What is a Default Judgment in Defamation?
A default judgment in a defamation proceeding arises when a defendant fails to take the basic procedural steps required to contest the claim – failing to file either a notice of intention to defend or a defence within the time prescribed by the rules.
When this occurs, the plaintiff may apply to the court for judgment to be entered in their favour, and the matter proceeds without opposition.
Our defamation lawyers explain in more detail below.
The Legal Basis Default Judgment in Defamation
In Queensland, the procedure is governed by rule 288 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR), which says:
(1) This rule applies if a defendant is in default and the plaintiff is not entitled to apply for judgment under rule 283 , 284 , 285 or 286 .
(2) The plaintiff may apply to the court for a judgment.
(3) On the application, the court may give the judgment it considers is justified on the pleadings even if the judgment was not claimed.
This rule empowers the court to give judgment in a proceeding where a party has not filed a defence.
Importantly, r 288 does not mean the court simply “rubber stamps” the plaintiff’s case.
The court still has a duty to examine the pleadings, ensure jurisdiction, and confirm that the relief sought is appropriate in the circumstances.
As noted in Bertwistle v Conquest [2015] QDC 133, the court confirmed that once a defendant defaults, all allegations of fact in the plaintiff’s pleading are deemed admitted. Samios DCJ saying at [4]:
A defence was required to be filed no later than 13 February 2015. The defendant has failed to do so and therefore is in default. The position therefore is that each allegation in the amended statement of claim is deemed to have been admitted.
This admission extends to the factual basis of the claim but does not extend to matters of law.
For example, in defamation proceedings, the pleaded imputations (the defamatory meanings) must first be found to be legally capable of arising from the publication.
That assessment is always a question of law for the judge, even in a default scenario.
Similarly, in Gregory v Johnson [2017] QDC 224, the District Court made clear that while default operates as a deemed admission of factual allegations, it remains necessary for the court to be satisfied that the imputations pleaded are capable of being conveyed.
Only once that threshold is crossed are those imputations treated as admitted facts on which damages may be assessed.
Default judgments in defamation have profound consequences in a defamation claim. By failing to defend, the defendant effectively loses the ability to:
- Contest the facts alleged in the statement of claim.
- Challenge whether the publication did in fact bear the pleaded defamatory meanings; and
- Raise any available defences, such as truth, honest opinion, or qualified privilege.
Once judgment is entered, the proceeding moves directly to the assessment of damages and any other relief sought, such as injunctions.
Because defamation law is designed to protect personal reputation, the consequences of default can be serious; judgments are entered based on the plaintiff’s pleaded case, and substantial damages can be awarded even without active participation from the defendant.
How Default Judgments in Defamation Work
When a defendant does not respond to a defamation claim in Queensland, the court has the power to bring the matter to an end by entering what is called a default judgment.
This process is not about punishing the defendant for failing to respond, it is about ensuring the plaintiff’s rights are not frustrated by delay or inaction.
The rules and legislation set out how this works and what the court must consider.
The Role of UCPR r 288
The starting point is rule 288 of the UCPR. This rule allows the court to enter judgment in favour of a plaintiff when a defendant has not filed a defence.
In practical terms, it means the plaintiff’s allegations of fact are taken to be admitted.
However, the court still has to be satisfied that the relief sought is appropriate on the pleadings.
The judge will examine the claim to ensure that the pleaded imputations are legally capable of arising from the publication before treating them as admitted.
This safeguard prevents plaintiffs from obtaining judgment on meanings that could never be sustained in law.
This was made evident in Bertwistle v Conquest [2015] QDC 133, where the District Court entered judgment under r 288 after the defendant failed to file a defence.
The court noted that while allegations of fact were deemed admitted, the legal capability of the pleaded meanings was still a matter for the judge to decide.
Similarly, in Gregory v Johnson [2017] QDC 224, the court reiterated that deemed admissions do not relieve it from the task of ensuring that imputations are legally capable of arising.
Section 34 – Damages Must Be Rationally Connected to Harm
Even when judgment is entered by default, the court must still turn its mind to damages. Under s 34 of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld), any award of damages must bear an “appropriate and rational relationship to the harm sustained”. Section 34 says:
In determining the amount of damages to be awarded in any defamation proceedings, the court is to ensure that there is an appropriate and rational relationship between the harm sustained by the plaintiff and the amount of damages awarded.
This section ensures damages are not arbitrary or excessive but are tied directly to the injury to reputation and the hurt caused.
Courts have repeatedly stressed the tripartite purpose of damages in defamation:
Reparation for harm to reputation, consolation for distress and hurt, and vindication of reputation.
In Gregory v Johnson [2017] QDC 224, the District Court applied s 34 and explained that damages must remain proportionate to the proven harm, even where the defendant has not defended the claim.
The presumption of harm in defamation assists the plaintiff, but evidence of impact can significantly influence the amount awarded.
Section 36 – Malice Generally Disregarded
A common misconception is that malice on the part of the defendant will automatically inflate damages. Under s 36 of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld), the court must disregard malice except to the extent that it affects the harm suffered by the plaintiff. Secton 36 says:
In awarding damages for defamation, the court is to disregard the malice or other state of mind of the defendant at the time of the publication of the defamatory matter to which the proceedings relate or at any other time except to the extent that the malice or other state of mind affects the harm sustained by the plaintiff.
