approved forms are therefore not templates to be adapted at will. They are enforcement mechanisms for clarity, precision, and procedural fairness.

In Chan v Goldenwater LDL Pty Ltd & Ors [2021] QCA 87, the Court confirmed that fundamental pleading requirements are enforced to protect procedural fairness, prevent unfair surprise, and ensure that litigation proceeds on clearly defined issues. The Court said at [12]:

Whether a pleading does or does not comply with this requirement is a matter for the assessment and judgment of the judge … to consider the possible future effect of the pleading … and to make a critical judgment about whether there is a risk … that the pleading might prejudice a fair trial.

A pleading that fails to meet those requirements is defective because it risks prejudicing a fair trial, not because it offends drafting etiquette.

Consequences of Non-Compliance

Non-compliance with pleading requirements attracts substantive consequences. The court’s powers include:

• striking out pleadings or parts of pleadings; and/or
• ordering re-pleading or amendment; and/or
• making adverse costs orders; and/or
• in serious cases, striking out pleadings in their entirety for failure to disclose a cause of action or defence.

Rule 171 expressly empowers the court to strike out pleadings that are unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous, vexatious, or that prejudice or delay the fair trial of the proceeding.

Structural non-compliance with r 146 frequently engages this rule, particularly where defects obscure the issues or frustrate responsive pleading.

The courts have made clear that effort expended in drafting is irrelevant.

In Fuller v Toms [2010] QCA 283 at [18]–[19], Fraser JA held that pleadings burdened with repetition, unnecessary narrative, and editorial comment were substantially deficient, notwithstanding the drafter’s asserted diligence (as extracted above).

Procedural rules are not aspirational standards; they are enforceable obligations.

Costs consequences follow naturally. Where a party is forced to bring strike-out or particulars applications due to defective pleading, costs orders are routinely made against the non-complying party.

Common Drafting Errors Identified in Queensland

Queensland authority identifies recurring pleading errors that breach r 146 and related rules:

• combining multiple allegations in a single paragraph, contrary to r 146(1)(f).
• inserting unnumbered narrative, commentary, or bolded assertions outside the paragraph structure.
• embedding evidence, submissions, or legal argument within pleaded facts.
• prolixity and repetition that obscure, rather than define, the issues; and
• failure to use approved forms or comply with layout requirements.

In Robinson v Laws & Anor [2001] QCA 122, the Court of Appeal struck out parts of a pleading on the basis that repetition and poor structure prejudiced the fair trial of the proceeding (as extracted above). Williams JA rejected the notion that repetition aids comprehension when it inflates and distorts the pleading.

These authorities establish a consistent judicial message: form and structure are not aesthetic preferences. They are instruments of procedural discipline.

Non-compliance is treated as a substantive failure to plead, not a technical irregularity.

Pleading Material Facts: What Must Be Included & Excluded

Rule 149 of the UCPR imposes a strict and enforceable boundary around the content of pleadings: a party must plead all material facts necessary to establish each legal element of the claim or defence relied upon, and must exclude evidence, argument, irrelevancies, and narrative excess.

Material facts are the indispensable facts which, taken together, constitute the cause of action or defence; omission of even one is fatal and cannot be cured by particulars.

This discipline is structural, not stylistic. It preserves procedural fairness, ensures clarity of issues, and protects the integrity of the admissions regime, disclosure, and trial preparation.

Queensland courts consistently enforce this boundary, striking out pleadings that descend into evidence, argumentative commentary, prolixity, or irrelevance, and treating departures from r 149 as substantive pleading failures rather than technical defects.

The Meaning of “Material Facts” Under r 149

Rule 149(1)(b) requires that a pleading contain “a statement of all the material facts on which the party relies but not the evidence by which the facts are to be proved.”

The rule draws a hard boundary around what must be pleaded. Material facts are those facts which, taken together, constitute the cause of action or defence recognised by law. Omit one, and the pleading fails.

The High Court definition remains controlling. In Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658, the Court stated that pleadings must allege the facts necessary to establish the legal right claimed and must not descend into the evidence by which those facts are to be proved. As above, the Court said:

Pleadings and particulars have a number of functions: they furnish a statement of the case sufficiently clear to allow the other party a fair opportunity to meet it; they define the issues for decision in the litigation and thereby enable the relevance and admissibility of evidence to be determined at the trial.

This definition has been repeatedly applied in Queensland.

Queensland courts consistently adopt the formulation that a cause of action is “the combination of the facts which are material to be established for the plaintiff to succeed.”

That formulation appears in Cooke v Gill (1873) LR 8 CP 107 at 116 per Brett J who defined “cause of action” as:

… every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed.

This has been approved in the Queensland appellate authority, including Allonnor Pty Ltd v Doran [1998] QCA 372 at [3] per McPherson JA and Wolfe v State of Queensland [2008] QCA 113 at [17] per Keane JA.

Rule 149, therefore, requires the pleader to identify, with precision, each fact necessary to satisfy every legal element of the claim or defence relied upon.

Nothing more. Nothing less.

In Chan v Goldenwater LDL Pty Ltd & Ors [2021] QCA 87 (extracted above), the Court of Appeal gives clear guidance on what must be included and excluded when pleading material facts, reinforcing orthodox pleading doctrine under the UCPR and closely aligning with the principles set out in this article.

Distinguishing Facts from Evidence and Argument

The distinction between material facts and evidence is fundamental and strictly enforced.

Material facts answer the question “what must be proved.”

Evidence answers the question “how it will be proved.”

Argument answers neither and has no place in a pleading.

Queensland courts have repeatedly identified as defective pleadings that recite sequences of evidentiary facts or argumentative commentary.

In Williams v Wilcox (1838) 8 Ad & El 314, the Court stated it was stated that it is sufficient to plead the facts necessary to constitute the cause of action, without pleading the subordinate facts or the evidence sustaining them. Lord Denman CJ said at [331]:

It is an elementary rule in pleading, that, when a state of facts is relied on, it is enough to allege it simply, without setting out the subordinate facts which are the means of producing it, or the evidence sustaining the allegation.

That principle has been expressly adopted in Queensland.

In Melco Engineering Pty Ltd v. Eriez Magnetics Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 198 at [36], Dutney J held that rule 166 is concerned only with facts and not with evidence, and that evidentiary assertions do not require a response (as extracted above).

This reflects the structural logic of r 149: evidence pleaded as fact distorts the operation of the admissions regime.

Similarly, in Sanrus Pty Ltd & Ors v Monto Coal 2 Pty Ltd & Ors (No 4) [2019] QSC 199 at [11], Bond J restated that pleadings “state and particularise material facts: they do not state the evidence by which the material facts are to be proved” (extracted above).

Where evidence is pleaded, it obscures the issues and undermines the purpose of pleadings.

Argumentative pleadings fare no better. In Fuller v Toms [2010] QCA 283 at [18]–[19] (as extracted above), Fraser JA criticised pleadings “burdened with unnecessary adjectival and adverbial flourishes” and “editorial comment,” holding that such pleadings were substantially deficient and incompatible with r 149.

Table Distinguishing Facts from Evidence and Argument

The Legal Elements Approach to Pleading

Compliance with rule 149 requires a legal-elements methodology.

The pleader must first identify the legal elements of the cause of action or defence, then plead facts corresponding to each element.

This is not optional. It is the only method that reliably produces a compliant pleading.

Queensland authority consistently enforces this approach.

In Thiess Pty Ltd v. FFE Minerals Australia Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 209 at [34], White J held that if even one material fact necessary to sustain the cause of action is omitted, the claim is liable to be struck out (extracted above).

The court will not infer missing elements, and particulars cannot repair the omission.

