Workplace Defamation: Groupchats and Private Messages

Why Work Messages Can Give Rise to Workplace Defamation Claims in Queensland

Under the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld), the statutory scheme proceeds on the footing that defamation remains a tort grounded in publication to a third party.

The Act does not distinguish between formal and informal communications, nor does it draw any line between public-facing media and internal workplace messaging.

As s 6 of the Act makes clear, the legislation operates against the background of the general law, which continues to govern the core elements of the tort

That general law position has long rejected the notion that liability turns on the medium used to communicate defamatory matter.

In Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575, the High Court made clear that defamation law is concerned with the fact of communication and comprehension, not the technology by which that communication occurs. As the Court explained at [198]:

The torts of libel and slander are committed when and where comprehension of the defamatory matter occurs. The rules have been universally applied to publications by spoken word, in writing, on television, by radio transmission, over the telephone or over the Internet.

This technology-neutral approach has particular force in the workplace context. A WhatsApp message sent to a group of colleagues is not legally distinguishable from an email circulated internally, a spoken statement made during a staff meeting, or a written memorandum distributed within a department.

Once a message is read and understood by someone other than the person defamed, the requirement of publication is capable of being satisfied.

The High Court’s reasoning in Trkulja v Google LLC (2018) 263 CLR 149 nonetheless reinforces the breadth of the publication concept, even in technologically mediated contexts.

While the case concerned search engine results rather than private messaging platforms, the Court emphasised that the law of publication is settled and adaptable to new factual settings. At [39], the plurality stated:

The law as to publication is tolerably clear. It is the application of it to the particular facts of the case which tends to be difficult, especially in the relatively novel context of internet search engine results.

Properly understood, that observation does not equate search engines with private messaging platforms.

Rather, it underscores that novel digital contexts do not displace orthodox publication principles, and that the decisive question remains how those principles apply to the facts of the communication in issue, including who receives it and in what circumstances.

Crucially, Australian defamation law has never required widespread dissemination. Publication to a small but relevant audience may be enough to cause reputational harm.

In Cerutti & Anor v Crestside Pty Ltd & Anor [2014] QCA 33, the Queensland Court of Appeal dealt with defamatory imputations published to a limited number of recipients in a business context.

In assessing the seriousness of the harm, the Court recognised at [3] that reputational injury can arise even where publication is confined to a small group with a direct professional connection to the plaintiff:

This is a defamation case in which the senior partner of an accounting firm and the firm successfully sued a former client over a letter which a jury found falsely imputed dishonest practices by them in issuing bills.

This principle resonates in workplace WhatsApp groups, where the audience often consists of managers, decision-makers, or colleagues whose opinions carry tangible professional consequences.

A defamatory allegation circulated within such a group may never reach the public domain, yet still inflict serious harm on reputation, employment prospects or professional standing.

Taken together, these authorities illustrate why workplace WhatsApp messages sit squarely within the reach of Queensland defamation law.

The informality of the platform does not dilute the legal consequences of publication, and the confined nature of the audience may, in some circumstances, heighten rather than diminish the significance of what is said.

If you have been defamed or have had defamation claims brought up against you and require legal assistance, contact one of our experienced team of defamation lawyers today.

Publication Does Not Depend on Publicity

Defamation law in Queensland does not draw any distinction between public and private communications when assessing whether publication has occurred.

The central inquiry is whether defamatory matter has been communicated to, and understood by, a person other than the plaintiff.

The statutory scheme under the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) proceeds on that footing, preserving the operation of the general law principles governing publication.

The High Court has repeatedly affirmed that defamation is concerned not with the scale of dissemination but with the fact of communication. In Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575, the Court explained at [124]:

…mere composition and writing of words is not enough to constitute the tort. Those words must be communicated to a third party who comprehends them.

That observation is particularly relevant to private communications. A message sent within a closed group chat, once read and understood by another participant, satisfies the communicative element required for publication, even though the sender may have intended the message to remain confined to that group.

Workplace Defamation and Small Group Communications

A further misconception is that defamation requires communication to a large audience. Australian courts have consistently rejected that proposition.