This means that unless the malice caused additional injury, for example, by intensifying the distress or expanding the reputational damage, it will not increase damages.
The practical effect is that plaintiffs cannot rely on malice alone to drive up awards. Instead, the focus remains squarely on the harm caused.
In default judgment situations, where the defendant has not appeared, the court carefully applies s 36 to ensure damages are awarded only for compensable harm, not as punishment.
Section 38 – Apologies and Mitigation
Defamation law recognises that steps taken after publication can lessen the damage.
Section 38 of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) requires courts to take into account an apology or an offer to make amends as a mitigating factor. Section 38 says:
1) Evidence is admissible on behalf of the defendant, in mitigation of damages for the publication of defamatory matter, that—
(a) the defendant has made an apology to the plaintiff about the publication of the defamatory matter; or
(b) the defendant has published a correction of the defamatory matter; or
(c) the plaintiff has already recovered damages for defamation in relation to any other publication of matter having the same meaning or effect as the defamatory matter; or
(d) the plaintiff has brought proceedings for damages for defamation in relation to any other publication of matter having the same meaning or effect as the defamatory matter; or
(e) the plaintiff has received or agreed to receive compensation for defamation in relation to any other publication of matter having the same meaning or effect as the defamatory matter.
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) operates to limit the matters that can be taken into account by a court in mitigation of damages.
Importantly, the Act makes clear that there is no limit on the matters that may be considered in mitigation.
Where a defendant has apologised, issued a correction, or made a genuine offer to make amends, the court can reduce damages accordingly.
This encourages early resolution and recognises that repairing reputational harm is sometimes more effective than monetary awards alone.
In default cases, the absence of any apology or attempt to make amends often weighs against the defendant.
As seen in Bertwistle v Conquest [2015] QDC 133, the court took into account the lack of contrition or remedial steps when assessing damages and costs.
What Gets Admitted When You Default
When a defendant fails to file a defence in a defamation case, the law treats the allegations in the plaintiff’s pleading in a very particular way.
The rules say that all allegations of fact contained in the statement of claim are taken to be admitted. This is known as a deemed admission.
It means that the plaintiff does not have to prove each factual element of their case through witnesses or evidence; the law assumes those facts to be true once the defendant defaults.
The Limits of Deemed Admissions
However, it is essential to understand that not everything is automatically accepted just because a defence has not been filed.
In defamation, the plaintiff usually pleads that a publication carried certain defamatory imputations or meanings.
The law makes a distinction here: the court must first determine whether those pleaded meanings are legally capable of arising from the publication.
This is a question of law, and the judge must decide it, even when the defendant has not turned up to defend the case.
As the courts have explained, deemed admissions apply only to allegations of fact, not to matters of law.
The principle was confirmed in Bertwistle v Conquest [2015] QDC 133, where the District Court said that once no defence is filed, all factual allegations in the statement of claim are taken as admitted.
But before those admissions can extend to the defamatory meanings, the judge must be satisfied that the imputations are legally capable of being conveyed.
Similarly, in Gregory v Johnson [2017] QDC 224, the court reinforced that a default judgment does not bypass the legal filter of capability.
Only once the judge is satisfied that an imputation could reasonably be drawn from the publication will it then be treated as an admitted fact because of the defendant’s default.
The “Capable of Arising” Test
The test applied by the courts is whether a reasonable reader, viewer, or listener could understand the publication as conveying the pleaded imputation.
This is not about what the plaintiff or the defendant personally thought; it is an objective legal test.
Classic authorities such as Jones v Skelton [1963] 1 WLR 1362 and Favell v Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 52 have long confirmed that capability is a matter for the court, while the question of whether the publication actually carried the meaning is usually a question of fact.
In default cases, the second step is treated as admitted once the first step, capability, is satisfied.
Why this Matters For Plaintiffs
For plaintiffs, this means that careful pleading is critical.
Overstating or drafting imputations that are not legally capable of arising can undermine a case, even if the defendant does not defend.
For defendants, it means that ignoring a claim is dangerous. Once the court decides the meanings are legally capable, they are treated as admitted facts, leaving no room to argue otherwise later.
In short, default does not give plaintiffs a free pass. The court still performs its gatekeeping role to ensure that only legally sustainable meanings proceed to damages.
But once that threshold is crossed, the effect of default is powerful: the facts, the defamatory imputations, and the absence of defences are all fixed against the defendant.
Judicial Discretion
In defamation proceedings, the court retains the discretion to refuse judgment or limit relief even when a defendant is in default, particularly where the pleadings or evidence are deficient.
This discretion ensures that the court does not merely “rubber-stamp” the plaintiff’s case but instead examines the pleadings to confirm that the relief sought is appropriate and justified.
The court must be satisfied that the pleaded imputations are legally capable of arising from the publication before treating them as admitted facts.
This safeguard prevents plaintiffs from obtaining judgment on meanings that could never be sustained in law.
Once a default judgment is entered, the defendant may apply to set aside the judgment.
However, this is only possible if the application is made promptly and demonstrates a genuine defence.
Courts exercise caution in granting such applications, particularly in defamation matters where reputations are at stake.