The same principle was applied in Mio Art Pty Ltd v Macequest Pty Ltd & Ors [2013] QSC 211 at [65] citing Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697 per Scott LJ. Jackson J says:

The cases have long recognised the negative proposition that if any one material fact is omitted, the pleading of a cause of action is bad.

The rule is absolute: gaps in material facts cannot be filled by particulars or evidence.

The methodology applies equally to defences.

In Hughes & Anor v Westpac Banking Corporation and Ors [2010] QSC 274 at [47], P Lyons J struck out a fraud plea where particulars were provided but the material facts constituting fraud were not pleaded. His Honour said:

The first defendant seeks to strike out paragraph 6A of the FASC on the ground that, although it contains the allegation of fraud, the allegation is a general one, and does not plead the specific facts said to constitute the fraud. In my view, that submission is correct. The plaintiffs’ submissions drew attention to facts identified in the particulars which they have provided, which evidence fraudulent conduct on the part of Drury Management. To the extent that they state comprehensively the fraud alleged by the plaintiffs, they alleviate the difficulty which the requirements relating to pleading fraud are intended to address. However, it seems to me that if the plaintiffs wish to rely on fraudulent conduct of Drury Management, then the material facts on which they rely should be included in their pleading.

The Court held that if fraud is relied upon, the material facts must appear in the pleading itself.

Risks of Prolixity, Irrelevance, and Narrative in Pleading

Rule 149(1)(a) requires pleadings to be “as brief as the nature of the case permits.”

Prolixity is not a drafting style. It is a pleading defect.  Prolixity is the quality of using too many words, resulting in speech or writing that is unnecessarily long, wordy, tedious, or boring, similar to verbosity or long-windedness, often dwelling on excessive detail.

In Robinson v Laws & Anor [2001] QCA 122, the Court of Appeal struck out parts of a pleading on the basis that repetition and excessive narrative prejudiced the fair trial of the proceeding. Williams JA said at [97]:

The matter must be considered in the light of all the circumstances. Here, the repetition of the passages I have referred to would prejudice the fair trial of the proceeding. The pleading is prolix and vexatious. For these reasons the paragraphs which offend on the ground of prolixity should be struck out.

Williams JA held that while repetition may sometimes aid comprehension, in that case it rendered the pleading “prolix and vexatious.”

In Fuller v Toms [2010] QCA 283 at [18]–[19] (as extracted above), the Court of Appeal reaffirmed that pleadings overloaded with narrative, commentary, and evidence breach r 149 and undermine procedural fairness.

The Court rejected any suggestion that effort or sincerity in drafting could excuse non-compliance.

Irrelevance attracts the same consequence. In Colston v McMullen [2011] QSC 60 at [62], McMurdo J struck out paragraphs that pleaded facts unrelated to any relief sought, saying:

I accept the submission that the pleading is deficient for not revealing the facts by which the alleged activity of the defendant in relation to this company was in breach of the undertaking. The result is that paragraphs 171 through 178, 185 and 186 will be struck out.

Irrelevant facts, even if true, have no place in pleadings and offend r 149.

The consistent judicial position is clear. Pleadings must identify the material facts necessary to establish the legal claim or defence, exclude evidence and argument, avoid narrative excess, and define the issues with discipline.

Departure from these requirements constitutes a substantive failure to plead, not a technical irregularity.

Matters Requiring Specific Pleading

Rule 150 of the UCPR imposes a mandatory and exacting pleading discipline that goes beyond the general requirement to plead material facts.

It identifies categories of allegations and relief which must be expressly pleaded on the face of the pleading, regardless of whether they might otherwise be inferred, assumed, or supported by particulars.

The rule exists to prevent surprise, confine the issues, and enforce forensic accountability at the outset of proceedings.

Queensland courts apply r 150 strictly, particularly in cases involving fraud, serious misconduct, damages, interest, and statutory rights, consistently striking out pleadings that rely on implication, abstraction, or legal conclusion unsupported by pleaded facts.

Compliance with r 150 is not technical or optional; it is a substantive requirement that ensures procedural fairness, proper case management, and clarity as to the precise case each party must meet.

Categories Mandated by r 150

Rule 150 of the UCPR operates as a mandatory amplification of r 149.

It identifies categories of matters that must be specifically pleaded, regardless of whether they might otherwise be regarded as implicit or inferable.

The rule exists to prevent surprise, confine issues, and ensure procedural fairness.

The matters required to be specifically pleaded include, relevantly:

• breach of contract or trust.
• every type of damage claimed, including special and exemplary damages.
• defences under the Limitation of Actions Act 1974.
• duress, estoppel, fraud, illegality, misrepresentation, and undue influence.
• malice, motive, intention, knowledge, notice, or other conditions of mind.
• negligence and contributory negligence.
• payment, performance, part performance, release, waiver, and voluntary assumption of risk.
• want of capacity, including disorder or disability of mind; and
• any matter required by an approved form or practice direction to be specifically pleaded.

Queensland courts treat r 150 as compulsory, not illustrative.

Where a party relies on one of the enumerated matters but fails to plead it expressly, the pleading is defective even if the issue might be discerned from context.

This is particularly strict in cases involving fraud or serious misconduct.

In Hughes & Anor v Westpac Banking Corporation and Ors [2010] QSC 274 at [47] (as extracted above), P Lyons J held that a general allegation of fraud, even if supported by detailed particulars, was insufficient where the material facts constituting the fraud were not pleaded.

The Court struck out the plea, confirming that r 150 requires the facts giving rise to fraud to appear on the face of the pleading.

Pleading Damages and the Interaction Between rr 150 and 155

Rule 150(1)(b) requires that “every type of damage claimed” be specifically pleaded.

Rule 155 of the UCPR operates alongside this requirement by governing the manner in which damages are to be pleaded.

The interaction between the two rules is functional. Rule 150 identifies damages as a category that must be pleaded; rule 155 regulates the level of disclosure required.

1. General damages may be pleaded generally.
2. Special damages must be pleaded with specificity.
3. Exemplary damages must be expressly claimed and justified by pleaded facts.

Queensland authority consistently enforces this structure.

Read our article on damages here – Damages in Commercial Litigation in Qld

In Thiess Pty Ltd v. FFE Minerals Australia Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 209 at [34], White J confirmed that damages form part of the material facts of a cause of action and that a failure to plead them adequately exposes the claim to strike-out, citing Scott LJ in Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697:

If even one material fact necessary to sustain the particular cause of action sought to be made out is omitted, then that part of the claim is liable to be struck out.

The Court reiterated that deficiencies in pleading damages cannot be cured by particulars alone.

The same principle applies to interest claims.

Rule 150(1)(h) requires that interest, including the rate and method of calculation, be specifically pleaded.

Failure to do so deprives the opposing party of notice and undermines the proper assessment of relief.

Conditions Precedent, Presumed Facts, and Inconsistent Alternatives

Rule 153 permits a party to plead that all conditions precedent have been satisfied or waived without pleading the facts of satisfaction.

The rule is permissive, not mandatory. Where compliance with a condition precedent is contested or forms part of the real dispute, the underlying facts must still be pleaded to avoid surprise.

Rule 151 governs presumed facts. It allows certain facts to be pleaded as presumed unless specifically denied.

The rule does not relieve a party from pleading material facts; it regulates the burden of response.

A party relying on presumed facts must still plead them clearly so that the opposing party can respond in accordance with r 166.

Rule 154 permits inconsistent allegations or claims to be pleaded in the alternative, but only where the alternatives are not within the pleader’s knowledge.

Queensland courts enforce this limitation strictly. Where a party pleads mutually inconsistent factual cases that are known to be false or unsustainable, the pleading is liable to be struck out.

The purpose of these rules is structural fairness. They allow flexibility without tolerating abuse.

Alternative pleading is permitted to address uncertainty, not to conceal evidentiary weakness or to defer forensic choice indefinitely.