Publication to a small number of people may be sufficient where those people can form or influence opinions about the plaintiff.

In Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575, the High Court further articulated at [124] that:

Damage to reputation is essential for the existence of the tort of defamation, but that damage may be done whenever the defamatory matter is communicated to others who are capable of understanding it.

That principle applies with force in private group communications, where the audience often consists of colleagues, managers, clients or professional peers.

In such settings, reputational harm may be acute despite the absence of any public dissemination.

How Workplace Defamation Applies to Private Communications

Australian defamation law does not recognise a general defence based on the privacy or confidentiality of a communication. A message does not cease to be a publication simply because it was intended to remain private or was communicated within a closed group.

This distinction between privacy in a social sense and publication in a legal sense is often misunderstood. In Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575, the Court stated at [124]:

Each time there is a communication of the defamatory matter to a third party, the plaintiff has a new cause of action.

That statement underscores why private group chats are legally significant. Each recipient who comprehends the defamatory matter constitutes a separate instance of publication, irrespective of any expectation that the communication would not be shared beyond the group.

Meaning and Implications for Workplace Defamation Claims

Workplace group chats and private messaging threads often feel informal. Legally, however, the assessment of defamatory meaning does not relax simply because the medium is conversational or confined. The orthodox principles governing meaning apply with full force.

The starting point remains the perspective of the ordinary, reasonable reader (or listener), applied to the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used.

In Wagner & Ors v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd & Ors [2018] QSC 201 at [127], the Court emphasised that blameworthiness conveyed by the publication is central to defamatory meaning:

When listened to as a whole, the broadcast conveys that it was the collapse of a man-made wall in a designated watercourse at the plaintiffs’ quarry which caused the deaths of 12 people. This in turn conveys that the Wagners are to blame. Such blameworthiness for the deaths of 12 people would cause people to think less of or shun or avoid each of the plaintiffs. Imputation (a) is defamatory.

Although Wagner was concerned with a radio broadcast, the analytical method is transferable. A workplace group message must be read as a whole, and the question remains whether it conveys blameworthiness or a moral failing that would lower the person’s standing in the estimation of others within that professional community.

The confined nature of a group chat does not alter the interpretive task. The court still asks what the ordinary recipient of that message with the relevant background knowledge would understand it to mean.

In Armstrong v McIntosh (No 4) [2020] WASC 31 at [185], dealing with text messages sent to a friend, Le Miere J observed:

The meaning of the words is not a matter of detailed textual analysis but rather a matter of the impression made on an ordinary reasonable reader.

This is particularly relevant to workplace communications. A short message such as “he’s cooked the books again” or “she lied to management” will not be parsed in a lawyerly fashion.

The court will assess the overall impression created in the minds of co-workers reading the thread.

When Language Becomes Workplace Defamation

Workplace chat environments frequently involve slang, exaggeration or rhetorical flourish. However, informal language does not immunise a publication from conveying a serious imputation.

In Wagner & Ors v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd & Ors [2018] QSC 201 at [281], the Court considered how colloquial language could carry serious imputations:

The suspicion being created by Mr Jones in the mind of the ordinary reasonable listener is that federal government money is not going where it should be.

The case illustrates that tone and context matter. Even where language is couched in suspicion or insinuation, the question is whether the ordinary recipient would understand the words to suggest dishonesty, corruption or other misconduct.

In the private messaging context of Armstrong v McIntosh (No 4) [2020] WASC 31, the defendant sent text messages referring to the plaintiff and others as having “plotted, schemed and lied to engineer my downfall”.

The Court analysed whether such language conveyed a defamatory imputation. At [185], Le Miere J concluded:

that the words ‘when you’re not blinded by Armstrong lies’ in the context of the message as a whole would convey to the ordinary reasonable reader that the Armstrongs, that is the plaintiff and Ms Armstrong, have told lies and they are liars.

This passage is directly instructive for workplace communications. An allegation that a colleague lies or has plotted and schemed is not mere workplace frustration.

