Innuendo in Defamation
Innuendo in defamation refers to a defamatory meaning that goes beyond the literal interpretation of the words published.
This usually arises where the audience brings extrinsic facts, facts known to them independently of the publication, to their reading, and those facts give the words a defamatory sting.
Such cases are classed as true innuendo. For example, a statement that appears neutral to the public might be understood as defamatory by industry insiders familiar with specific background facts.
The dictionary defines “Innuendo” to mean:
an allusive or oblique remark or hint, typically a suggestive or disparaging one.
To rely on a true innuendo, the plaintiff must plead and prove the relevant extrinsic facts.
Courts have traditionally required the plaintiff to establish the truth of those facts to sustain the pleaded innuendo.
However, courts have questioned this orthodoxy, holding that there is no universal rule requiring the facts to be objectively true; it may be enough that they exist in the belief or opinion of the recipients.
Importantly, the publisher can still be held responsible for defamatory meanings conveyed to readers with that special knowledge, even if the publisher was unaware of either the facts or the readership’s awareness.
Proving a true innuendo in defamation often requires witness testimony from members of the audience who held the relevant knowledge, demonstrating that they understood the words in the defamatory sense because of those extrinsic facts.
In this article, our expert defamation lawyers provide a more detailed explanation of these concepts.
“False Innuendo in Defamation” vs Natural and Ordinary Meaning
Historically, courts used the term false innuendo in defamation to describe defamatory meanings inferred from the words themselves without relying on extrinsic facts.
Modern law treats these cases simply as part of the natural and ordinary meaning of the words.
The distinction was clarified in Wilkinson v S Bennett Ltd (1921) 29 CLR 283, where the High Court held that where the pleaded meaning arises solely from the words themselves, there is no need to plead it as an innuendo. The Court said:
…a plaintiff in an action of libel or slander may set out in his declaration the words of which he complains, and an innuendo stating the meaning which he alleges they bear, and if the words either in their natural meaning or in that alleged by the innuendo are defamatory, that is sufficient.
In Vadic v The Ballarat News Pty Ltd [1981] VR 213, Marks J said:
It is clear that the law recognizes two causes of action in defamation, one based on the natural and ordinary meaning of the words and the other on special or extended meanings provided by facts and circumstances known to readers. The first is said to be based on a false and the latter upon a true innuendo: see Grubb v Bristol United Press Ltd [1963] 1 QB 309; Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234; Barclay v Cox [1968] VR 664.
Only when the meaning depends on extrinsic facts must it be pleaded as a true innuendo in defamation with proper particulars.
A classic illustration comes from Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234, where the plaintiff argued that headlines such as “Fraud Squad Probe Firm” imputed that he was guilty of fraud. Lord Devlin said:
It is not … correct to say as a matter of law that a statement of suspicion imputes guilt. It can be said as a matter of practice that it very often does so, because although suspicion of guilt is something different from proof of guilt, it is the broad impression conveyed by the libel that has to be considered and not the meaning of each word under analysis. A man who wants to talk at large about smoke may have to pick his words very carefully if he wants to exclude the suggestion that there is also a fire; but it can be done. One always gets back to the fundamental question: what is the meaning that the words convey to the ordinary man: you cannot make a rule about that. They can convey a meaning of suspicion short of guilt; but loose talk about suspicion can very easily convey the impression that it is a suspicion that is well founded.
The House of Lords held that the ordinary reasonable reader, without extrinsic knowledge, would not necessarily infer guilt.
Instead, the words were only capable of meaning that the company was under investigation, not that the chairman was guilty.
This case highlights the principle that meanings naturally flowing from the words themselves fall within the scope of natural and ordinary meaning, rather than true innuendo in defamation.
This case was adopted in Australia in the case of Favell v Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 52 at [12] where Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow & Heydon JJ said:
A mere statement that a person is under investigation, or that a person has been charged, may not be enough to impute guilt. If, however, it is accompanied by an account of the suspicious circumstances that have aroused the interest of the authorities, and that point towards a likelihood of guilt, then the position may be otherwise. There is an overlap between providing information and entertainment, and the publishing of information coupled with a derogatory implication may fall into both categories. It may be that a bare, factual, report that a house has burned down is less entertaining than a report spiced with an account of a suspicious circumstance.
Types of Innuendo in Defamation
This section explains the three main categories of innuendo in defamation law.