Pleading Conclusions of Law and Statutory Causes of Action

Rule 149(2) allows a party to plead a conclusion of law or raise a point of law, but only if the material facts supporting that conclusion are also pleaded.

Rule 150 reinforces this requirement by mandating that specific legal characterisations, such as breach, fraud, negligence, or misrepresentation, be specifically pleaded.

Queensland courts consistently reject “rolled-up” pleas that assert legal conclusions without factual foundation. In Dominus P/L v Daydream Island Resort Investments P/L & Ors [2003] QSC 44 at [59], Ambrose J struck out a pleading that alleged agency in conclusory terms without pleading the facts said to give rise to actual, apparent, or ostensible authority, stating:

It is quite insufficient in my view in a case of this sort for the plaintiff to plead merely that Williams was the actual or apparent or ostensible agent of Daydream Investments and/or Daydream Island. That bare allegation of fact merely pleads a legal conclusion. It does not plead the facts upon which such a conclusion might properly or arguably be reached. The material fact of agency properly particularised in this case must specify every material act or omission of the principal with reference to its time, place and persons involved in respect of which Dominus will seek to lead evidence upon trial and indeed in respect of which all parties must disclose documents to support or refute the inference that Williams acted as agent for the Bullivant and/or Williams interests.

The Court held that the allegation merely stated a legal conclusion and failed to plead the material facts necessary to support it.

Similarly, in Pipeworks Australia v Betcop Pty Ltd atf The Watts Family Trust & Ors [2015] QSC 284 at [56], Burns J held that an allegation of breach expressed at a high level of abstraction was defective because it failed to identify which contractual obligations were breached and how, stating:

A review of the particulars supplied with respect to paragraph 7 reveals that they fail to identify which obligations contained within the deed executed on 18 March 2014 were allegedly breached by the defendants. Even if such obligations were identified in the particulars, the specific breaches relied on must be expressly pleaded: UCPR r 150(1)(a). Paragraph 7 is otherwise in my view an unsatisfactory pleading of a critical component of the plaintiff’s case. It is thick with legal conclusion but thin in the pleading of the material facts on which the plaintiff relies. Such facts must be pleaded so as to prevent the defendants from being taken by surprise: UCPR r 149(1). Although a party is free to plead a conclusion of law, it must support any such conclusion with material facts: UCPR r 149(2). Paragraph 7 fails to do so. It will be struck out with leave to replead.

The Court emphasised that even where a legal conclusion is pleaded, the specific factual acts or omissions constituting the breach must appear in the pleading itself.

Statutory causes of action are subject to the same discipline.

Rule 149(1)(e) requires identification of the specific statutory provision relied upon.

That identification does not dispense with the obligation to plead facts satisfying each statutory element.

A pleading that merely recites the language of a statute, without factual content, is vulnerable to a strikeout.

The consistent judicial position is that r 150 enforces forensic accountability at the pleading stage.

If a party relies on serious allegations, statutory rights, or particular heads of relief, the material facts justifying that reliance must be pleaded expressly, precisely, and on the face of the pleading.

Particulars: Purpose, Timing, and Strategic Use

Particulars under Part 3 of Chapter 6 of the UCPR serve a confined and strictly regulated function within the pleading framework.

They exist to explain pleaded material facts, prevent surprise, and enable the opposing party to plead, prepare for trial, and comply with disclosure obligations; they do not define, enlarge, or repair the pleaded case.

The relationship between pleadings and particulars is hierarchical and non-negotiable: pleadings state the material facts constituting the cause of action or defence, while particulars merely elucidate those facts where necessary for fairness.

Queensland courts enforce this boundary rigorously, repeatedly holding that particulars cannot cure omissions of material facts, introduce new allegations, or substitute for proper pleading.

Compliance with the rules governing particulars is therefore a matter of substantive pleading discipline, not tactical choice, and misuse routinely attracts interlocutory intervention, strike-out, and costs consequences.

The Function of Particulars Under Part 3

Part 3 of Chapter 6 governs particulars. Its function is narrow, controlled, and non-substitutable.

Particulars exist to explain pleaded material facts, prevent surprise, and enable the opposing party to understand the case sufficiently to plead, prepare for trial, and comply with disclosure obligations. They do not expand the pleaded case.

Rule 157 requires that a pleading include particulars necessary to define the issues and prevent surprise. The obligation is functional, not formalistic.

Particulars are required where the material fact pleaded is otherwise too general to perform its defining role.

Queensland courts consistently emphasise that particulars serve the pleaded case; they do not create it.

In Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697, a principle repeatedly applied in Queensland, it was held that particulars cannot be used to fill gaps in a pleading where a material fact has not been alleged. Scott LJ said:

The cardinal provision in r. 4 is that the statement of claim must state the material facts … The function of “particulars” under r. 6 is quite different. They are not to be used in order to fill material gaps in a demurrable statement of claim – gaps which ought to have been filled by appropriate statements of the various material facts which together constitute the plaintiff’s cause of action.

This position was reaffirmed in Thiess Pty Ltd v. FFE Minerals Australia Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 209 at [34], where White J held that particulars cannot cure deficiencies in pleading material facts.

If the material fact is missing, the pleading is defective and liable to be struck out.

Relationship between pleadings and particulars

The relationship is hierarchical. Pleadings define the case. Particulars explain it. The distinction is enforced strictly.

Rule 149 governs what must appear in the pleading. Rule 157 governs how far explanation is required.

Particulars cannot introduce new causes of action, defences, or factual bases not already pleaded.

They may clarify time, place, manner, identity, and scope, but only in aid of an existing allegation.

Queensland authority consistently rejects attempts to use particulars as a surrogate pleading.

In Hughes & Anor v Westpac Banking Corporation and Ors [2010] QSC 274 at [47] (as extracted above), P Lyons J struck out a fraud plea where the pleading failed to allege the material facts constituting fraud, notwithstanding extensive particulars.

His Honour held that where fraud is relied upon, the facts constituting it must be pleaded, not relegated to particulars.

Similarly, in Sanrus Pty Ltd & Ors v Monto Coal 2 Pty Ltd & Ors (No 4) [2019] QSC 199 at [11], Bond J stated that pleadings “state and particularise material facts,” but do not state evidence (extracted above).

Particulars operate within that boundary; they cannot alter it.

When Particulars are Mandatory Versus Discretionary

Particulars are mandatory where, without them, the pleading would fail to define the issues or would surprise the opposing party.

This commonly arises in allegations involving:

• fraud, misrepresentation, or dishonesty.
• negligence or breach involving multiple acts or omissions.
• damages, particularly special or economic loss; and
• conditions precedent or contractual breaches spanning time.

Rule 158 imposes a specific obligation to provide particulars of damages.

Where special damages are claimed, particulars are mandatory.

General damages may be pleaded generally, but particulars may still be ordered if required for fairness or trial preparation.

Outside mandatory categories, particulars remain discretionary but are controlled by purpose.

Courts assess whether particulars are reasonably required to enable the opposing party to plead and prepare. They do not permit fishing exercises.

In UI International Pty Ltd v. Interworks Architects Pty Ltd & Ors [2010] QSC 280 at [14]–[15], Daubney J recognised that particulars may legitimately go beyond the bare minimum of material facts where necessary to avoid surprise, but only to that extent, stating:

Even accepting that the fundamental object of pleadings is to ‘bring the parties to the issue’ that is left to the judge for determination, under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules … pleadings extend beyond the sole function of identification and narrowing of issues to that of ensuring procedural fairness between the parties … But even apart from that technical basis, it seems to me that it is quite appropriate for the plaintiff, in an action of this magnitude and complexity, to give notice not only of the bare elements of the case it intends to prove, but the basis on which it will seek to prove that case.

Proper Methods of Giving Particulars

Rule 160 governs the manner of giving particulars.