It can convey an imputation of dishonesty, a core attribute in any professional setting.

Threshold for Workplace Defamation in Confined Communications

Queensland plaintiffs must satisfy the statutory serious harm threshold under s 10A of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld).

Even apart from that statutory test, the common law has long recognised a substantive threshold of seriousness in determining defamatory meaning.

In Armstrong v McIntosh (No 4) [2020] WASC 31 at [112], the Court adopted the “Thornton threshold” as part of Australian law:

The threshold principle does not require an examination of factors external to the publication. It does not require an examination of whether or not the publication has actually caused any harm to the plaintiff’s reputation. Tuggendhat J articulated a threshold of seriousness which was already inherent in the common law concept of defamatory meaning.

For workplace chats, this has two practical consequences.

First, the court focuses on the seriousness inherent in the meaning conveyed, not merely the size of the audience.

A message circulated to five senior managers alleging fraud may meet the threshold more readily than a vague insult broadcast more widely.

Secondly, defamatory meaning is concerned with the tendency of the words to affect reputation, but a Queensland plaintiff must still satisfy the statutory serious harm element under s 10A by showing that the publication has caused, or is likely to cause, serious harm to reputation.

Whether the serious harm threshold is met is ultimately a question for the court on the particular facts, including the nature of the allegation, the identity of the recipients and the extent of publication.

The Court in Armstrong v McIntosh (No 4) [2020] WASC 31 also reiterated, at [109], the formulation derived from Sim v Stretch:

a statement may be defamatory of the plaintiff because it substantially affects, in an adverse manner, the attitude of other people towards him, or has a tendency so to do.

In a workplace context, the relevant others are often supervisors, subordinates, or peers whose attitudes directly affect career progression, trust, and professional standing.

An imputation that a person has engaged in tax fraud, falsified records, harassed colleagues or manipulated outcomes is plainly capable of altering those attitudes in a substantial way.

Identification in Group Communications

A further issue in group chat defamation is identification. Even where a message uses first names, nicknames or indirect references, the question is whether the ordinary recipient would understand it to refer to the plaintiff.

In Wagner & Ors v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd & Ors [2018] QSC 201 at [50], the Court noted:

In determining the issue of identification it is unnecessary to go beyond the natural and ordinary meaning of the words spoken… I accept that the reasonable and ordinary listener would not understand that anyone other than the Wagners were referred to.

Within a workplace team, contextual knowledge can make identification straightforward.

A reference to “the payroll issue last week” or “the project manager who stuffed up the tender” may be immediately intelligible to those in the chat, even if an outsider would not understand it.

Accordingly, the confined nature of a group message does not reduce the risk.

It may, in fact, sharpen the sting of the imputation because the recipients are precisely those whose opinions matter most to the plaintiff’s professional reputation.

Potential Defences for Workplace Defamation Disputes

Private and workplace communications frequently give rise to arguments that the publisher was just telling the truth, expressing an opinion, or raising a legitimate concern.

Under Queensland law, however, the availability of defences is structured and technical.

The fact that a publication occurs within a workplace or confined group does not dilute the statutory requirements under the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld).

This section addresses the principal defences likely to arise in disputes involving group chats, internal messages and workplace reporting.

Truth (Justification)

Section 25 provides a complete defence if the defendant proves that the defamatory imputations are substantially true.

Two points are critical in the workplace context.

First, the defendant must prove the truth of the imputation actually conveyed, not merely the truth of some underlying grievance.

If a message conveys that a colleague committed tax fraud or falsified records, it is that imputation which must be proved true.

Secondly, persistence in an unmeritorious truth defence may itself have consequences in damages.

In Cerutti & Anor v Crestside Pty Ltd & Anor [2014] QCA 33 at [39], the Court of Appeal observed:

Conduct which is improper, unjustifiable or lacks bona fides may increase injury to feelings by causing the plaintiff greater indignity.

The Court went on to emphasise that damages may be increased where the defendant’s conduct aggravates harm, stating at [40]:

If the defendant’s conduct is improper or unjustifiable, this aggravation may be reflected in a separate award of aggravated damages.

