Domestic Violence and Defamation
Domestic violence and defamation proceedings require applicants to allege violence, coercive control, intimidation, stalking, or threats.
These allegations are serious and, once repeated outside the court or police process, operate as defamatory imputations of criminal or abusive conduct.
The uniform Defamation Act 2005 adopts a single cause of action and incorporates the common-law elements of publication, identification, and defamatory meaning.
In domestic-violence contexts, these elements are frequently satisfied because allegations made for protective purposes are often repeated in workplaces, family circles, community groups, and digital platforms.
The High Court in Mann v O’Neill (1997) 191 CLR 204 confirms that serious allegations are inherently defamatory, though absolute privilege shields those made to authorities exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions as shown at [12]:
It is well settled that absolute privilege attaches to all statements made in the course of judicial proceedings, whether made by parties, witnesses, legal representatives or judges. It extends to oral statements and to statements in originating process, pleadings or other documents produced in evidence or filed in the proceedings, even though they may be defamatory, and even though the statements are made maliciously.
Once allegations leave that privileged channel, no immunity applies, and liability arises unless a statutory or common-law defence is established.
The result is a structural tension: domestic-violence systems rely on frank disclosure, while defamation law imposes strict consequences for dissemination outside the proceeding.
Overview of DVO Frameworks Across Australia
Domestic-violence protection regimes differ by jurisdiction but share a common structure.
Courts may impose orders preventing violence, intimidation, or harassment where allegations demonstrate a need for protection.
In New South Wales, the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 authorises Apprehended Domestic Violence Orders based on alleged violence, intimidation, or stalking.
In Queensland, the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 permits Domestic Violence Orders where domestic violence has occurred, and further harm is likely.
Victoria’s Family Violence Protection Act 2008 adopts a broad definition of family violence, including emotional, psychological, and economic abuse.
South Australia, Western Australia, Tasmania, the Northern Territory, and the ACT operate parallel regimes requiring specific allegations of violent or abusive behaviour.
These allegations are privileged only within the proceeding.
Once repeated to unprivileged audiences, they can constitute actionable defamation.
Core Principles of Defamation to DVO Allegations
Australian defamation law requires publication, identification, and defamatory meaning.
These elements are routinely met when domestic-violence-order allegations are repeated outside the confined privilege of police or court processes.
Publication is satisfied when the matter is communicated to any third party, including through digital channels such as posts, messages, or forwarded screenshots.
The Supreme Court of Victoria in Rothe v Scott (No 4) [2016] NSWDC 160 emphasised the breadth of this principle, observing from [85-87] that:
I first consider the issues of defamatory meaning (and whether the plaintiff can establish by extrinsic facts that he is the person about whom any defamatory imputations are conveyed) and the extent of publication. The defendant effectively conceded that imputation (b) was conveyed and that both (a) and (d) were conveyed, restricting his submissions to the issue of identification and to a denial that imputation (a) was conveyed. “Whether any imputations are conveyed depends substantially on the issues of identification and extrinsic facts. I shall consider this issue first.
Identification is established when recipients can recognise the plaintiff, whether by name, description, or contextual inference.
The High Court in Trkulja v Google LLC (2018) HCA 25 articulated the principle in clear terms at [4]:
The Court held that it was evident that at least some of the search results complained of had the capacity to convey to an ordinary reasonable person viewing the search results that the appellant was somehow associated with the Melbourne criminal underworld, and, therefore, that the search results had the capacity to convey one or more of the defamatory imputations pleaded.
Absolute privilege under s 27 of the Defamation Act 2005 shields statements made during judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, including complaints made for the purpose of invoking those proceedings.
However, that protection is strictly confined. Republication of the same allegations to neighbours, employers, schools, or online forums falls outside privilege and attracts ordinary defamation liability.
Qualified privilege under s 30 may apply to limited communications made pursuant to a duty or interest, but the defence collapses where malice is established.
Truth under s 25 remains a complete defence but requires proof of substantial truth, which is often contested where domestic violence and defamation allegations are repeated informally.
When DVO Allegations Become Defamatory
Domestic-violence-order allegations are protected by absolute privilege only while they remain inside the formal processes of police, courts, or another body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial authority.
Once those allegations are repeated in any unprivileged setting, they become actionable publications.
The law draws a sharp line between disclosures made to authorities for the purpose of seeking protective relief and disclosures made to private individuals, employers, community groups, or online audiences.