Particulars may be included in the pleading, set out in a separate document, or delivered in response to a request.

Regardless of form, they must be precise, confined to explanation, and consistent with the pleading.

Rule 161 permits an application for an order for particulars where they have not been provided or are inadequate.

The court may order further and better particulars where required to achieve procedural fairness.

Rule 162 empowers the court to strike out particulars that are unnecessary, scandalous, or oppressive.

Particulars that plead evidence, argument, or new allegations are vulnerable to strike-out.

Rule 163 provides sanctions for failure to comply with an order to give particulars, including adverse costs and procedural consequences.

Queensland courts permit interlocutory scrutiny of particulars where a party relies on them to advance a positive case. In Tri-Star Petroleum Co v Australia Pacific LNG Pty Ltd [2017] QSC 136 at [25], Bond J held that where particulars are relied upon substantively, they may be subjected to requests for documents and further particulars. Bond J said:

It is true that there is authority that suggests that where, in compliance with r 166(4) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR), a party pleads an explanation for a denial, the plea of the explanation does not create an issue of fact for determination at the trial and, accordingly, a request for production of documents pleaded as part of such an explanation (or a request for particulars of such an explanation) would be denied. That much may be accepted, but it is commonplace that a party who pleads an explanation so as to comply with r 166(4) also relies on what is pleaded in the explanation to advance a positive case and to comply with the obligation under r 149(1)(c) of the UCPR to plead facts which, if not stated specifically, might take another party by surprise. If facts pleaded in an explanation are also relied on in this way, then it is perfectly legitimate for an opponent to subject them to ordinary interlocutory scrutiny, including by requests for production of documents pleaded and requests for further particulars.

The controlling principle across Part 3 is constant. Particulars exist to explain, not invent; to confine, not expand; and to support the pleaded case, not to repair it.

Non-compliance is treated as a substantive failure of pleading discipline, not a technical oversight.

Pleading Damages, Interest, and Relief

Damages, interest, and relief are not ancillary aspects of a pleading; they are integral components of the cause of action and must be pleaded with the same discipline as liability.

The UCPR require that the nature of the loss claimed, the basis on which it is said to arise, and the relief sought be disclosed with sufficient precision to define the issues and prevent surprise.

Queensland courts consistently enforce the distinction between general and special damages at the pleading stage, require loss and causation to be pleaded as material facts, and insist that interest claims identify their statutory or contractual basis, rate, and method of calculation.

The pleaded facts confine general relief and do not excuse vagueness or forensic deferral.

Non-compliance with these requirements constitutes a substantive failure to plead, exposing the claim to strike-out, re-pleading, and adverse costs.

General Versus Special Damages

Rule 155 governs the pleading of damages and operates in conjunction with r 149 and r 150. Damages are not a peripheral matter.

They are a material component of most causes of action and must be pleaded with precision consistent with their legal character.

The distinction between general and special damages is enforced at the pleading stage.

1. General damages may be pleaded generally.
2. Special damages must be specifically pleaded.

This distinction reflects function, not form.

General damages compensate for loss that is not capable of precise calculation at the pleading stage.

Special damages compensate for identifiable economic loss and must be exposed so the opposing party knows the financial case it must meet.

Queensland courts have repeatedly confirmed that damages form part of the material facts of a cause of action.

In Thiess Pty Ltd v. FFE Minerals Australia Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 209 at [34], White J held that where damages are an essential element of the claim, a failure to plead them adequately renders the pleading vulnerable to strike-out.

The Court confirmed that deficiencies in pleading damages cannot be cured by particulars alone.

Rule 150(1)(b) reinforces this position by requiring that “every type of damage claimed” be specifically pleaded, including special and exemplary damages.

A pleading that asserts liability without identifying the nature of the loss claimed fails to define the issues and offends procedural fairness.

Particularisation of Loss and Causation

Particularisation of damages is governed by r 155 and 158 and informed by the general principles of r 149.

Where special damages are claimed, the pleading must disclose the nature of the loss and the causal connection between the alleged wrongdoing and the loss suffered.

Queensland authority consistently rejects pleading approaches that assert loss as a conclusion divorced from factual causation.

In Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697 at 712 per Scott LJ, a principle applied repeatedly in Queensland, it was held that material facts must be pleaded and cannot be supplied by particulars or inference (as extracted above).

Loss and causation are material facts where damages are claimed.

In Hughes & Anor v Westpac Banking Corporation and Ors [2010] QSC 274 at [47] (as extracted above), P Lyons J struck out parts of a pleading where particulars supported serious allegations but the material facts establishing liability and loss were not pleaded.

The Court held that particulars cannot replace the obligation to plead facts establishing entitlement to damages.

Causation must therefore be pleaded as fact, not assumed.

It is not sufficient to plead wrongdoing and then assert loss as a consequence.

The pleading must identify how the alleged act or omission caused the loss claimed.

Interest Claims and Calculation Methodology

Interest is a distinct head of relief and must be pleaded specifically.

Rule 150(1)(h) requires that interest claimed be pleaded, including the rate of interest and the method of calculation.

Rule 159 supplements this requirement by addressing interest claimed as damages.

A claim for interest that fails to identify the statutory or contractual basis, the rate, or the calculation methodology is defective.

Interest is not incidental relief. It is a quantifiable component of the claim that affects both exposure and settlement posture.

Queensland courts treat failures to plead interest properly as substantive defects.

The requirement to plead rate and method exists to prevent surprise and to permit meaningful response.

A pleading that merely asserts “interest pursuant to statute” without more does not comply with the rules.

Where interest is claimed as damages, the pleading must disclose the factual basis upon which that claim is made.

Rule 159(1) treats interest as part of the compensatory case where it forms part of the loss suffered.

General Relief and the Limits of r 156

Rule 156 permits a party to claim general relief without specifying the precise form of relief sought, but the rule is limited in operation.

It does not relieve a party from pleading the material facts necessary to justify the relief ultimately sought.

Queensland courts have consistently confined r 156 to its proper scope.

In Banque Commerciale SA v Akhil Holdings Ltd [1990] HCA 11, Mason CJ and Gaudron J emphasised that pleadings must still give notice of the case to be answered, even where relief is framed in general terms. They said:

Even where relief is claimed in general terms, the pleadings must nonetheless disclose the case which the opposing party is called upon to meet. General relief does not dispense with the need to plead the material facts which found the entitlement to that relief.

That principle is applied in Queensland pleading practice.

Rule 156 does not permit a party to plead vaguely in the hope that relief can be fashioned later. Nor does it permit relief that is inconsistent with or unsupported by the pleaded facts.

The pleaded facts control the available relief, not the prayer for relief.

The consistent judicial position is that damages, interest, and relief must be pleaded with forensic discipline.

Loss and causation are material facts. Interest requires explicit pleading of basis and calculation.

General relief operates only within the boundaries set by the pleaded case.

Failure to comply with these requirements is treated as a substantive pleading defect, not a technical omission.

Responding to Pleadings: Admissions, Denials, and Non-Admissions

Rules 165 to 168 of the UCPR impose a strict and prescriptive regime governing how parties must respond to pleaded material facts.

The regime is designed to force early, candid engagement with the real issues in dispute and to prevent forensic evasion through ambiguity, blanket denials, or tactical non-admissions.

Each allegation must be met with a clear admission, denial, or justified non-admission, and the consequences of non-compliance are deliberate and substantive.

Queensland courts consistently enforce these rules as instruments of procedural discipline, treating evasive or unreasonable responses as failures of pleading rather than mere defects of form.

The object is not strategic opacity, but precision: to ensure that admissions are made where possible, disputes are properly confined, and proceedings can be conducted fairly, efficiently, and proportionately in accordance with the UCPR.

