Rule 151 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) governs presumed facts in Queensland pleadings. A party need not plead a fact that the law presumes in its favour, or a fact it does not bear the burden of proving. The exception is where the fact must be pleaded to comply with rule 149 or meet another party’s denial. The facts needed to engage a presumption must still be pleaded.
A pleading is not improved by adding every conceivable allegation. Nor is it improved by leaving out an essential fact and hoping that a presumption will supply it. The drafting task is to identify precisely what the law supplies, what the other party must prove, and what your own case still needs to say.
How rule 151 governs Presumed Facts in Queensland Pleadings
Rule 151(1)(a) concerns a fact presumed by law in the pleading party’s favour. Rule 151(1)(b) separately concerns a fact for which that party does not carry the burden of proof. These are alternative grounds for omitting a factual allegation, subject to the exceptions in subrule (2).
The distinction matters. A legal presumption has a source in law. A client’s conviction that a transaction was ordinary, that an invoice was correct or that an accusation was false does not itself create one. Equally, a party does not acquire the benefit of rule 151 merely because the opponent holds the relevant documents.
Presumed Facts in Queensland Pleadings therefore require a legal analysis before they require an editorial decision. Identify the applicable cause of action or defence, work out the burden attached to the particular fact, and then decide whether omission is permissible.
Under rule 3(1), the UCPR applies, unless otherwise expressly provided, to civil proceedings in the Supreme Court, District Court and Magistrates Courts. This article addresses that framework; a Queensland tribunal proceeding should not simply be assumed to use the same pleading rules.
Presumed Facts in Queensland Pleadings must be read with rule 149
Rule 151(2)(a) preserves the requirements of rule 149. This is the qualification most likely to matter when settling a statement of claim.
Rule 149(1)(b) requires the material facts relied on, rather than the evidence proving them. Rule 149(1)(c) requires specific disclosure of a matter that might otherwise take another party by surprise. If a statutory claim or defence is relied on, rule 149(1)(e) requires identification of the specific statutory provision.
The practical question is whether the pleading, read as a whole, tells the opponent the case it must meet. A presumption cannot explain an unidentified transaction, repair an omitted representation or establish which alleged publication is sued upon.
The same discipline applies to a conclusion of law. Under rule 149(2), the supporting material facts must accompany a pleaded legal conclusion or point. Writing that a fact is presumed does not remove the need to plead the factual basis which engages the relevant law. Stonegate Legal’s guide to pleadings and particulars in Queensland explains the broader distinction between material facts, evidence and particulars.
Plead the facts that engage the presumption
A presumption usually operates in a defined setting. Before relying on it, identify the facts that bring the case within that setting. Where those facts are material to the claim or defence, plead them.
This is the central drafting safeguard for Presumed Facts in Queensland Pleadings: omit only the fact the law permits you to omit. Do not omit the foundation on which the legal consequence depends. If the opponent disputes that foundation, the party relying on it must address that dispute in the ordinary way.
| Situation | What the pleading should address | Relevant provision |
| The law presumes a fact in the party’s favour | Identify and plead the material facts that engage the presumption; consider whether the presumed fact can be omitted | UCPR r 151(1)(a), subject to r 151(2) |
| The party does not bear the burden of proving a fact | Check the actual allocation of the burden; do not confuse access to evidence with legal responsibility for proof | UCPR r 151(1)(b), subject to r 151(2) |
| Omission would leave the case unclear or cause surprise | Plead the necessary fact despite the ordinary permission to omit it | UCPR rr 149 and 151(2)(a) |
| Another party pleads a denial requiring an answer | Plead the fact necessary to meet the denial | UCPR r 151(2)(b) |
| A necessary condition precedent has occurred | An allegation of occurrence or performance is implied, but a party disputing it must specifically deny it | UCPR r 153 |
The table draws on rule 151, rule 149 and rule 153. It summarises separate mechanisms, rather than treating them as interchangeable.
Defamation and Presumed Facts in Queensland Pleadings
Defamation supplies a useful example. A plaintiff is not ordinarily required to establish falsity as an element of the cause of action. If the defendant relies on justification, section 25 of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) places on the defendant the task of proving that the defamatory imputations complained of are substantially true.
For Presumed Facts in Queensland Pleadings, the benefit is narrow. It does not relieve the plaintiff of pleading the publication, identification and defamatory meaning relied on. Nor does it dispense with the serious harm element under section 10A(1). A presumption concerning falsity is not a presumption that the entire defamation claim succeeds.
A defendant intending to prove substantial truth should plead that defence and the facts supporting it. A bare denial of liability does not perform that work. The defence of justification or truth in defamation warrants separate attention because the defence must address the defamatory imputations, not merely show that some incidental details of a publication were accurate.