In a workplace setting, advancing and persisting in serious allegations in a group chat and later maintaining a truth defence without a proper evidentiary basis carries real forensic risk.

If you wish to read further on this defence, you can read our in-depth article on the defence of justification (truth).

Contextual Truth 

In multi-message threads, several imputations may arise from a single exchange. Section 26 permits a defendant to argue that, even if one imputation is not proved true, the plaintiff’s reputation was not further harmed because other, substantially true imputations were also conveyed.

The strategic importance of this defence lies in careful identification of imputations. Courts repeatedly stress that imputations must be defined precisely and assessed in context.

In Wagner & Ors v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd & Ors [2018] QSC 201 at [126], the Court carefully isolated which imputations were in fact conveyed:

I therefore determine that the following imputation was conveyed by the Eighth Matter complained of: (a) that each of the first, second, third and fourth plaintiffs caused the deaths of 12 people by constructing a dam at his quarry across Lockyer Creek which collapsed under the weight of water, causing the Grantham flood.

The discipline of defining imputations with precision applies equally to internal communications.

A loosely worded message in a group chat may give rise to multiple pleaded meanings, some of which may be defensible and others not.

If you wish to read further on this defence, you can read our in-depth article on the defence of contextual truth.

Honest Opinion

Workplace publishers frequently assert that their message was “just my opinion”. Section 31 provides a defence where:

1. The matter is an expression of opinion rather than fact;
2. The opinion relates to a matter of public interest; and
3. The opinion is based on proper material.

The distinction between fact and opinion is therefore central.

In Barrow v Bolt & Anor [2015] VSCA 107 at [31], the Court described a publication that was clear that the first respondent was expressing his own opinion, and noted that this was relevant in assessing harm and the defence:

The email made it clear that the first respondent was expressing his personal opinion.

However, characterising a statement as opinion does not control the legal analysis. The court will assess how the ordinary recipient would understand it.

A statement such as “in my view he’s corrupt” may still convey a factual imputation of corrupt conduct if no factual substratum is identified.

Further, in the workplace context, many communications concern private employment matters rather than matters of public interest.

Whether allegations of internal performance or misconduct satisfy the public-interest element may be contentious and fact-specific.

If you wish to read further on this defence, you can read our in-depth article on the defence of honest opinion.

Qualified Privilege

Qualified privilege is likely to be the most frequently invoked defence in workplace disputes. Section 30 of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) provides a defence where:

• The recipient has an interest or apparent interest in having the information;

• The matter is published in the course of giving that information; and

• The conduct of the defendant in publishing the matter is reasonable in the circumstances.

The statute sets out non-exhaustive factors relevant to reasonableness, including:

the seriousness of any defamatory imputation carried by the matter published” and “the extent to which the matter published distinguishes between suspicions, allegations and proven facts

In the workplace setting, this defence may be available where:

• A manager reports suspected misconduct to HR;

• An employee makes a complaint through an internal reporting channel;

• A supervisor communicates performance concerns to those with oversight responsibility.

However, the reasonableness requirement is substantive. Publishing serious allegations in a broad team chat, rather than through a structured reporting process, may undermine the defence.

The seriousness of the imputation is also relevant to whether the communication was proportionate. As the Court observed in Wagner & Ors v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd & Ors [2018] QSC 201 at [127]:

Such blameworthiness … would cause people to think less of or shun or avoid each of the plaintiffs.

The more serious the imputation – for example, allegations of criminal conduct, fraud or harassment – the greater the care required in verification and in limiting publication to those with a legitimate interest.

Finally, qualified privilege is defeated if the plaintiff proves malice. Section 30(4) makes this explicit. A workplace communication motivated by personal animus, rivalry or retaliation may therefore lose the protection otherwise available.

If you wish to read further on this defence, you can read our in-depth article on the defence of qualified privilege.

Limited Publication and Triviality Arguments

Defendants in workplace matters often argue that the communication was limited in scope and unlikely to cause harm.