Obligations Under Rules 165 to 168

Rules 165 to 168 impose mandatory obligations on a responding party to engage directly and intelligibly with each material fact pleaded.

The structure is prescriptive. A party must state, for each allegation, whether it is admitted, denied, or not admitted. Silence is not neutral. The rules allocate consequences.

1. Rule 165 governs answering pleadings. It requires a party to plead to each allegation of fact.
2. Rule 166 then regulates how denials and non-admissions must be framed.
3. Rule 167 addresses unreasonable denials and non-admissions.
4. Rule 168 creates implied non-admissions where an allegation is not specifically dealt with.

The rules operate together to ensure that the real issues are identified early and that parties do not evade forensic responsibility by equivocation.

Queensland courts apply these rules strictly as part of case management discipline.

Prohibition on Evasive Denials

Rule 166 prohibits evasive denials and non-admissions.

A denial must be direct and must be accompanied by an explanation of the facts relied upon to deny the allegation, unless the matter is purely formal.

A non-admission must be justified by a genuine inability to admit or deny after reasonable inquiry.

Queensland authority makes clear that a party is not permitted to deny by ambiguity or to non-admit as a matter of convenience.

In Gilbert v Goodwin (No 3) [2006] 1 Qd R 499, Helman J held that r 166 requires substantive engagement with pleaded facts and that explanations for denials are directed to compliance with the rule, not to creating additional issues for trial, stating:

In the case of a denial, the fact in issue is the fact denied. In the case of a non-admission, the fact in issue is the fact not admitted. The explanations given in the amended defence were included to comply with the rules but did not thereby create issues of fact for determination at the trial of the proceeding.

The prohibition on evasive pleading was reinforced in Cape York Airlines Pty Ltd v. QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd [2008] QSC 302, where Daubney J held that explanations given to comply with r 166 do not themselves become issues of fact unless relied upon affirmatively, stating at [34]:

The explanations given in the amended defence were included to comply with the rules but did not thereby create issues of fact for determination at the trial of the proceeding … I am persuaded by the argument on behalf of the respondents. It appears to me that the acceptance of the proposition advanced for the applicants that the direct explanations create further issues for determination at the trial of the proceeding would result in a proliferation of ancillary issues not directly relevant to the questions in issue between the parties.

The Court of Appeal confirmed this position in Holdway v. Arcuri Lawyers (A Firm) [2008] QCA 218, Keane JA, approving Gilbert v Goodwin (No 3) [2006] 1 Qd R 499 and emphasising that r 166 is directed to candour and precision in pleading, not tactical obscurity, stating at [50] fn6:

While an explanation of a non-admission does not amount to a pleading of a fact, in this case the assertions in paragraphs 5 and 11 of the defence that the pieces of real property had been distributed to the executor, can hardly be said to be part of the explanation for the non-admission of the allegations in paragraph 12 of the statement of claim. In truth, they were a qualification of the defendant’s non-admission.

Unreasonable Denials and Implied Non-Admissions

Rule 167 addresses unreasonable denials and non-admissions. Where a party unreasonably denies or fails to admit a fact, the court may make costs orders or draw adverse inferences.

The rule is intended to discourage defensive pleading that inflates disputes without forensic justification.

Queensland courts treat unreasonable denials as a breach of pleading discipline.

The assessment is objective. If a fact ought reasonably to be admitted having regard to the information available to the party, a denial or non-admission is unreasonable.

Rule 168 provides that an allegation of fact not specifically admitted is taken to be not admitted.

This deeming provision does not excuse non-compliance with r 166. It operates as a default mechanism, not a licence to avoid proper pleading.

Where allegations are met with blanket non-admissions without explanation, the pleading is vulnerable to criticism and cost sanctions.

The courts have emphasised that r 166 concerns only facts, not evidence.

In Melco Engineering Pty Ltd v. Eriez Magnetics Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 198 at [36], Dutney J held that a failure to plead to assertions of evidence does not amount to a deemed admission (as extracted above).

This reinforces the requirement that parties identify and respond to material facts only and do so correctly.

Strategic Considerations in Defensive Pleading

Defensive pleading under rr 165–168 is not a tactical exercise in minimising admissions at all costs.

It is an exercise in defining the true area of dispute. Over-denial and indiscriminate non-admission undermine that objective and expose the pleader to adverse procedural consequences.

Queensland courts have repeatedly warned against defensive pleadings that obscure issues or prejudice the fair trial of proceedings.

In Sanrus Pty Ltd & Ors v Monto Coal 2 Pty Ltd & Ors (No 4) [2019] QSC 199 at [11], Bond J emphasised that a defendant’s task is to plead denials, non-admissions, or admissions to the material facts pleaded, and that pleadings must serve the function of defining issues rather than expanding them. His Honour said:

In a defendant’s case … the defendant must plead denials, non-admissions or admissions in relation to the material facts pleaded by the plaintiff … Each party is also subject to obligations to plead matters which, if not pleaded, might take their opponent by surprise … and there are also other matters which must be specifically pleaded

Where a party pleads an explanation for a denial to comply with r 166(4) and then relies on that explanation to advance a positive case, the explanation becomes subject to ordinary interlocutory scrutiny.

In Tri-Star Petroleum Co v Australia Pacific LNG Pty Ltd [2017] QSC 136 at [25] (as extracted above), Bond J held that such explanations may justify requests for documents and further particulars.

The consistent judicial position is that rr 165–168 enforce forensic accountability.

Parties must admit what should be admitted, deny only what can be denied on a proper factual basis, and non-admit only where genuine uncertainty exists after reasonable inquiry.

Departures from this discipline are treated as substantive pleading failures with real procedural and cost consequences.

Progress of Pleadings and Close of Issues

The rules governing the progress and close of pleadings under the UCPR impose a controlled and finite sequence designed to crystallise the issues in dispute and prevent iterative or unfocused pleading.

Replies, answers to counterclaims, and the timing of each step are regulated to ensure that pleadings perform their defining function without delay or expansion of the case beyond what is necessary.

The close of pleadings marks a substantive procedural milestone, fixing the issues for disclosure, interlocutory steps, and trial, and entitling the parties to conduct the proceeding on the basis that no new issues will emerge without leave.

Within this framework, the doctrine of confession of defence operates as a safeguard against incoherent or undisciplined defensive pleading, ensuring that parties do not plead themselves into liability.

Together, these rules enforce finality, clarity, and forensic accountability at the transition from pleading to proof.

Replies, Answers to Counterclaims, and Timing Under r 164

Rule 164 governs the timing for the service of replies and answers to counterclaims. The rule is procedural but substantive in effect. It controls when issues crystallise and limits iterative pleading that delays the definition of the dispute.

A reply is not mandatory in every case. Its function is confined to responding to new matters raised in a defence.

Where a defence contains only denials and non-admissions, a reply is neither required nor appropriate.

A reply that merely repeats the statement of claim or attempts to repair defects in the original pleading is improper.

An answer to a counterclaim, by contrast, is mandatory.

A counterclaim is treated as a claim in its own right and must be answered within the time prescribed by r 164.

Failure to answer exposes the responding party to default consequences.

Queensland courts have repeatedly emphasised that replies and answers must comply with the same pleading discipline as primary pleadings.

They must plead material facts, avoid evidence and argument, and comply with r 149 – r 150.

Replies are not a second opportunity to reformulate the plaintiff’s case.

In Sanrus Pty Ltd & Ors v Monto Coal 2 Pty Ltd & Ors (No 4) [2019] QSC 199 at [11], Bond J explained that the plaintiff’s task is to plead the material facts establishing the cause of action, and the defendant’s task is to plead denials, non-admissions, or admissions (as extracted above).

A reply is only justified where the defence introduces new factual material requiring response. The case underscores that pleadings progress in a controlled sequence, not as an open-ended exchange.