Case example The Age Company Ltd v Elliott
In The Age Company Ltd v Elliott [2006] VSCA 168, Elliott sued over a newspaper article said to impute insider trading. The publisher did not plead justification, but sought discovery of documents bearing on whether Elliott had engaged in that conduct.
The Victorian Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal from the refusal of discovery. Buchanan JA explained at [15]–[17] that falsity need not ordinarily be pleaded or proved, and that neither party had put truth or falsity in issue. Ashley JA discussed the entrenched presumption at [20].
The decision illustrates why Presumed Facts in Queensland Pleadings can affect the scope of a dispute. It is Victorian authority on defamation and discovery, not a decision interpreting Queensland rule 151. Its practical lesson is that a defendant cannot assume truth is in issue without a pleading that puts it there.
For Queensland proceedings, rule 211(1)(b) ties ordinary disclosure to documents directly relevant to an allegation in issue in the pleadings, alongside the rule’s other requirements. That makes the definition of the dispute consequential. Stonegate Legal’s guide to disclosure of evidence in Queensland explains the disclosure framework in more detail.
Real world example An accusation in a local business group
Suppose a person posts in a business group that an accountant stole client funds. The accountant sues. This is a hypothetical example, not a reported case.
The accountant’s pleading must identify the publication and the defamatory meaning relied on, together with the other facts necessary for the claim, including serious harm. The accountant does not need to add an allegation disproving every possible factual basis for the accusation simply to anticipate a truth defence.
If the publisher pleads justification, the litigation changes. The publisher must identify the facts supporting substantial truth, and the accountant must consider what response those allegations require. Presumed Facts in Queensland Pleadings do not allow either side to keep its actual case undisclosed once that case must be pleaded.
Future representations and Presumed Facts in Queensland Pleadings
Representations about future matters provide a second, more technical example. The Australian Consumer Law, section 4, appears in schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). The ACL text is applied as Queensland law by section 16(1) of the Fair Trading Act 1989 (Qld), subject to the qualifications in section 16(2).
Under ACL section 4(1), a representation about a future matter is taken to be misleading if the maker lacks reasonable grounds. Section 4(2) supplies a statutory starting position: the maker is taken not to have had reasonable grounds unless evidence to the contrary is adduced.
That is not an automatic reversal of the ultimate burden of proof. Section 4(3)(b) expressly says that subsection (2) does not impose an onus of proving reasonable grounds. Section 4(3)(a) also makes clear that adducing contrary evidence does not itself establish that reasonable grounds existed.
When dealing with Presumed Facts in Queensland Pleadings, it is therefore unsafe to compress section 4 into a statement that the defendant must prove its prediction was reasonable. The evidential mechanism and the ultimate legal burden must be kept distinct.
A statutory presumption is not a complete statutory claim
The better drafting course is usually to allege the absence of reasonable grounds expressly and identify section 4 as a provision relied on. That makes the case clear and avoids an unnecessary dispute about what the pleading is intended to allege.
For a claim relying on ACL section 18(1), the pleading must still identify the conduct in trade or commerce and explain the representation conveyed. If damages are claimed under ACL section 236(1), plead the loss or damage and the causal connection to the contravention. Section 4 does not presume those matters.
This is where Presumed Facts in Queensland Pleadings reward precision rather than minimalism. A short, express allegation may be more useful than defending the omission of a fact that is central to understanding the statutory case.
Real world example A promised completion date
Assume a supplier tells a customer, before an order is placed, that custom machinery will be operational by 1 December. The customer alleges that this assurance induced the order and that delay caused a defined financial loss. This is another hypothetical example.
The customer should plead who made the representation, its substance, when and how it was communicated, and the facts showing that it concerned a future matter. A damages claim also needs the relevant reliance, causation and loss allegations. If the customer relies on the absence of reasonable grounds, stating that allegation and the statutory provisions makes the case intelligible.
Production schedules or component orders may provide evidence to the contrary for section 4(2). Their existence does not, by itself, determine whether the supplier had reasonable grounds. The court must assess the evidence. The drafting point is to expose the disputed prediction and its legal significance without turning the pleading into a catalogue of production records.
Conditions precedent are distinct from Presumed Facts in Queensland Pleadings
Rule 153(1) implies an allegation of the performance or occurrence of a condition precedent necessary for a party’s case. Under rule 153(2), a party denying performance or occurrence must specifically plead that denial.
This operates differently from rule 151. It supplies an implied allegation; it does not establish that the event occurred. If a contract requires a specified notice before a right can be exercised, and that requirement is a condition precedent, rule 153 may imply the necessary allegation. A defendant who says the notice was never given must specifically raise that issue.