Legal Capacity
A concrete example of a failed imputation that is not legally capable of arising can be seen in cases where the alleged defamatory meanings are overstated or vague.
For instance, if a plaintiff pleads that a publication implies criminal conduct without a reasonable basis, the court may find that such imputations are not legally capable of arising.
The law requires that imputations must be legally capable of arising before they are treated as admitted on default.
This is always a question of law for the judge, and unsustainable meanings risk being struck out or ignored by the court.
How Damages Are Assessed on Default
When a defamation claim proceeds to default judgment, the court does not simply award damages at large.
It must carefully assess the harm caused by the publication and determine an amount that is fair, proportionate, and grounded in the principles of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld).
The assessment is guided by established purposes of damages, statutory requirements, and the evidence available, even in the absence of a defence.
The Purposes of Damages
Damages in defamation are not designed to punish the defendant. Instead, they serve three key purposes identified by the High Court in Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd [1966] HCA 40:
- Reparation for harm done to reputation.
- Consolation for the personal distress and hurt feelings caused by the defamation.
- Vindication of the plaintiff’s reputation, to demonstrate publicly that the defamatory allegations were without foundation.
These principles continue to be applied by Queensland courts in default matters. For example, in Gregory v Johnson [2017] QDC 224, the District Court emphasised that even in default, damages must reflect these purposes, not act as a penalty.
Section 34 – Proportionality to Harm
Section 34 of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) provides that damages for defamation must bear an “appropriate and rational relationship to the harm sustained”.
This statutory test ensures that damages are proportionate to the actual or likely impact of the defamatory publication.
Courts consider the seriousness of the imputations, the reach of the publication, and the personal circumstances of the plaintiff in applying this principle.
In Bertwistle v Conquest [2015] QDC 133, the court reaffirmed that s 34 requires damages to be assessed by reference to the particular harm suffered, taking into account the purposes of reparation, consolation, and vindication.
Presumption of Harm and the Grapevine Effect
Once defamation is established, the law presumes harm to reputation.
Plaintiffs are not required to prove actual financial loss or quantifiable reputational damage.
However, the more persuasive the evidence of impact, such as hurt feelings, community gossip, or damage to personal and professional relationships, the higher the likely award.
Courts also take into account the “grapevine effect”: the likelihood that defamatory material will spread beyond its immediate audience.
In Gregory v Johnson [2017] QDC 224, the court considered the way in which defamatory allegations, once published, can be circulated among family, friends, colleagues, or the wider community, compounding the harm.
The grapevine effect is particularly powerful in the age of social media, where even a small original audience may lead to broad reputational damage.
The Seriousness of Imputations
The gravity of the defamatory imputation is central to the damages awarded.
Allegations of sexual misconduct, paedophilia, or serious criminal conduct are treated as among the most damaging, striking at the core of a person’s character and integrity.
Courts have consistently recognised that such allegations warrant substantial damages to repair and vindicate reputation.
Aggravated Damages
Damages may be increased if the defendant’s conduct has aggravated the harm caused. Aggravating factors can include:
- Failure to apologise or retract the defamatory material.
- Evasion of service or uncooperative conduct in the proceedings.
- Malicious behaviour or refusal to engage with the process.
- Conduct during litigation that worsens the plaintiff’s distress.
In Bertwistle v Conquest [2015] QDC 133, the absence of contrition and refusal to engage were treated as factors aggravating the plaintiff’s harm, supporting a higher award of damages and indemnity costs.
It is important to note that s 36 of the Defamation Act 2005 requires courts to disregard malice except to the extent that it increases the harm suffered.
Malice on its own does not justify higher damages unless it worsens the plaintiff’s actual injury.
Mitigation of Damages
By contrast, damages may be reduced if the defendant takes steps to repair the harm.
Under s 38 of the Defamation Act 2005, a court must take into account any apology or offer to make amends when assessing damages.
The statute also makes clear that there is no limit to the factors that may be considered in mitigation.
A prompt and genuine apology, a correction, or a sincere offer to make amends can significantly reduce damages.
Conversely, where no such steps are taken, as in many default cases, the absence of mitigation often weighs heavily against the defendant.
In summary, damages in default defamation cases are assessed with care.
The court balances the statutory requirement of proportionality with the common law purposes of reparation, consolation, and vindication.
The seriousness of the imputation, the grapevine effect, and the presence or absence of aggravating or mitigating factors all play a decisive role in determining the outcome.
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
Aggravating Factors
- Failure to apologise or retract the defamatory material.
- Evasion of service or uncooperative conduct in the proceedings.
- Malicious behaviour or refusal to engage with the process.
- Conduct during litigation that worsens the plaintiff’s distress.
Mitigating Factors
- Apology or offer to make amends.
- Correction of the defamatory matter.
- Evidence of compensation or settlement in related matters.
Aggravated (compensatory) damages may be awarded if the defendant’s conduct has aggravated the harm caused.
However, punitive damages are barred, as defamation damages are remedial, not punitive.
Evidence for Quantum
To effectively support a claim for damages in defamation proceedings, it is crucial to provide comprehensive evidence.
The following checklist outlines recommended types of evidence:
- Affidavits detailing the impact of the defamatory publication.