Statements made within complaints to police, applications filed in court, or evidence given during a hearing fall under s 27 of the Defamation Act 2005 and receive complete immunity. Outside this narrow domain, the same allegations lose all statutory protection.
- A disclosure to a neighbour, co-worker, or relative that “I have a DVO because he assaulted me” constitutes publication.
- A screenshot of a DVO application forwarded to a WhatsApp group constitutes publication.
- A social-media post or Google review describing a respondent as violent or abusive constitutes publication.
In each instance, identification and defamatory meaning are typically straightforward.
Courts have repeatedly held that republication constitutes a fresh defamation.
In Rothe v Scott (No 4) [2016] NSWDC 160, the New South Wales Supreme Court accepted that informal digital dissemination of allegations of abusive conduct was a complete publication, observing that Facebook postings were “communications to the community at large” and fully actionable.
Informal sharing, verbal, written, or digital, provides no immunity and triggers ordinary defamation principles.
Case Law Illustrating How Courts Treat DVO-Related Defamation
When domestic-violence allegations intersect with defamation disputes, privilege principles determine whether a communication made in the context of a complaint or proceeding attracts immunity.
Mann v O’Neill (1997) 191 CLR 204 remains the High Court’s leading authority on the limits of absolute privilege and illustrates why republication of DVO-related allegations outside the protected setting becomes actionable.
In Mann v O’Neill, the plurality stressed that the scope of absolute privilege is tightly confined and must not be expanded without demonstrable necessity. The Court stated at [11]:
… the general rule is that the extension of absolute privilege is ‘viewed with the most jealous suspicion, and resisted, unless its necessity is demonstrated’.
This passage makes clear that absolute privilege applies only when strictly required for the functioning of judicial or quasi-judicial processes.
Communications that fall outside those processes, including informal complaints, personal emails, conversations, or digital messages, do not satisfy this necessity threshold.
Accordingly, when allegations originating in a DVO context are repeated to third parties, such as friends, employers, schools, neighbours, or social media audiences, they are no longer shielded by absolute privilege.
Once outside the judicial setting, the communication becomes an ordinary publication subject to the standard rules of defamation, including identification, defamatory meaning, and lack of privilege.
Boundaries of Privilege in the DVO Context
Absolute privilege protects certain communications made during judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings where that protection is necessary to ensure the proper administration of justice.
The High Court in Mann v O’Neill (1997) 191 CLR 204 emphasised that this immunity exists so that participants can carry out their functions without fear of defamation liability. As the Court explained at [12]:
Absolute privilege is given to proceedings in courts of law in order that judges, advocates and witnesses may perform their respective parts free from a deterrent fear of actions for defamation. This privilege can create hardship for some persons in particular cases, but it is on balance an advantage to the community.
This principle is fundamental in the DVO context.
It means that applications, evidence, submissions, and other formal steps taken within the proceeding are protected, not because the allegations are benign, but because the justice system cannot function if complainants fear civil liability for what they must disclose.
That protection, however, is tightly confined. Mann v O’Neill also makes clear that privilege attaches only where the communication is part of a recognised judicial or quasi-judicial process.
Statements made outside such a process, whether to neighbours, employers, family members, support networks, or online audiences, fall outside the recognised scope of privilege and are treated as ordinary publications for the purpose of defamation law.
Qualified privilege under s 30 of the Defamation Act 2005 may still arise where there is a reciprocal duty or interest to communicate the information, but that protection is lost if the plaintiff proves malice.
A communication motivated by personal animosity or intended to cause reputational harm is not shielded, even if the topic relates to safety, domestic violence, or defamation.
Publication Outside the Protected DVO Process
Defamation liability arises when DVO-related allegations are communicated outside the protected court or police process.
Once a statement moves into the community, the law treats it as an ordinary publication.
The Courts consistently assess liability by examining the extent of publication and the audience reached.
Rothe v Scott (No 4) [2016] NSWDC 160 provides a clear example. The Court emphasised that publication beyond a confined audience can rapidly expand reputational harm as seen at [34].
The gravity of the libel, the social standing of the parties and the availability of alternative remedies are all relevant to assessing the quantum of damages necessary to vindicate the plaintiff. An award must be sufficient to convince a person to whom the publication was made or to whom it has spread along the grapevine of “the baselessness of the charge.