In Barrow v Bolt & Anor [2015] VSCA 107 at [35], the Court summarised the relevant inquiry under the (now repealed) triviality defence:

The critical test is whether those circumstances were such, at the time of publication, that it was unlikely that the applicant would suffer harm.

Although the statutory triviality defence has been removed, the reasoning remains relevant to the assessment of serious harm and damages. The extent of publication, the identity of recipients and the likelihood of a “grapevine effect” remain material.

In a workplace, however, even publication to a small group may carry significant reputational consequences if that group includes decision-makers or influential colleagues.

Consequences of Failing to Defend a Workplace Defamation Dispute

Where liability is established, the confined nature of a workplace communication does not prevent an award of meaningful damages. Nor does the fact that the publication occurred in a “private” chat insulate a defendant from injunctive relief or aggravated damages.

This section addresses the principal consequences flowing from defamatory workplace communications.

Compensatory Damages and Limited Publication

Damages in defamation serve a vindicatory and compensatory function. The size of the audience is relevant but not determinative.

In Armstrong v McIntosh (No 4) [2020] WASC 31, the publication consisted of text messages sent to a single friend.

Despite that limited audience, the Court found liability and awarded damages, including aggravated damages. At [4], Le Miere J summarised the outcome:

I find:

1. the defendant published the matters complained of, of and concerning the plaintiff;
   …
2. the plaintiff will be awarded damages of $6,500, including aggravated compensatory damages of $1,500; and
3. the court will grant an injunction restraining the defendant from publishing the words complained of or any similar words defamatory of the plaintiff.

The award was modest relative to major media cases, but the decision illustrates an important principle: a small audience does not defeat liability or damages.

The extent of publication is one factor in assessing quantum. As the Victorian Court of Appeal explained in Barrow v Bolt & Anor [2015] VSCA 107 at [35]:

The circumstances include (inter alia) the content of the publication, the extent of the publication, the nature of the recipients and their relationship with the applicant.

In a workplace setting, the “nature of the recipients” may amplify harm. Publication to two senior executives may be more damaging than publication to dozens of distant acquaintances.

Injunctive Relief in Ongoing Messaging Environments

Unlike traditional publications, workplace messaging platforms are continuous. Threads remain accessible. Messages can be forwarded or revisited.

Courts may grant injunctive relief to restrain repetition.

Again at [4], in Armstrong v McIntosh (No 4) [2020] WASC 31, the Court ordered:

the court will grant an injunction restraining the defendant from publishing the words complained of or any similar words defamatory of the plaintiff.

This remedy is particularly relevant in workplace settings where relationships continue. An injunction may restrain further circulation of similar allegations, even where the original publication occurred in a confined group.

Employment and Organisational Consequences

Defamation liability does not operate in isolation from employment law and organisational governance.

Allegations made in internal chats may:

• Trigger formal disciplinary processes;

• Form part of performance or misconduct investigations;

• Expose employers to vicarious liability depending on the circumstances of publication;

• Lead to reputational damage extending beyond the immediate chat group.

As the High Court observed in Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56, publication occurs where comprehension takes place, as stated at [198]:

The torts of libel and slander are committed when and where comprehension of the defamatory matter occurs.

In a workplace, comprehension occurs among colleagues whose opinions may directly influence promotion, trust and professional standing. Even confined publication may therefore have tangible employment consequences.

Key Takeaways Regarding Workplace Defamation

Workplace group chats and private messaging platforms have become routine tools of professional communication, but their informality can obscure the legal risks they carry.

As the authorities demonstrate, the orthodox principles of defamation apply equally to these environments.

Messages sent to a small audience may still constitute publication, convey serious defamatory imputations, and give rise to liability where they tend to damage a person’s reputation among colleagues.

Cases such as Armstrong v McIntosh illustrate that even a limited exchange of text messages can support findings of defamatory meaning, damages, and injunctive relief.

The key legal questions remain unchanged: how the ordinary reasonable recipient would understand the message, whether the imputation is sufficiently serious, and whether any statutory defence is established.