- Witness statements corroborating the harm suffered.
- Social media posts demonstrating the spread and impact of the defamatory material.
Failure to provide adequate evidence can result in a lower award of damages, as the court requires credible evidence to determine the extent of the harm.
The presumption of harm in defamation assists the plaintiff, but the more persuasive the evidence of impact, the higher the likely award.
Procedural Fairness Even If Defendant Defaults
Even when a defendant fails to appear or file a defence, the court does not automatically rubber-stamp the plaintiff’s claim.
Defamation law in Queensland requires judges to apply the principles of procedural fairness, ensuring that any judgment entered is grounded in proper pleadings, appropriate relief, and credible evidence.
Default judgment is never a shortcut to punitive or excessive outcomes.
Ensuring Pleadings Are Proper
Before entering judgment, the court must be satisfied that the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim is clean, that is, that the pleaded imputations are legally capable of arising from the publication and that the elements of defamation have been sufficiently set out.
This safeguard exists to prevent plaintiffs from obtaining judgment on unsustainable or impermissible claims, even where the defendant has chosen not to defend.
In Gregory v Johnson [2017] QDC 224, the District Court emphasised that while factual allegations are deemed admitted in default, it remains the role of the court to determine whether the pleaded meanings are legally capable of arising.
Only once that threshold question of law is satisfied will those meanings be treated as admitted facts for the purpose of assessing damages.
Staying Within the Remedial Scope
Defamation law is concerned with remedying harm, not punishing defendants.
This principle underpins the statutory scheme in Queensland. In particular, s 34 of the Defamation Act 2005 requires damages to bear an “appropriate and rational relationship to the harm sustained”.
Courts are therefore bound to ensure that any award remains compensatory in nature, directed towards reparation, consolation, and vindication, rather than punishment.
As noted in Bertwistle v Conquest [2015] QDC 133, even when a defendant defaults, the court’s discretion is not unfettered.
Relief must be proportionate to the harm established and consistent with the tripartite purposes of damages.
This prevents default judgments in defamation from becoming punitive windfalls.
The Need for Evidence of Quantum
Another key safeguard is that the plaintiff must still provide credible evidence to assist the court in assessing quantum.
While reputational harm is presumed once defamation is established, the courts have consistently required affidavit material or other supporting evidence to demonstrate the extent of distress, reputational loss, and the likely spread of the defamatory material.
In Gregory v Johnson [2017] QDC 224, the court confirmed that even in default cases, evidence is essential for fixing damages in a way that reflects the statutory requirements under s 34.
Likewise, in Bertwistle v Conquest [2015] QDC 133, the court relied on affidavit material detailing the seriousness of the imputations and their impact before making an award.
In short, a default judgment does not mean automatic success without scrutiny.
The courts in Queensland maintain a careful balance: ensuring plaintiffs are not left without remedy when defendants ignore proceedings, while also upholding fairness by requiring proper pleadings, proportionate relief, and credible evidence of harm.
Summary of Procedural Fairness
Procedural fairness is a fundamental principle in defamation proceedings, ensuring that judgments are grounded in proper pleadings, appropriate relief, and credible evidence.
Even when a defendant defaults, the court must be satisfied that the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim is clean and that the pleaded imputations are legally capable of arising from the publication.
This safeguard prevents plaintiffs from obtaining judgment on unsustainable or impermissible claims.
The rationale for procedural fairness extends beyond the parties involved, as it upholds the integrity of the judicial process and ensures that judgments are fair and proportionate.
Courts are bound to ensure that any award remains compensatory in nature, directed towards reparation, consolation, and vindication, rather than punishment.
This approach prevents default judgments in defamation from becoming punitive windfalls.
Remedies Beyond Damages
When a court enters default judgment in a defamation matter, the outcome is not limited to an award of damages.
Queensland law recognises that damages alone may not always be sufficient to protect or vindicate a plaintiff’s reputation.
The court has the discretion to grant a range of additional remedies, including injunctions, interest, and costs orders.
These orders, although ancillary, are often crucial in ensuring that the harm is appropriately addressed.
Default Judgment in Defamation – Injunctions
An injunction is a court order restraining a defendant from publishing, or further publishing, defamatory material.
Even in default proceedings, injunctions are not granted automatically. The court will only make such an order where it is necessary to prevent ongoing or future harm, and where the relief is proportionate.
In Bertwistle v Conquest [2015] QDC 133, the District Court granted injunctive relief alongside damages, restraining the defendant from republishing the defamatory matter. The court considered the seriousness of the imputations and the lack of contrition, concluding that an injunction was required to protect the plaintiff’s reputation from further injury.
This demonstrates that where the defamatory allegations are grave, such as imputations of criminality or sexual misconduct, injunctive relief is a powerful and appropriate tool to ensure protection beyond monetary compensation.
Default Judgment in Defamation – Interest on Damages
The court may also award interest on damages, compensating the plaintiff for the period during which they have been deprived of the money awarded.
Interest is not punitive but recognises that reputational harm and the delay in vindication both have real consequences.
In Gregory v Johnson [2017] QDC 224, the District Court ordered interest in addition to damages, reflecting the time elapsed between the defamatory publication and the judgment.
This approach reinforces that interest is a standard component of the remedial package, ensuring the plaintiff is made whole.