Close of Pleadings Under r 169

Rule 169 defines when pleadings close. Closure occurs when the last permissible pleading is served, whether that be a reply, an answer to a counterclaim, or the expiry of the time for service where no further pleading is filed.

The closing of pleadings has substantive consequences. It fixes the issues for disclosure, interlocutory applications, and trial.

Once pleadings close, the parties’ forensic positions are locked, subject only to amendment by leave.

Queensland courts treat the close of pleadings as a critical procedural milestone.

It marks the point at which the scope of the dispute is set. Attempts to expand or shift the case after this point attract strict scrutiny.

In Banque Commerciale SA v Akhil Holdings Ltd [1990] HCA 11, Mason CJ and Gaudron J emphasised that pleadings exist to define issues so that proceedings can be conducted fairly and efficiently (as extracted above).

That principle informs the operation of r 169. Once pleadings close, the parties are entitled to conduct the proceeding on the basis that no new issues will be raised without proper procedural justification.

Where pleadings remain open through unnecessary replies or improper amendments, efficiency and fairness are compromised. Rule 169 operates to prevent that outcome.

Confession of Defence and Tactical Implications

Rule 170 deals with the confession of defence. It applies where a defendant pleads facts which, taken at face value, establish the plaintiff’s cause of action.

In such a case, the defendant is taken to have confessed the claim, subject only to any affirmative defence pleaded.

The rule reflects a substantive pleading principle: a party cannot plead itself out of a defence. Where a defence admits all material facts necessary to establish liability, the court may give judgment accordingly.

Queensland courts treat confessions of defence as a serious pleading failure.

They arise most commonly where a defendant pleads extensive narrative facts without appreciating their legal effect, or where denials are abandoned in favour of explanations that amount to admissions.

In Thiess Pty Ltd v. FFE Minerals Australia Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 209 at [34], White J reiterated that pleadings must allege facts sufficient to sustain the defence relied upon.

Where a pleading fails to do so, or pleads facts that affirmatively establish the opposing case, it is vulnerable to adverse consequences.

Although the case concerned a strike-out, the principle applies equally to a confession of defence: pleading facts without legal discipline can be fatal.

The tactical implication is direct. Defensive pleadings must be constructed with constant reference to legal elements.

Explanatory pleading that concedes material facts without a supporting defence is not neutral; it is dispositive.

The rules governing the progress and close of pleadings enforce finality and clarity. Replies are limited. Counterclaims must be answered.

Pleadings close at a defined point. Confession of defence operates as a safeguard against incoherent defensive pleading.

Together, these rules ensure that litigation moves from pleading to proof on clearly defined issues, without drift or procedural abuse.

Strike-Out Applications and Pleading Failure

Rule 171 of the UCPR is the principal enforcement mechanism for pleading discipline.

It empowers the court to intervene where pleadings fail in substance, by obscuring issues, omitting material facts, embedding evidence or argument, or otherwise prejudicing the fair and efficient conduct of proceedings.

Queensland courts apply the rule pragmatically and prospectively, focusing on whether the pleading, as drafted, performs its defining function or instead distorts disclosure, delays resolution, or undermines procedural fairness.

Strike-out is not confined to hopeless cases; it extends to pleadings that are prolix, evasive, structurally defective, or abusive of process.

Critically, deficiencies arising from the absence of material facts cannot be cured by particulars, while defects of explanation may be.

Rule 171 thus operates as a corrective safeguard, ensuring that litigation proceeds on clearly pleaded, legally cognisable issues rather than narrative excess or forensic overreach.

Grounds for Strike-Out Under r 171

Rule 171 confers a broad discretionary power to strike out all or part of a pleading where it is unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous, vexatious, or where it has a tendency to prejudice or delay the fair trial of the proceeding.

The rule is directed to substance, not form. Its function is to enforce pleading discipline and protect the integrity of case management.

Queensland courts apply r 171 where pleadings fail to perform their defining function or where their structure obstructs efficient resolution.

In Robinson v Laws & Anor [2001] QCA 122, the Court of Appeal struck out parts of a defence based on prolixity and repetition, holding that the pleading prejudiced the fair trial of the proceeding (as extracted above). Williams JA observed at [97] that repetition which obscures issues renders a pleading “prolix and vexatious” and attracts strike-out.

The rule is not confined to extreme cases. Pleadings that blur issues, embed evidence, or deploy narrative excess may be struck out even where the underlying claim is arguable.

The inquiry focuses on whether the pleading, as drafted, impedes the proper conduct of the proceeding.

Failure to Disclose a Cause of Action or Defence

A pleading that omits a material fact necessary to establish a cause of action or defence is liable to be struck out. This is a threshold failure.

The court will not speculate as to missing elements or permit them to be supplied by inference later.

In Thiess Pty Ltd v. FFE Minerals Australia Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 209 at [34], White J held that where even one material fact necessary to sustain the cause of action is omitted, that part of the claim is liable to be struck out. The omission is fatal.

The pleading does not disclose a cause of action known to law.

The same principle applies to defences. Where a defence fails to plead facts sufficient to negate an element of the claim or to establish an affirmative defence, it is liable to be struck out.

Pleadings must articulate the legal basis of resistance through pleaded facts, not assertions.

Queensland authority consistently applies the long-standing principle articulated in Bruce v Odhams Press Ltd [1936] 1 KB 697 at 712 per Scott LJ: gaps in material facts cannot be filled by particulars or by matters outside the pleading (as extracted above).

The rule operates with full force under r 171.

Prejudice, Delay, and Abuse of Process

Rule 171 expressly targets pleadings that prejudice or delay the fair trial of the proceeding.

The assessment is practical and forward-looking.

The court considers whether the pleading, as framed, will distort disclosure, multiply interlocutory disputes, or obscure the real issues for trial.

In Sanrus Pty Ltd & Ors v Monto Coal 2 Pty Ltd & Ors (No 4) [2019] QSC 199 at [9]–[15], Bond J emphasised that the traditional purposes of pleadings must be achieved within the modern context of avoiding undue delay, expense, and technicality. His Honour said:

The purpose of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) … is to facilitate the just and expeditious resolution of the real issues in civil proceedings at a minimum of expense. The Courts are required to apply the UCPR with the objective of avoiding undue delay, expense and technicality … The function of pleadings is to state with sufficient clarity the case that must be met, so as to avoid surprise to the other party and to allow the issues to be narrowed.

Pleadings that frustrate those objectives may be struck out even where they attempt to plead “everything.”

Narrative pleadings that combine facts, argument, and evidence are a recurrent source of prejudice.

In Fuller v Toms [2010] QCA 283 at [18]–[19] (as extracted above), the Court of Appeal upheld the refusal of leave to file an amended defence and counterclaim on the basis that the proposed pleading was repetitious, argumentative, and substantially deficient.

Fraser JA held that the fundamental requirements of succinct and comprehensible pleading are not mere technicalities; they are designed to ensure procedural fairness and efficient disposition.

Abuse of process may also arise where pleadings are used to pursue untenable positions, to defer forensic choice, or to expand the dispute beyond what is legally cognisable.

Rule 171 operates as the corrective mechanism.

When Defects can (and cannot) be Cured by Particulars

A critical limitation on pleading repair is that particulars cannot cure the absence of a material fact. This principle is repeatedly enforced in Queensland.

In Thiess Pty Ltd v. FFE Minerals Australia Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 209 at [34], White J confirmed that particulars cannot cure deficiencies in pleading material facts.

Particulars explain pleaded facts; they do not replace them. Where the material fact is missing, the pleading fails and is liable to be struck out.

The principle was applied in Hughes & Anor v Westpac Banking Corporation and Ors [2010] QSC 274 at [47] (as extracted above), where P Lyons J struck out a fraud plea despite extensive particulars.