Once notice is disputed, the party relying on it needs to address the material facts, including any alternative case about waiver or another answer to the alleged non-compliance. Rule 150(1)(s) requires waiver to be specifically pleaded, and rule 150(2) requires the facts from which that matter is said to be inferred. The guide to matters that must be specifically pleaded in Queensland addresses those express pleading obligations.
Neither rule makes a missing statutory precondition occur or cures a failure to comply with it. Whether a particular precondition is necessary, and the consequence of non-compliance, depends on the applicable substantive law.
Denials and admissions involving Presumed Facts in Queensland Pleadings
Rule 151(2)(b) removes the permission to omit a fact where pleading it is necessary to meet another party’s denial. That requires a review of the opposing pleading, rather than an assumption that the original pleading can remain silent indefinitely.
A need to plead a fact does not necessarily change who bears the burden of proving it. The procedural obligation to define the issue and the substantive allocation of proof remain separate questions.
Presumed Facts in Queensland Pleadings must also be distinguished from deemed admissions. Rule 166(1) ordinarily treats an allegation as admitted when an opposite party required to plead fails to deny or non-admit it. The rule contains exceptions, including the operation of rule 168(1) for allegations in the last pleading before pleadings close, and rule 166(2) concerning legal incapacity.
A non-admission requires the reasonable inquiries and continuing uncertainty specified in rule 166(3). A denial or non-admission also requires a direct explanation under rule 166(4); non-compliance attracts a deemed admission under rule 166(5). These are consequences of how allegations are answered, not legal presumptions under rule 151.
There is a further constraint. Under rule 165(2), a party pleading a non-admission may not give or call evidence concerning that fact unless the evidence relates to another part of its pleading. The guide on how to draft a defence and reply explains why a non-admission should not be used to conceal a positive factual case.
Case example Barker v Linklater
In Barker v Linklater [2007] QCA 363, a dispute about claimed interests in a home included an argument that the defendants’ non-admission was defective and therefore amounted to an admission.
At [48]–[50], Muir JA considered the explanation that the defendants could not attest to the allegations’ truth. Read in context, it meant the matters were outside their knowledge or means of knowledge. The judgment stressed that compliance with the inquiry requirements was a precondition to a non-admission; the pleading did not have to recite those requirements expressly. The appeal was dismissed.
This case concerns rule 166, not rule 151. It is relevant because a deemed admission is a different route to treating a fact as established for the proceeding. Before asserting one, examine the explanation in context and the applicable rule.
| Mechanism | Source | What it does and does not do |
| Permission to omit a presumed fact | UCPR r 151(1)(a) | Reduces express pleading where a legal presumption applies; does not supply missing foundational facts |
| Permission to omit a fact another party must prove | UCPR r 151(1)(b) | Recognises the allocation of proof, subject to the exceptions in subrule (2) |
| Implied allegation of a condition precedent | UCPR r 153 | Supplies an allegation of performance or occurrence; does not prove disputed compliance |
| Admission arising from a defective response | UCPR r 166 | May remove a factual dispute through the pleading response; subject to the rule’s qualifications |
| Statutory treatment of future representations | ACL s 4(2)–(3) | Operates unless contrary evidence is adduced; does not reverse the ultimate onus of proving reasonable grounds |
Sources for these distinctions are UCPR rule 151, rule 153, rule 166 and ACL section 4(2)–(3).
Reviewing Presumed Facts in Queensland Pleadings before filing
Start with a simple question beside each proposed omission: what legal rule permits this fact to be left out? If the answer is only that the allegation seems obvious, reconsider the omission.
Then check the factual foundation, the requirements of rule 149, any matter requiring specific pleading, and the opposing party’s actual denials. Rule 157 separately requires particulars needed to define the trial issues, prevent surprise, enable the opponent to plead and support a specifically pleaded matter. A permissible omission of a fact does not remove those obligations.
Presumed Facts in Queensland Pleadings can produce a shorter and more accurate document when used carefully. They can also produce an incomplete case if the drafter mistakes an evidential advantage for permission to omit the transaction, conduct or loss on which liability depends.
If the review reveals a missing material allegation, address the pleading itself. The procedure and restrictions are explained in amending pleadings in Queensland civil proceedings. A presumption will not necessarily protect an incomplete pleading from an application under rule 171(1)–(2), which permits strike-out on specified grounds and an indemnity costs order for the application.
The useful discipline is to identify the exact fact supplied by law, plead the facts that engage it, and make the remaining dispute clear. That is the point at which reliance on rule 151 becomes sound drafting rather than an avoidable pleading argument.