Default Judgment in Defamation – Costs Orders
Costs are a further remedy available to successful plaintiffs. As a general principle, the losing party is required to pay the costs of the proceeding.
However, in defamation cases, particularly in defaults, the court may go further and order indemnity costs where the defendant’s conduct is found to be blameworthy.
Blameworthy conduct may include:
- Evasion of service or deliberate non-engagement with the proceedings.
- Failure to respond to correspondence or to apologise.
- Conduct in litigation that aggravates the harm or increases costs unnecessarily.
In Bertwistle v Conquest [2015] QDC 133, the court considered the defendant’s conduct sufficiently unreasonable to warrant indemnity costs. Samios DCJ said:
The affidavits I have seen show the defendant actively sought to avoid being served, has shown no remorse, she has refused to take part in these proceedings and despite an offer to make amends she failed to do so. The costs should therefore be on the indemnity basis.
The absence of cooperation, combined with the seriousness of the defamatory allegations and the failure to apologise, justified a higher costs order.
Such orders send a clear message that ignoring proceedings or acting in bad faith will have serious financial consequences.
In summary, the remedies available in default defamation judgments extend beyond damages.
Injunctions provide protection against further harm, interest ensures compensation remains fair over time, and costs orders, particularly indemnity costs, reflect the court’s disapproval of blameworthy behaviour.
Together, these remedies ensure that plaintiffs receive not only financial redress but also meaningful protection of their reputations.
Case Examples from Queensland
Two decisions of the Queensland District Court illustrate how default judgments in defamation are handled in practice.
These cases highlight the importance of properly pleaded imputations, credible evidence of harm, and the way courts apply the Defamation Act 2005 and the UCPR in the default context.
Bertwistle v Conquest [2015] QDC 133
In this case, the defendant failed to file a defence, allowing the plaintiff to apply for default judgment under r 288 UCPR.
The court found that all allegations of fact were deemed admitted, but it still scrutinised the pleadings to ensure the imputations were legally capable of arising from the publication.
The defamatory allegations were severe, suggesting criminal and sexual misconduct.
The court emphasised the tripartite purpose of damages; reparation, consolation, and vindication, and applied s 34 of the Defamation Act 2005 to ensure the award bore an appropriate and rational relationship to the harm sustained.
The court also considered the grapevine effect, acknowledging that the false allegations were likely to spread beyond the initial audience, magnifying the reputational harm.
The absence of apology or remorse, together with the defendant’s conduct in avoiding service and failing to engage, was treated as an aggravating factor.
Ultimately, the plaintiff was awarded damages, injunctive relief to restrain further publication, interest on the award, and indemnity costs on account of the defendant’s blameworthy conduct. The judgment was:
That, until further order, the defendant is restrained from making and/or repeating in any way whatsoever statements to the effect of those pleaded in paragraphs 2 and 8 of the Amended Statement of Claim.
That the defendant pay compensatory damages to the plaintiff for defamation in the amount of $100,000.00.
That the defendant pay interest to the plaintiff pursuant to s. 58 of the Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld) in the amount of $4,202.74 on the damages awarded.
That the defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of and incidental to the proceedings on an indemnity basis.
The case demonstrates how Queensland courts balance procedural fairness with the need to provide meaningful redress in serious default scenarios.
Gregory v Johnson [2017] QDC 224
This case followed a similar pattern. The defendant did not defend the proceedings, and the plaintiff sought default judgment.
The court confirmed that under r 288 UCPR, each allegation of fact in the statement of claim was deemed admitted, but stressed that the capability of imputations remained a question of law for the judge.
When assessing damages, the court again applied s 34, emphasising the need for a rational relationship to the harm suffered.
The judgment discussed the grapevine effect, recognising that defamatory statements can circulate widely and continue to damage reputation long after publication.
The court also examined aggravating and mitigating factors.
It noted that malice must generally be disregarded under s 36, unless it affects the extent of the harm.
At the same time, it confirmed that apologies or offers to make amends under s 38 can significantly mitigate damages.
In this case, the absence of meaningful mitigation meant the damages award remained substantial.
The decision in Gregory v Johnson reinforces the principle that even where the defendant defaults, the court requires evidence of harm to fix quantum fairly. The judgment in this case was:
Judgment be entered for the plaintiff in the sum of $170,901.92; comprising:
(a) $120,000 for compensatory damages
(b) $40,000 for aggravated damages; and
(c) $10,901.92 for interest
The defendant be restrained, whether by herself, her servants or agents, from publishing matters of and concerning the plaintiff alleging that:
(a) he is a paedophile;
(b) he has been charged with sexual offences against children;
(c) he films women in the shower;
or words to similar effect.
The defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of the proceeding, including reserved costs, on the indemnity basis.
It also confirms that damages are compensatory, not punitive, and that courts will closely scrutinise both the seriousness of the imputations and the conduct of the defendant.
Together, Bertwistle v Conquest and Gregory v Johnson show how Queensland courts approach default judgments in defamation: ensuring pleadings are legally sound, applying statutory requirements on damages, weighing aggravation and mitigation, and granting remedies beyond damages where necessary.
These cases illustrate the risks of ignoring a defamation claim and the importance of properly preparing evidence to support damages in default proceedings.