His Honour held that if fraud is relied upon, the material facts constituting the fraud must be pleaded in the pleading itself.

Particulars cannot be used as a surrogate pleading.

Conversely, where a material fact is properly pleaded but insufficiently explained to prevent surprise, particulars may cure the defect.

The distinction is structural. Explanation is curable; absence is not.

Rule 171, therefore, operates alongside Part 3 to enforce a bright line: plead the material facts first. Use particulars only to explain them.

Where that sequence is reversed, strike-out follows.

Read our detailed article here – Striking out Pleadings and Particulars in Queensland

Special Pleadings and Advanced Scenarios

Certain categories of pleadings under the UCPR attract heightened and non-negotiable pleading discipline because of their substantive legal consequences and potential to expand or distort the scope of the proceeding.

Set-off, tender, defamation claims, counterclaims, third-party pleadings, and admissions all require precise and express pleading of the factual bases relied upon.

Queensland courts enforce these requirements strictly, rejecting abstract assertions, narrative pleading, or attempts to advance serious allegations without exposing their factual foundation.

In these advanced scenarios, pleading failure is not cured by inference, particulars, or forensic explanation; it attracts strike-out, binding admissions, or dispositive consequences.

The governing principle is consistent across these categories: where a pleading carries significant legal effect, the facts justifying that effect must appear clearly and fully on the face of the pleading itself.

Set-Off and Tender

Set-off and tender are specialised defensive pleadings governed by rr 172–173 and must be pleaded expressly.

A defence of tender admits the debt or obligation but asserts that performance was offered and refused. It is not implicit.

The facts constituting the tender, what was offered, when, how, and in what amount, must be pleaded with precision.

Set-off operates differently. Rule 173 recognises both legal and equitable set-off.

A legal set-off must be for a liquidated sum or one capable of precise calculation.

An equitable set-off requires a close connection between the claim and the cross-claim such that it would be unjust to enforce one without taking the other into account.

Queensland authority requires strict pleading discipline. In Pipeworks Australia v Betcop Pty Ltd atf The Watts Family Trust & Ors [2015] QSC 284 at [56] (as extracted above), Burns J held that allegations of breach or set-off pleaded at a high level of abstraction are defective.

The specific obligations relied upon and the factual basis for the set-off must be pleaded.

Bare assertions of entitlement are insufficient and liable to be struck out.

Defamation Pleadings Under r 174

Defamation pleadings are subject to heightened specificity under r 174. This reflects the substantive law of defamation, where meaning is a question of fact and surprise is acute.

A plaintiff must plead the precise defamatory imputations relied upon. Generalised assertions that words were defamatory are insufficient. Each imputation must be identified so the defendant knows the case to meet.

In Magub v Hinchliffe [2004] QSC 4, the Court said that r 149 requires a plaintiff in defamation proceedings to plead the imputations relied upon, because meaning is a matter of fact. Failure to do so takes the defendant by surprise. McMurdo J held at [10]:

Rule 149 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules requires a pleading to contain a statement of all the material facts on which the party relies and to state specifically any matter that if not stated specifically may take another party by surprise. Although generally the meaning of words is a matter of law and need not be pleaded, in defamation the meaning of words is a question of fact … Accordingly, the terms of r 149 require a plaintiff to plead the allegation of fact that the publication by the defendant involved an imputation to a certain effect.

Defamation pleadings that rely on narrative descriptions of publications without isolating imputations are structurally defective and vulnerable to a strike-out.

Counterclaims and Third-Party Pleadings

Counterclaims are governed by rr 175–185 and are treated as claims in their own right.

They must comply with the same pleading standards as a statement of claim.

A counterclaim must plead all material facts necessary to establish the cause of action relied upon.

Rule 176 permits counterclaims after the issue of a claim.

Rules 177–179 regulate counterclaims against plaintiffs and additional parties. Failure to plead a counterclaim with a proper factual foundation exposes it to a strike-out under r 171.

Third-party pleadings under rr 191–208 involve additional complexity.

A third-party notice must plead the factual basis for contribution or indemnity and identify how the third party is said to be liable in respect of the plaintiff’s claim.

Queensland courts enforce strict alignment between the pleaded claim and the third-party case.

In Sanrus Pty Ltd & Ors v Monto Coal 2 Pty Ltd & Ors (No 4) [2019] QSC 199 at [11], Bond J reiterated that pleadings must define the issues between parties so that disclosure and trial proceed efficiently. His Honour said:

For the most part, Courts still require pleadings to be delivered. In a plaintiff’s case the fundamental task of the statement of claim is to state the material facts which, if proved by evidence, will establish the cause of action on which the plaintiff relies.

Third-party pleadings that expand the dispute beyond the pleaded issues offend that principle.

Admissions, Withdrawal, and Notices to Admit

Admissions are governed by rr 186–190. An admission is a substantive forensic act. It narrows issues and may lead to judgment.

Rule 187 permits voluntary admissions. Rule 188 regulates withdrawal of admissions and requires leave. Withdrawal is not automatic. The court considers prejudice, explanation, and the interests of justice.

In Gilbert v Goodwin (No 3) [2006] 1 Qd R 499 (as previously extracted), Helman J emphasised that admissions and explanations for denials operate within a disciplined pleading framework and do not create new issues unless relied upon affirmatively.

Rule 189 governs notices to admit facts or documents. Failure to respond results in deemed admissions. The rule is designed to narrow issues and avoid unnecessary proof.

Queensland courts treat notices to admit as a serious procedural mechanism. In Holdway v. Arcuri Lawyers (A Firm) [2008] QCA 218 at [50] n6 per Keane JA (as extracted above), the Court of Appeal approved the principle that admissions regime rules are directed to efficiency and fairness, not tactical gamesmanship.

Rule 190 permits judgment or orders based on admissions. Once an admission is made or deemed, it controls the litigation unless withdrawn by leave.

Special pleadings therefore demand heightened discipline.

Set-off and tender require precise factual pleading.

Defamation demands exact identification of imputations.

Counterclaims and third-party pleadings must mirror the rigor of primary claims.

Admissions and notices to admit operate with binding effect.

Failure to observe these requirements attracts immediate and substantive procedural consequences.

Key Takeaways – Pleadings and Particulars in Queensland

1. Pleadings are not optional narrative; they are the mechanism for procedural fairness, defining issues and preventing ambush.
2. Plead material facts only: the indispensable facts that satisfy each legal element of the cause of action or defence. Omit one material fact and the pleading is vulnerable.
3. Exclude evidence and argument. Evidence proves pleaded facts; argument persuades. Neither belongs in a pleading.
4. Form and structure matter because they control joinder of issue. r 146 and approved forms enforce disciplined, numbered allegations and accountability.
5. r 150 mandates express pleading of specified matters (including serious allegations, conditions of mind, limitation defences, and types of damage). Do not rely on implication.
6. Damages, interest, and relief are part of the pleaded case. Special damages and interest methodology must be pleaded with specificity; general relief does not excuse vague pleading.
7. Particulars are subordinate to pleadings. They explain pleaded facts to prevent surprise; they cannot add a new case or cure missing material facts.
8. Defensive pleadings must engage directly with each allegation. rr 165–168 require clear admissions, denials, or justified non-admissions; evasive pleading attracts consequences.
9. Pleadings progress in a controlled sequence and close at a defined point. Replies are confined to new matters; counterclaims must be answered; the close of pleadings fixes issues for the conduct of the proceeding.
10. Strike-out under r 171 is the enforcement mechanism for pleading failure. Prolixity, repetition, irrelevance, embedded evidence/argument, and missing material facts commonly justify intervention.
11. In advanced scenarios (set-off, tender, defamation imputations, counterclaims, third-party claims, admissions), specificity increases because legal consequences and unfairness risks increase.