The judgment explained that even a limited disclosure can “spread along the grapevine,” requiring vindication through compensation.
This is expressed directly in the Court’s statement that damages must be sufficient to convince any recipient, “or to whom it has spread along the grapevine of ‘the baselessness of the charge’.”
This principle applies squarely to DVO-related allegations.
A single disclosure to a neighbour, employer, school, church group, or online chat becomes actionable. Each iteration counts as a fresh publication. Each new recipient creates a new cause of action.
Privilege no longer applies because the communication is no longer “necessary” for any judicial function.
Qualified Privilege in Domestic Violence
Qualified privilege under s 30 of the Defamation Act 2005 may protect communications made where the speaker has a duty to convey information and the recipient has a corresponding interest in receiving it.
In domestic-violence contexts, this may arise when someone communicates genuine safety concerns to schools, employers, or community organisations.
But the protection is narrow.
It collapses when a plaintiff proves malice, improper motive, or a reckless disregard for the truth.
Rothe v Scott (No 4) [2016] NSWDC 160 shows how courts analyse motive and recklessness when considering privilege and liability.
The Court made clear that where a defendant publishes serious allegations without proper inquiry, and for a purpose unrelated to any legitimate duty, the publication loses any protective character. This is demonstrated in the Court’s findings at [144-145]:
It would be fair to say that the publication of the matter complained of has destroyed the plaintiff’s wellbeing as well as his peace of mind. It is clear, from the plaintiff’s reference in his evidence to persons in Nambucca Heads still wanting to run him out of town, that this damage is ongoing … Only a very substantial award of damages is capable of vindicating as well as consoling the plaintiff in relation to the defendant’s disgraceful conduct in publishing allegations of this seriousness without any prior inquiry or proper evidence, for purposes of inciting a lynch mob mentality in order to justify his own delusional belief that he had some special role to play in law and order issues in Nambucca Heads.
These passages illustrate the kinds of findings that entirely defeat qualified privilege.
They show that a defendant who publishes allegations “without any prior inquiry,” and for the purpose of fuelling hostility or influencing community opinion, is not acting out of duty or legitimate concern. He is acting out of malice or improper motive. In the DVO context, this matters.
If allegations made within a DVO application are later repeated to neighbours, employers, relatives, or online audiences because the speaker wishes to shame, punish, or damage the subject, qualified privilege will fail.
Malice extinguishes the defence. The publication then becomes subject to the ordinary elements of defamation, without any protective shield.
Digital Publication and the Amplifying Effects of Social Media
Social media dramatically increases defamation exposure. Courts treat digital publication as broad, uncontrolled, and persistent. This is especially relevant where DVO allegations are posted or reshared online.
Rothe v Scott (No 4) [2016] NSWDC 160 confirms that a social media publication attracts significant damages. The judgment discusses the relevance of social media cases and identifies them as central to understanding the reach and seriousness of online communication. The Court stated at [136]:
Two judgments where the allegations were made on social media are relevant. In North Coast Children’s Home Inc. trading as Child & Adolescent Specialist Programs & Accommodation (CASPA) v Martin [2014] NSWDC 125, where allegations of paedophile conduct in relation to a children’s home conveyed imputations concerning the personnel who conducted that home, an award of damages totalling $250,000 was made for publications.
This can also be seen in Mickle v Farley [2013] NSWDC 295 at [21]:
When defamatory publications are made on social media it is common knowledge that they spread. They are spread easily by the simple manipulation of mobile phones and computers. Their evil lies in the grapevine effect that stems from the use of this type of communication.
This positions Mickle v Farley as a binding authority for the proposition that reputational harm is magnified by digital dissemination.
The platform, audience scope, and re-share potential all aggravate damages.
DVO allegations published online fall squarely within this reasoning.
Even a single Facebook post or group chat message constitutes publication to the world at large, triggering full defamation liability.
Absolute Witness Immunity in AVO/DVO Proceedings
Australian law provides complete immunity for statements made in the course of judicial proceedings, and this immunity applies with full force to DVO/AVO matters.
The principle is absolute: a person cannot be sued, whether in defamation, negligence, conspiracy, or any other civil cause of action, for anything they say as a witness, even if the evidence is false, malicious, or intentionally harmful. This rule extends beyond the courtroom to preparatory conduct intimately connected with the eventual giving of evidence.