In modern workplaces where communication is increasingly informal and instantaneous, participants should assume that written allegations of dishonesty, misconduct or wrongdoing will be scrutinised by the same legal standards that govern more traditional publications.

Frequently Asked Questions

Can you sue someone for workplace defamation over a group chat?

Yes. Messages sent in workplace group chats, internal messaging platforms, or private texts can constitute “publication” for the purposes of defamation law. If a message about you is shared with at least one other person and it damages your reputation, it may be actionable. The same legal principles that apply to newspapers or broadcasts apply to digital communications, including Slack messages, WhatsApp groups, Teams chats, and internal email threads.

Is a message still defamatory if it was only sent to a small group of coworkers?

Yes. The size of the audience does not determine whether a message is defamatory. Even publication to a small group can be sufficient if the statement harms your reputation among those recipients. In a workplace, the impact may be significant if the message is seen by supervisors, managers, or colleagues who influence professional reputation, promotions, or disciplinary decisions.

What types of statements in workplace chats are most likely to be defamatory?

Statements that accuse someone of dishonesty, criminal behaviour, fraud, harassment, professional incompetence, or unethical conduct are the most likely to be defamatory. For example, claiming that a colleague falsified records, stole company funds, or lied to management may seriously damage their reputation. Courts focus on whether the statement would cause reasonable people to think less of the person in their professional or personal capacity.

Does saying something was “just my opinion” protect me from defamation?

Not necessarily. Simply labelling a statement as an opinion does not automatically protect you. Courts will look at how an ordinary reader or listener would understand the message. If the statement implies undisclosed facts or suggests wrongdoing, it may still be treated as a defamatory factual allegation. For an honest opinion defence to apply, the opinion must be clearly based on proper material and relate to matters of public interest.

Can private messages or texts still count as defamation?

Yes. Defamation can occur through any form of communication, including private text messages or direct messages, as long as the statement is communicated to someone other than the person being discussed. Even if the message is sent to only one recipient, it may still satisfy the publication requirement. The key issue is whether the statement damages the person’s reputation in the recipient’s eyes.

What if the statement in the group chat is true?

Truth is a complete defence to defamation if the person who made the statement can prove that the allegation is substantially true. However, the burden of proof lies with the person who made the statement. If they cannot provide evidence supporting the claim, the defence will fail. Making serious allegations in a workplace chat without reliable evidence can therefore create significant legal risk.

Can employers be liable for defamatory messages between employees?

In some circumstances, yes. Employers may be exposed to liability if employees make defamatory statements in the course of their employment or through official workplace systems. For example, comments made on internal communication platforms used for work purposes could potentially create organisational risk. Employers often address this through workplace policies that govern respectful communication and the proper reporting of concerns.

Can defamation occur even if the person’s name was not used?

Yes. A statement can still be defamatory if the recipients of the message can reasonably identify the person being referred to. In workplace settings, references such as job titles, recent incidents, or identifiable descriptions may be enough for colleagues to recognise who the message is about. Courts focus on whether reasonable recipients would understand the statement to refer to the plaintiff.

What should you do if someone defames you in a workplace chat?

In Queensland, a person generally cannot commence defamation proceedings unless they have first given the proposed defendant a concerns notice that identifies the matter complained of and particularises the imputations relied upon. Strict limitation periods also apply. A defamation action must generally be commenced within one year from the date of publication, although limited extensions may be available in some circumstances.

If you believe a defamatory statement has been made about you, it is usually sensible to preserve evidence such as screenshots of the messages and the context in which they were sent. In many cases, the issue can first be raised through workplace channels, such as HR or management. Legal advice may also be appropriate, particularly if the allegation is serious or continues to circulate.

Can you be forced to remove or stop repeating defamatory messages?

Yes. Courts can order injunctions preventing a person from repeating defamatory statements. In addition to damages, a court may restrain the defendant from publishing the same or similar allegations again. This is particularly relevant in digital communications where messages can be forwarded, reposted, or repeated in ongoing conversations. Continuing to repeat allegations after being challenged may also increase damages.