What to Do If Facing or Seeking a Default Judgment
Default judgments in defamation cases are powerful tools, but they come with strict rules.
Whether you are the plaintiff bringing the claim or the defendant responding to it, knowing what steps to take is critical. Queensland courts apply the UCPR and the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) to ensure that judgments are fair, proportionate, and based on proper pleadings and evidence.
If you’re a Plaintiff
Draft your Statement of Claim with precision. The strength of your case begins with the pleadings.
Every fact you allege will be deemed admitted if the defendant defaults, but the court must still decide if your pleaded imputations are legally capable of arising.
As confirmed in Gregory v Johnson [2017] QDC 224, deemed admissions do not extend to matters of law.
Poorly drafted imputations may fail even if unchallenged, so clarity and precision are essential.
Gather strong evidence of harm. While harm to reputation is presumed once defamation is established, evidence of public reach, distress, and reputational impact will increase damages.
In Bertwistle v Conquest [2015] QDC 133, the court relied on affidavit material to assess the extent of the harm, including the likely grapevine effect, the way defamatory statements spread beyond the immediate audience.
Address mitigation issues. Section 38 of the Defamation Act 2005 requires courts to take into account apologies and offers to make amends when fixing damages.
If no apology has been made, highlight this in your material.
If an insincere or inadequate attempt was made, explain why it should not reduce damages.
Prepare submissions on remedies. Default judgments in defamation can include more than damages.
As seen in Bertwistle v Conquest [2015] QDC 133, the court granted injunctive relief to restrain further publication, awarded interest, and ordered indemnity costs because of the defendant’s blameworthy conduct.
Plaintiffs should be ready to address each of these remedies in their submissions.
If You’re a Defendant
Do not ignore the claim. Failing to respond means losing the ability to contest the facts, the imputations, and any defences you may have, such as truth or honest opinion.
Under r 288 UCPR, once judgment is entered, your chances to argue those points are gone.
File a defence or notice of intention to defend. Even if you believe the claim is weak, filing a defence keeps your rights intact.
It also prevents a default judgment from being entered against you without your side being heard.
If judgment has been entered, act quickly. It is sometimes possible to apply to set aside a default judgment, but only if you act promptly and can demonstrate a genuine defence.
Courts are cautious in exercising this discretion, particularly in defamation matters where reputations are at stake.
Delay or lack of merit will almost certainly lead to refusal.
Default judgments in defamation are not automatic victories for plaintiffs, nor are they easy to unwind for defendants.
For plaintiffs, the key is precise pleadings, strong evidence, and careful preparation on damages and remedies.
For defendants, the message is clear: engage with the process early or risk losing the ability to defend yourself entirely.
Common Mistakes to Avoid
Default judgments in defamation can provide plaintiffs with an efficient pathway to relief, but they are not without risks.
Courts in Queensland maintain strict safeguards to ensure fairness, and careless missteps can undermine a claim or reduce damages.
The following mistakes are frequently seen in practice and should be carefully avoided.
Pleading Meanings That Are Not “Capable of Arising”
The most common error is overreaching in the pleadings.
Plaintiffs often allege defamatory meanings that the publication cannot reasonably bear.
The law requires that imputations must be legally capable of arising before they are treated as admitted on default.
This is always a question of law for the judge.
As explained in Gregory v Johnson [2017] QDC 224, even in default, the court will not accept pleaded meanings automatically; it must first be satisfied that a reasonable reader, viewer, or listener could understand the words as conveying the imputation.
Likewise, in Bertwistle v Conquest [2015] QDC 133, the District Court stressed that deemed admissions apply to allegations of fact, but the court must determine the legal capacity of imputations.
Pleading vague, strained, or legally unsustainable meanings risks having them struck out, even when unopposed.
Assuming Evidence Is Unnecessary
Another mistake is assuming that because a default has been entered, the plaintiff does not need to provide evidence of harm.
While reputational injury is presumed once defamation is proven, the court still requires credible evidence to determine the extent of the damage.
Affidavit material about the impact of the publication, the grapevine effect, and the distress suffered by the plaintiff is critical to the assessment.
In Gregory v Johnson [2017] QDC 224, the court confirmed that damages must be supported by evidence and remain proportionate under s 34 of the Defamation Act 2005.
Plaintiffs who fail to file supporting evidence risk receiving a lower award than the seriousness of the allegations might otherwise justify.
Over-Claiming Punitive or Excessive Damages
Defamation damages are remedial, not punitive.
The High Court in Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd [1966] HCA 40 made it clear that the purposes of damages are reparation, consolation, and vindication, not punishment.
Queensland courts, applying s 34, ensure that damages bear an “appropriate and rational relationship to the harm sustained.”
Over-claiming or presenting damages as punishment undermines credibility and risks judicial criticism.
In default cases, where the defendant is absent, courts are cautious to avoid punitive awards.
Plaintiffs must focus their submissions on compensable harm and the statutory purposes of damages.
Misunderstanding the Limits on Malice
Finally, plaintiffs sometimes attempt to rely on malice to drive up damages.
This is a significant error. Under s 36 of the Defamation Act 2005, the court must disregard malice except to the extent that it affects the harm suffered by the plaintiff.