The authority is long-standing. In Cabassi v Vila (1940) 64 CLR 130, the High Court states unequivocally:
No action lies in respect of evidence given by witnesses in the course of judicial proceedings, however false and malicious it may be, any more than it lies against judges, advocates or parties in respect of words used by them in the course of such proceedings or against juries in respect of their verdicts.
The judgment goes further and makes clear that this immunity is rooted in public policy, not the protection of wrongdoers:
This rule… was established not for the benefit of witnesses, but for that of the public and the advancement of the administration of justice, to prevent witnesses from being deterred by the fear of having actions brought against them from coming forward and testifying to the truth.
The principle is then reinforced with a passage approved in Munster v Lamb, also quoted in Cabassi v Vila:
No action will lie for words spoken or written in the course of any judicial proceeding… The mischief would be immense if the person aggrieved, instead of preferring an indictment for perjury, could turn his complaint into a civil action.
This doctrinal position is echoed again in D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005), where the High Court explained the public policy foundation for witness immunity:
Neither party, witness, counsel, jury, or Judge, can be put to answer, civilly or criminally, for words spoken in office.
The combined effect of these authorities is decisive. Nothing said in a DVO proceeding, affidavit, oral evidence, statements in court, statements to a lawyer preparing evidence, can ever ground a defamation claim.
This is critical in DVO/defamation crossovers.
It means that even if a complainant gives knowingly false evidence during an ADVO hearing, the respondent cannot sue them for defamation or malicious falsehood arising from that testimony.
Why Malicious Prosecution Does Not Apply
Malicious prosecution is a narrow tort confined primarily to the misuse of the criminal law.
The High Court in A v State of New South Wales (2007) 230 CLR 500 sets out the essential requirements: a plaintiff must show that proceedings “of the kind to which the tort applies” were initiated, that they terminated in the plaintiff’s favour, and that they were brought without reasonable cause and with malice.
The request document correctly traces this tort back to its criminal roots. The tort developed to prevent the abuse of “the coercive powers of the State,” a rationale reaffirmed by the House of Lords in Gregory v Portsmouth City Council. In that case, the court warned against extending the tort to civil or administrative processes, noting that such expansion risks discouraging reporting and undermining the administration of justice.
Applying this framework, DVO and AVO proceedings do not meet the threshold. They are civil in nature, protective rather than punitive, and involve no prosecutorial discretion or criminal sanction. They do not activate the coercive machinery that the tort was designed to restrain.
The High Court’s reasoning in D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid supports this barrier: collateral attacks on the initiation or conduct of proceedings are incompatible with the finality and stability of the judicial system. Allowing malicious prosecution claims to arise from AVO applications would create endless satellite litigation.
Accordingly, malicious prosecution cannot be used against a complainant who commenced a DVO or AVO, even if the application was misguided or ultimately dismissed.
Remedies lie within the AVO jurisdiction itself—appeal, variation, or (in narrow cases) costs, not in the tort of malicious prosecution.
Limits of Civil Liability for False Statements in DVO Proceedings
The doctrine of absolute witness immunity limits civil liability for statements made during domestic violence and defamation proceedings. The principle is unambiguous: no civil action lies for evidence given in judicial proceedings, regardless of whether it is false, malicious, or intentionally harmful.
In Cabassi v Vila, the High Court states:
No action lies in respect of evidence given by witnesses in the course of judicial proceedings, however false and malicious it may be, any more than it lies against judges, advocates or parties in respect of words used by them in the course of such proceedings…
The Court further explains the public policy foundation:
This rule… was established not for the benefit of witnesses, but for that of the public and the advancement of the administration of justice.
The doctrine extends beyond oral evidence. It applies to affidavits, written statements, and preparatory steps “intimately connected” with the giving of evidence, as confirmed in D’Orta-Ekenaike, where the High Court adopted the longstanding principle that immunity attaches to parties, counsel, and witnesses for all acts in the course of proceedings.
Structural and Legal Limits on Remedies for False or Malicious DVO Allegations
The combination of malicious-prosecution limitations and absolute witness immunity creates significant structural barriers to civil remedies for false domestic violence and defamation allegations.
First, DVO and AVO applications are civil protective orders, not criminal charges. Because the tort of malicious prosecution requires criminal proceedings, no action lies for merely initiating an AVO, even if malice or exaggeration is alleged.
This is consistent with the High Court’s formulation of the tort and with the caution expressed in Gregory v Portsmouth about expanding liability into civil contexts.