True innuendo arises where a defamatory meaning depends on extrinsic facts known to the audience, requiring detailed particulars and, traditionally, proof of their truth.
Courts have since questioned whether objective truth is always necessary, with Chesterton confirming that liability may exist even if the publisher was unaware of the audience’s knowledge.
False innuendo in defamation is now treated simply as the natural and ordinary meaning.
Finally, the use of extrinsic facts purely for identification is not considered true innuendo; the meaning remains ordinary where the defamatory sting comes from the words themselves.
True Innuendo in Defamation (Extrinsic Facts)
A true innuendo arises when a defamatory meaning depends upon the audience’s knowledge of extrinsic facts.
The law has long required that these extrinsic facts be pleaded with particulars so that the defendant is fully aware of the case it must meet.
Traditionally, the plaintiff also had to prove the objective truth of those extrinsic facts.
The High Court of Australia in Mirror Newspapers Ltd v World Hosts Pty Ltd [1979] HCA 3 endorsed this approach, requiring that the supporting facts actually exist before liability could arise. Mason & Jacobs JJ said at [17]:
…the erroneous belief of a reader as to the existence of a fact cannot found an innuendo, for an innuendo must be based on an existing fact. A defendant is not liable for an imputation which is not the product of the words complained of read in the light of existing facts known to the reader, but which is merely the product of those words understood in the light of the reader’s erroneous belief…
Similarly, in Slatyer v Daily Telegraph Newspaper Co Ltd [1908] HCA 22, the court insisted upon proof of those background facts. Griffith CJ said:
…no evidence was given on behalf of the plaintiff by any independent witness of what he understood by the articles in question. In point of fact some witness should have been called for the purpose of proving that he had read the article and taken it to refer to the plaintiff in the worst sense, if that was the meaning upon which the plaintiff relied.
This confirms that the High Court insisted the plaintiff must prove, through evidence of independent readers, that the extrinsic/background facts existed and were understood by the audience at the time of publication.
Importantly, liability is not confined to situations where the publisher knew of the extrinsic facts.
A publisher will be held responsible for extended meanings conveyed to readers with the relevant knowledge, whether the publisher knew of the existence of those facts, or that any recipients were aware of them.
In Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16, French CJ, Gummow, Kiefel and Bell JJ say at [51]:
When a true innuendo is pleaded evidence may be given of special facts, known to those to whom the matter was published, such as would lead a reasonable person knowing those facts to conclude that the words have another, defamatory, meaning. The essential requirement of the plea is that the matter is not one within the general knowledge of the hypothetical referees.
This principle highlights the broad scope of true innuendo in protecting one’s reputation.
“False” Innuendo in Defamation (Ordinary Meaning)
The term “false innuendo” historically referred to defamatory meanings that arose solely from the words themselves, without reliance on extrinsic facts.
Courts once allowed such meanings to be pleaded as innuendoes, but the practice created confusion.
In Uren v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 680, Ferguson J explained:
This is important because there are two types of innuendo … one which does no more than state the plaintiff’s interpretation of the natural meaning of the words, and the other which extends their natural meaning by the addition of extrinsic facts. Both are quite properly called innuendoes … For convenience I … shall refer to the latter as a true innuendo and to the former as a false innuendo. … But a false innuendo adds nothing to the words complained of and cannot constitute a second cause of action.
That’s the judicial basis for the idea that a false innuendo is just the plaintiff’s gloss on the ordinary meaning of the words, and not a separate defamatory meaning based on extrinsic facts.
This decision distinguished true innuendo in defamation (which requires extrinsic facts and particulars) from false innuendo (which is nothing more than ordinary meaning).
In Toomey v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 291, Hunt J referred to the distinction between true and false innuendo. The case records that in Simmons v Mitchell (1880) 6 App Cas 156, the Privy Council treated the matter as a false innuendo case because:
… it was held (at 161) that the innuendo pleaded did not purport to enlarge the meaning of the words … the appeal proceeded upon the basis that it was a false innuendo case.
This confirms that a false innuendo in defamation arises where the plaintiff merely asserts the ordinary defamatory meaning of the words without adding extrinsic facts. It is contrasted with a true innuendo, which depends on proof of additional facts known to the audience.
Today, Australian and English courts treat such meanings as part of the natural and ordinary meaning, avoiding unnecessary terminology that could lead to false innuendo.