Malice, standing alone, cannot justify higher damages.
In both Bertwistle v Conquest [2015] QDC 133 and Gregory v Johnson [2017] QDC 224, the District Court applied s 36, confirming that while malice may aggravate harm if it worsens the plaintiff’s distress or reputation, it is otherwise irrelevant to damages.
Plaintiffs should therefore be careful to frame malice only in terms of its impact on the actual injury suffered.
In summary, plaintiffs seeking default judgment in defamation should avoid four recurring pitfalls: pleading unsustainable meanings, failing to present evidence of harm, over-claiming damages as punishment, and misapplying the role of malice.
By steering clear of these mistakes, claimants maximise their chances of obtaining fair and effective relief while staying within the boundaries set by Queensland law.
Default Judgments in Defamation – Key Takeaways
Default judgments in defamation are a powerful mechanism under Queensland law, but they are never automatic.
Courts apply important checks to safeguard fairness, and both plaintiffs and defendants need to be aware of the risks and opportunities involved.
Procedural Checks Remain
Even where a defendant does not defend the proceeding, the court does not simply hand victory to the plaintiff.
Under r 288 of the UCPR, the court must be satisfied that the pleadings are in order and that the imputations are legally capable of arising.
As confirmed in Gregory v Johnson [2017] QDC 224, deemed admissions extend only to facts, not to legal conclusions.
Similarly, in Bertwistle v Conquest [2015] QDC 133, the court emphasised its obligation to scrutinise the pleadings before entering judgment.
Careful Drafting of Pleadings
Success in default proceedings begins with precision in pleadings.
Overstated or vague imputations risk being struck out, even if uncontested.
Courts have consistently held that imputations must be capable of arising as a matter of law before being treated as admitted.
This underscores the importance of drafting a statement of claim with clarity and accuracy from the outset.
Evidence Still Matters
While harm to reputation is presumed once defamation is established, courts require credible evidence to fix damages.
Section 34 of the Defamation Act 2005 demands that damages bear an “appropriate and rational relationship to the harm sustained.”
In both Gregory v Johnson and Bertwistle v Conquest, the court relied on affidavit evidence to assess the seriousness of the imputations, the grapevine effect, and the personal impact on the plaintiff.
Plaintiffs who fail to provide such evidence risk reduced awards.
Remedies Go Beyond Money
Damages are not the only remedy available.
Plaintiffs may also seek injunctions to restrain further publication, interest on the award, and costs orders, including indemnity costs where the defendant’s conduct has been blameworthy.
In Bertwistle v Conquest [2015] QDC 133, the court granted all of these remedies, recognising that monetary compensation alone would not adequately protect the plaintiff’s reputation.
Timing Is Everything
For defendants, the message is simple: act fast. Ignoring a defamation claim can mean losing the ability to contest facts, meanings, and defences.
Applications to set aside default judgments in defamation are possible, but only if made promptly and backed by a genuine defence.
For plaintiffs, preparation is key: carefully pleaded imputations, strong supporting evidence, and well-prepared submissions on remedies will maximise the prospects of success.
In short, default judgments in defamation are not automatic wins for plaintiffs, nor are they hopeless for defendants.
Clear rules, statutory safeguards, and judicial discretion govern them.
Proper preparation, credible evidence, and timely action are the cornerstones of navigating this process successfully in Queensland.
Default Judgments in Defamation – FAQ
If you are involved in a defamation matter where the other side has defaulted, you are likely to have many practical questions about what happens next.
Below are answers to the most common questions, drawn from Queensland case law and legislation, to help you understand how default judgments in defamation really work.
What is “deemed admission,” and what does it mean for me?
A deemed admission occurs when a defendant fails to file a defence in time. Under r 288 UCPR, all factual allegations in the plaintiff’s statement of claim are taken as admitted. However, this does not extend to matters of law. The court must still decide whether pleaded imputations are legally capable of arising. Once that threshold is satisfied, the imputations are treated as admitted.
Can I still challenge the meaning / imputation even after default?
No. Once default judgment is entered, the defendant loses the ability to contest pleaded imputations if the court finds them legally capable of arising. As confirmed in Gregory v Johnson [2017] QDC 224, capability remains a question of law for the judge. After that, meanings are treated as admitted facts, and defendants cannot later dispute them.
How high might damages go in a default case?
Damages in default cases can be substantial, particularly where imputations allege criminal or sexual misconduct. In Bertwistle v Conquest [2015] QDC 133, damages of $100,000 were awarded, and in Gregory v Johnson [2017] QDC 224, $170,901.92 was ordered. The amounts reflected the seriousness of the allegations, the grapevine effect, and the lack of apology or mitigation.
What role does apology play in reducing damages?
Section 38 of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) requires courts to consider apologies or offers to make amends as mitigating factors. A prompt, genuine apology may reduce damages significantly. However, in default cases, the absence of apology often weighs heavily against the defendant, as seen in Bertwistle v Conquest [2015] QDC 133, where the court noted the lack of contrition when fixing damages.
Can someone obtain injunctions or impose penalties in default judgments?