Second, absolute privilege and witness immunity foreclose civil liability for all statements made in the course of the proceeding. As the High Court held in Cabassi v Vila, evidence cannot be sued upon “however false and malicious it may be.”
Third, D’Orta v Ekenaike establishes that collateral civil actions attacking the conduct of judicial proceedings are generally impermissible. Allowing such suits would undermine finality and create instability by encouraging dissatisfied litigants to relitigate procedural grievances in fresh proceedings.
Due to these structural features, individuals wrongly accused in AVO proceedings generally have only in-jurisdiction remedies:
- Cross-examination and evidentiary challenge.
- Application for variation or dismissal.
- Appeal to a higher court; and
- Costs for frivolous or vexatious applications (in limited cases).
These constraints are not accidental; they reflect a deliberate policy design that prioritises access to protective orders while restricting retaliatory litigation.
The law aims to ensure that complainants are not deterred from seeking protection, while also allowing respondents to challenge improper applications through established in-court mechanisms rather than collateral civil suits.
Practical Risk Scenarios for Clients in DVO Defamation
Clients frequently encounter risk in everyday situations. Courts treat each disclosure as a separate publication, regardless of intention.
Concrete risks include:
- Texting allegations to a family member.
- Emailing a school or employer.
- Sharing a screenshot of a DVO application.
- Talking about allegations in a neighbourhood dispute.
- Messaging community groups for support; and/or
- Posting updates or accusations online.
Rothe v Scott (No 4) [2016] NSWDC 160 demonstrates the consequences of allowing allegations to circulate through informal networks in domestic violence and defamation proceedings.
The Court noted that once the matter reaches even a small group, the effect can expand far beyond the initial audience.
The requirement for vindication arises precisely because publication spreads “along the grapevine.”
Pedavoli v Fairfax [2014] NSWSC 1674 also shows that serious allegations, particularly sexual or violent in nature attract large awards even where the plaintiff is unnamed.
The Court highlighted an award of $350,000 for allegations of sexual impropriety as shown in Rothe v Scott at [135]:
Where damages have been awarded for allegations of paedophilia or facilitating paedophilia, the size of the award in each case has taken into account the extent of publication as a significant factor. In RJ v JC [2008] NSWDC 217, where the matter complained of was published to one person and known only to the members of the plaintiff’s immediate family, the award of damages was $30,000. By contrast, in Pedavoli v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1674, where an imputation of sexual impropriety with boys by a female teacher was made (in circumstances where she was not named), an award was made of $350,000.
These cases demonstrate that in DVO contexts, even a “small disclosure” can carry extraordinary legal and financial consequences.
Strategic Considerations for Respondents and Applicants
Strategic approaches in domestic violence and defamation law differ depending on whether the client is an applicant or a respondent in domestic violence and defamation proceedings.
Applicants must ensure their allegations remain within protected channels. This includes police, lawyers, courts, and authorised support agencies. Any disclosure beyond these boundaries risks creating an actionable publication.
Respondents must consider whether the republication is sufficiently serious to justify action.
Where allegations have circulated online or through community networks, Mickle, Pedavoli, and Rothe show that courts treat such publication as gravely harmful.
Courts also recognise that a plaintiff, by filing proceedings, may unintentionally expand the audience.
Both sides must be advised with precision. Missteps in communication can dramatically escalate legal risk.
Key Takeaways – Domestic Violence and Defamation in Australia
Domestic violence and defamation law intersect in predictable ways. The court process is protected. Repetition outside that process is not.
Absolute privilege shields statements made to police, lawyers, and the court when applying for or defending a DVO.
But the same allegations become defamatory once communicated to neighbours, employers, relatives, community groups, or online audiences.
Courts assess those republications using the ordinary elements of defamation publication, identification, defamatory meaning, no privilege unless a narrow duty–interest relationship exists, and malice defeats that defence entirely.
The cases provided, Mann v O’Neill, Rothe v Scott, Mickle v Farley, and Pedavoli, demonstrate how quickly reputational harm escalates when allegations circulate beyond the protected setting.
Digital platforms intensify that harm; screenshots, forwarding, and resharing expand liability.
The legal position is clear. Privileged channels must be used carefully. Uncontrolled disclosure creates serious litigation risk in domestic violence and defamation matters.
Understanding the limits of privilege, the reach of publication, and the impact of motive is essential for anyone involved in DVO-related disputes.