FAQ and Answers – Pleadings and Particulars in Queensland

The following frequently asked questions summarise the core principles governing pleadings and particulars in Queensland under the UCPR.

They address how pleadings are assessed, what must be pleaded, and the procedural consequences of non-compliance, with reference to the strict and consistently enforced approach taken by Queensland courts.

What is the function of pleadings under the UCPR?

The function of pleadings under the UCPR is to define the real issues in dispute and give each party clear advance notice of the case it must meet at trial. Pleadings secure procedural fairness by preventing surprise and “ambush”. If a pleading does not define issues with sufficient clarity, it undermines the integrity of the process and is vulnerable to judicial intervention.

What must a pleading contain under r 149(1)(b)?

A pleading must contain a statement of all material facts on which the party relies, but not the evidence by which those facts are to be proved. Material facts are the indispensable facts necessary to establish each legal element of the claim or defence. The rule enforces a strict boundary: plead what happened and what is relied upon, not how it will be proved.

What are “material facts” in Queensland pleading practice?

Material facts are the facts which, taken together, constitute the cause of action or defence recognised by law. They are the minimum necessary facts that must be proved to succeed. If even one material fact necessary to sustain a cause of action or defence is omitted, the pleading is deficient and liable to be struck out. Particulars cannot cure that omission.

What is the difference between facts, evidence, and argument in pleadings?

Facts are what must be pleaded because they establish the legal elements of the case. Evidence is how those facts will be proved and must not be pleaded. Argument is commentary or reasoning about why the facts satisfy the law and also must not be pleaded. Mixing evidence or argument into pleaded facts obscures the issues, distorts the admissions regime, and increases strike-out risk.

Why does the UCPR require pleadings to exclude evidence?

The UCPR requires evidence to be excluded so pleadings can define issues and confine proof to matters genuinely in dispute. Evidence belongs at trial, not in pleadings. Pleading evidence obscures the material facts, makes it harder to identify what is admitted or denied, and distorts the operation of rules governing admissions, disclosure, interlocutory steps, and trial preparation.

What formal requirements apply to pleadings under r 146?

Rule 146 imposes mandatory formal requirements, including identifying the proceeding and the pleading, filing and dating it, signing it, numbering pages, dividing it into consecutively numbered paragraphs, and ensuring each paragraph contains (as far as practicable) a separate allegation. These are functional requirements. Non-compliance impairs clarity, joinder of issue, and the orderly operation of admissions and strike-out rules.

Why must each paragraph contain, as far as practicable, a separate allegation?

Each paragraph must contain a separate allegation so the opposing party can respond precisely by admission, denial, or non-admission, and so the court can identify what is truly in issue. Multiple allegations in one paragraph cause conflation of facts and issues, frustrate proper joinder, and increase the risk of strike-out or re-pleading orders because the pleading becomes structurally unclear and unfair.

What is the role of approved forms in Queensland pleadings?

Approved forms for statements of claim, defences, and defences with counterclaims operate alongside r 146 and related requirements to enforce clarity and structure. They are not optional templates. Departures increase compliance risks, especially where structure becomes defective through compressed drafting, multiple allegations per paragraph, or unnumbered narrative. Courts distinguish cosmetic departures from structural defects that undermine intelligibility and fairness.

What does r 150 require to be specifically pleaded?

Rule 150 requires specified matters to be pleaded expressly on the face of the pleading, including breach of contract or trust, every type of damage claimed, limitation defences, duress, estoppel, fraud, illegality, misrepresentation, undue influence, states of mind (including knowledge and intention), negligence and contributory negligence, payment and performance matters, want of capacity, and matters required by approved forms or practice directions.

Why does r 150 require specific pleading of fraud and serious misconduct?

Rule 150 requires fraud and serious misconduct to be specifically pleaded to prevent surprise and enforce forensic accountability at the outset. Serious allegations cannot be left to implication or deferred to particulars. The pleading must disclose the material facts constituting the allegation on its face so the opposing party knows the precise case to meet, disclosure can be focused, and the proceeding can be managed efficiently and fairly.

How do rr 150 and 155 interact when pleading damages?

Rules 150 and 155 work together. Rule 150 requires that every type of damage claimed be specifically pleaded, while rule 155 governs the manner of pleading damages. General damages may be pleaded generally, but special damages must be specifically pleaded. The rules enforce early clarity about the financial case being advanced. Deficiencies in pleading damages cannot be cured by particulars alone.

What is the difference between general and special damages at the pleading stage?

General damages can be pleaded generally because they are not capable of precise calculation at the pleading stage. Special damages must be pleaded specifically because they are identifiable economic losses that must be exposed to give the opposing party notice of the financial case it must meet. The distinction is functional, not stylistic. Failure to plead special damages with specificity is a substantive defect.

What must be pleaded when claiming interest?

Interest is a distinct head of relief that must be pleaded specifically. The pleading must identify the basis for interest and disclose the rate and method of calculation. This requirement exists to prevent surprise and allow meaningful response to a quantifiable component of exposure. A bare claim for “interest pursuant to statute” without the rate or methodology does not comply with the pleading discipline described.

What does r 156 permit, and what are its limits?

Rule 156 permits a party to claim general relief without specifying the precise form of relief sought, but it does not excuse vague pleading of the case. The pleading must still disclose the material facts that found entitlement to any relief ultimately sought. General relief operates within the boundaries of the pleaded facts. The prayer for relief does not expand the case, and cannot support relief inconsistent with the pleading.

What is the purpose of particulars under rr 157–163?

Particulars exist to explain pleaded material facts, prevent surprise, and enable the opposing party to plead, prepare for trial, and comply with disclosure obligations. Their function is confined and hierarchical: pleadings define the case; particulars explain it. Particulars may clarify time, place, identity, manner, and scope where necessary, but they do not expand the case, introduce new allegations, or substitute for missing material facts.

Can particulars cure a defective pleading that omits a material fact?

No. If a material fact necessary to sustain the cause of action or defence is missing from the pleading, the pleading is defective and liable to strike-out. Particulars cannot fill gaps where the pleading fails to allege the necessary material facts. The boundary is structural: explanation is curable by particulars, but absence of a material fact is not. Plead the facts first, then particularise.

When are particulars mandatory rather than discretionary?

Particulars are mandatory where, without them, the pleading would fail to define issues or would take the opposing party by surprise. This commonly arises in allegations such as fraud or dishonesty, negligence involving multiple acts or omissions, damages (especially special or economic loss), and breaches spanning time. Outside mandatory categories, particulars remain discretionary but are confined to what is reasonably required for pleading and trial preparation.

What are the obligations when responding to pleadings under rr 165–168?

Rules 165–168 require a party to engage directly with each pleaded allegation of fact by stating whether it is admitted, denied, or not admitted. Rule 166 regulates how denials and non-admissions must be framed, including explanations for denials and justified non-admissions after reasonable inquiry. Rule 167 addresses unreasonable denials and non-admissions, and rule 168 provides implied non-admissions where allegations are not dealt with.

Why are evasive denials and tactical non-admissions prohibited?

Evasive denials and tactical non-admissions are prohibited because the admissions regime exists to define the true area of dispute early and prevent forensic evasion. Denials and non-admissions must be candid and precise, with explanations directed to compliance rather than creating collateral issues for trial. Over-denial and blanket non-admission expand disputes unnecessarily, distort case management, and expose the pleader to adverse procedural and costs consequences.

When will the court strike out a pleading under r 171?

A pleading may be struck out under r 171 where it is unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous, vexatious, or tends to prejudice or delay the fair trial of the proceeding. Strike-out also follows where a pleading omits a material fact and therefore fails to disclose a cause of action or defence. Prolixity, repetition, narrative excess, embedded evidence or argument, and abuse of process are common triggers for intervention.