Yes. Injunctions can be granted to stop repetition or further publication of defamatory material, but they are not automatic. In Bertwistle v Conquest [2015] QDC 133, the court issued an injunction restraining further defamatory statements. However, damages remain remedial, not punitive. Courts avoid imposing penalties; they focus on compensation, vindication, and preventing ongoing harm.
How long do I have to bring a defamation claim (limitation periods)?
The article confirms that defamation proceedings are subject to strict limitation periods. Generally, a claim must be brought within one year of publication. Extensions may be available in limited circumstances, but the rules are tightly applied. Plaintiffs who delay risk losing their right to sue, even if the defamatory material caused serious reputational harm.
What is Rule 288 UCPR, and why is it important?
Rule 288 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) governs default judgments where a defence has not been filed. It allows the court to give judgment justified on the pleadings. Importantly, it does not operate automatically—the court must still examine pleadings and relief. This ensures fairness and prevents unjust outcomes, even when defendants ignore proceedings.
Does the court just “rubber-stamp” default judgments?
No. Courts emphasise that a default judgment is not automatic. In Gregory v Johnson [2017] QDC 224, the judge highlighted that imputations must first be legally capable of arising. The court must also ensure damages are proportionate under s 34. This gatekeeping role ensures that plaintiffs cannot obtain judgment for unsustainable claims simply because the defendant did not defend.
What is the “grapevine effect”?
The grapevine effect refers to the way defamatory statements spread beyond the immediate audience. Courts recognise that gossip, social networks, and digital platforms can magnify reputational harm. In Gregory v Johnson [2017] QDC 224, the court considered the likelihood of wide circulation as a factor increasing damages. Plaintiffs should provide evidence of this effect when seeking higher awards.
Is harm always presumed in defamation?
Yes. Once defamatory publication is established, harm to reputation is presumed. Plaintiffs do not need to prove actual loss. However, stronger evidence—such as witness statements, affidavits, or proof of community gossip—can increase damages. In Bertwistle v Conquest [2015] QDC 133, affidavit evidence was central to assessing damages. Courts still require credible evidence to fix quantum.
Are damages in defamation punitive?
No. Damages in defamation are compensatory, not punitive. The High Court in Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd [1966] HCA 40 confirmed that damages serve to repair reputation, console for hurt, and vindicate reputation. Section 34 of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) enforces proportionality, ensuring awards have a rational relationship to harm suffered.
Can malice increase damages in default cases?
Only if it worsens the harm. Section 36 of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) requires courts to disregard malice unless it affects the harm sustained. In Gregory v Johnson [2017] QDC 224, the court stressed that malice alone cannot increase damages, but if it intensifies distress or reputational harm, it may justify a higher award.
What evidence should plaintiffs provide in default claims?
Plaintiffs should provide affidavits detailing reputational harm, distress, and the spread of defamatory material. Witness statements and social media evidence can demonstrate the grapevine effect. Courts require credible evidence to fix damages fairly, even in default. In both Bertwistle v Conquest and Gregory v Johnson, affidavit material was key in assessing quantum.
Can default judgments be set aside?
Yes, but only in limited circumstances. Defendants may apply to set aside a default judgment if they act promptly and can demonstrate a genuine defence. Courts are cautious in exercising this discretion, particularly in defamation matters where reputations are at stake. Delay or weak arguments will almost certainly lead to refusal.
What are aggravated damages, and when are they awarded?
Aggravated damages may be awarded when the defendant’s conduct worsens the harm. This can include refusing to apologise, evading service, or engaging in malicious behaviour. In Bertwistle v Conquest [2015] QDC 133, the defendant’s lack of contrition and avoidance of proceedings justified aggravated damages. Courts distinguish these from punitive damages, which are not permitted.
Can mitigation reduce damages in default cases?
Yes. Section 38 of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) allows courts to consider apologies, corrections, or settlements as mitigating factors. While rare in default cases, genuine steps to repair harm can reduce damages significantly. Conversely, the absence of mitigation, as in Gregory v Johnson [2017] QDC 224, often results in higher awards.
What remedies beyond damages are available?
Plaintiffs can seek injunctions to stop further publication, interest on damages, and costs orders. In Bertwistle v Conquest [2015] QDC 133, the court awarded all three: damages, an injunction, interest, and indemnity costs. Remedies beyond damages are especially important where reputational harm is ongoing or the defendant has behaved unreasonably.
When will indemnity costs be awarded?
Indemnity costs may be ordered where the defendant’s conduct is blameworthy. This includes evading service, refusing to apologise, or aggravating harm during proceedings. In Bertwistle v Conquest [2015] QDC 133, the defendant’s deliberate avoidance of service and lack of remorse justified indemnity costs, sending a strong message about the financial risks of ignoring claims.
Why is careful pleading of imputations so important?
Because courts only treat imputations as admitted once they are found legally capable of arising. Overstating or pleading vague meanings risks them being struck out. As seen in Gregory v Johnson [2017] QDC 224, capability is always a legal question for the court. Poor drafting can undermine even an undefended case.
What is the key takeaway for defendants facing defamation claims?
The key message is to act quickly. Ignoring proceedings results in losing the chance to contest facts, meanings, and defences. While default judgments can sometimes be set aside, success requires prompt action and a genuine defence. Courts, as shown in Gregory v Johnson [2017] QDC 224, are reluctant to disturb defaults where defendants delay.