Domestic Violence and Defamation in Australia – FAQ & Answers
The questions below address the most common legal issues that arise when domestic violence order allegations intersect with defamation law.
They explain when statements are protected, when liability can arise, and how Australian courts approach these disputes in practice.
Can allegations made in a domestic violence order (DVO) application be defamatory in Australia?
Allegations in a DVO application cannot be defamatory when made within the court process because they are protected by absolute privilege. This protection covers statements made to police, lawyers, and the court when applying for or responding to a DVO. However, if the same allegations are repeated outside the protected context, such as to relatives, employers, neighbours, or online, the privilege no longer applies. Those external communications can trigger ordinary defamation liability if they harm reputation and are not defensible.
Are statements in a DVO protected by absolute privilege under defamation law?
Yes. Statements made in a DVO application, affidavit, court hearing, or through police for the purpose of initiating proceedings are covered by absolute privilege. This protection exists to ensure people can report domestic violence without fearing defamation claims. But privilege applies only to statements necessary for the judicial or quasi-judicial process. If someone repeats the allegations outside that process verbally, digitally, or through documents, the privilege ends, and the claimant may pursue a defamation action.
When do DVO allegations become defamation if they are repeated to others?
DVO allegations become defamation the moment they are communicated outside protected channels. A statement that is privileged inside the court process becomes fully actionable if repeated to third parties. This includes disclosures to friends, family, workplaces, schools, community groups, or social-media platforms. Courts treat each disclosure as a new publication, meaning every repetition creates a separate cause of action. If the allegation is false, harmful, and unprotected by any defence, defamation liability arises.
Can posting DVO allegations on social media lead to domestic violence and defamation?
Yes. Posting DVO allegations on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, or any public or semi-public digital platform creates defamation liability. Australian courts treat social media as wide publication to the community at large, even when the audience is technically limited. Screenshots, re-shares, and comments can rapidly expand the audience. Courts consistently award higher damages for online allegations because digital publication is permanent, searchable, and difficult to contain. Privilege never applies to social-media republication.
Does absolute privilege apply to DVO-related statements made to police?
In domestic violence and defamation action absolute privilege generally applies when reporting domestic violence to police for the purpose of initiating or participating in a DVO process. Communication with police is treated as part of the administration of justice. However, privilege does not apply when someone casually discusses allegations with police outside that context—for example, gossip, character attacks, or unrelated personal disputes. If the purpose is not directly tied to the legitimate exercise of police or judicial functions, absolute privilege does not operate.
What is the difference between absolute privilege and qualified privilege in DVO disputes?
In domestic violence and defamation proceedings, absolute privilege gives complete immunity from defamation for statements made within judicial or quasi-judicial processes, including DVO applications. Qualified privilege is narrower. It protects communications made where there is a duty to give information and the recipient has a corresponding interest in receiving it—such as safety-related disclosures to schools or workplaces. Unlike absolute privilege, qualified privilege is defeated by malice, improper motives, or reckless indifference to truth.
Can I sue my ex-partner for defamation if they lied about domestic violence in a DVO?
You cannot sue for statements made inside the DVO application or courtroom because of absolute privilege. However, you can sue if the ex-partner repeats the allegations outside the protected process. Common examples include telling friends, family, neighbours, employers, sporting clubs, or posting about the allegations online. If those republications identify you, damage your reputation, and are not protected by a defence such as truth or qualified privilege, you may have a viable defamation claim.
How does malice affect qualified privilege to domestic violence and defamation?
In domestic violence and defamation proceedings, malice destroys qualified privilege. If a person repeats DVO allegations to third parties out of spite, revenge, hostility, or to influence family proceedings, courts will rule that the communication was not made out of a genuine duty or interest. Malice also includes reckless indifference to whether the allegation is true. Once malice is proven, the defendant loses the protection of s 30 of the Defamation Act, and liability becomes significantly more likely.
What damages can be awarded for domestic violence and defamation?
Damages concerning domestic violence and defamation allegations depend on the seriousness and reach of the publication. Courts award higher damages when allegations involve criminal conduct, violence, or abuse, because these imputations strike at core character. Social-media publication further increases damages due to its speed, permanence, and broad audience. Plaintiffs may recover general damages, aggravated damages if malice is shown, and sometimes special damages for financial loss. In cases involving serious misconduct allegations, awards can exceed six figures.