Identification using extrinsic facts is not a true innuendo
A subtle but essential distinction exists where extrinsic facts are needed solely to establish the identification of the plaintiff. In such cases, the meaning conveyed “of and concerning” the plaintiff is treated as the natural and ordinary meaning, not as a true innuendo in defamation.
For instance, if a newspaper refers to “the director of a recently collapsed construction company” and readers who know that the plaintiff was the director of that company identify him from the description, the defamatory sting lies in the ordinary meaning of the words.
The use of extrinsic facts is confined to establishing identification, not extending the defamatory sense.
Courts have consistently drawn this line to ensure that true innuendo is reserved for cases where the defamatory meaning itself depends on extrinsic facts.
When (and Why) to use Innuendo in Defamation
This section outlines when innuendo should and should not be pleaded in defamation.
It explains that innuendo in defamation is strategically valuable where a publication appears neutral to the public but defamatory to a group with special knowledge, or where related publications must be read together.
By contrast, if the sting lies entirely in the words themselves, courts treat it as ordinary meaning.
When to Use Innuendo in Defamation
A true innuendo is used when the defamatory meaning depends on extrinsic facts known to some part of the audience. Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Wing (2019) 271 FCR 632. Greenwood, Rares, and Lee JJ said:
In the case of the true innuendo alleged by the applicant, the question of meaning remains an objective one, even though there are statements in the authorities that evidence from persons with knowledge of the extrinsic facts is admissible … The requirement to prove, whether by direct evidence or inference, knowledge amongst some recipients of the publication of the extrinsic facts goes to proof of publication of the innuendo.
This is the authority for the principle that a true innuendo in defamation arises when the defamatory sting only exists for readers with knowledge of extrinsic facts.
The Court emphasised that the meaning remains an objective question, but proof is required that at least some recipients were aware of those extrinsic facts.
Strategically, true innuendo is also appropriate where the defamatory meaning only emerges when the publication is read in conjunction with related or serial publications.
Courts have recognised that if it is apparent from the face of the material that the defendant intended them to be read together, or where there are direct cross-references, the plaintiff may plead the combined meaning without separately drafting paragraphs of true innuendo.
Instead, the statement of claim may identify the defamatory meaning arising from the material as a whole.
For example, where a series of newspaper articles reference each other, an ordinary reader who has followed the series may understand a defamatory meaning that is not obvious from a single article read in isolation.
In these cases, the combined context itself supplies the defamatory sting, and pleading innuendo ensures the plaintiff captures the broader meaning conveyed by the serial publications.
Why Use Innuendo in Defamation?
The rationale is that without pleading an innuendo, a plaintiff might fail to capture the defamatory sting that only arises for readers with special knowledge.
Pleading innuendo ensures the precise meaning is identified, which is essential for evaluating defences like truth or honest opinion. In Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Wing (2019) 271 FCR 632, Greenwood, Rares and Lee JJ said:
The crucial first step is to identify the precise meaning of the words in issue … The precise meaning of the words in question is crucial to whether truth or honest opinion defences uare made out.
The Court also noted that innuendo serves the interests of fairness and practical justice: it alerts the defendant to the case they must meet and frames the boundaries of the trial. In Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Wing (2019) 271 FCR 632, Greenwood, Rares and Lee JJ said:
… would the applicant be entitled to judgment at trial if the Court rejected the applicant’s imputations, but found that one of the lesser meanings alleged by the respondents was conveyed … That question is to be answered by an examination of the parties’ pleadings against considerations of fairness and practical justice.
In Uren v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 680, Ferguson J discussed when true innuendo in defamation should be used, and said:
When a true innuendo is pleaded for the purpose of extending the meaning of words defamatory in themselves, the pleading is to be read as if there were two counts, one with the innuendo and one without.
In Cornes v The Ten Group Pty Ltd (2012) 114 SASR 46, the Court recognised that an innuendo in defamation can be necessary where the defamatory meaning only arises for those with special or extrinsic knowledge, saying:
… if understood literally, the remark carried a true innuendo to those who knew that Mrs Cornes was married that she had been unfaithful and committed adultery and was thereby defamatory.
In Coull v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2008) 23 NTLR 147, the Court affirmed that ordinary reasonable readers can draw inferences from words beyond their literal meaning:
The ordinary reasonable reader is a person who is not avid for scandal, but who can and does read between the lines in the light of his or her general knowledge and experience of worldly affairs.
Further, quoting Lord Devlin in Lewis v Daily Telegraph:
Ordinary men and women have different temperaments and outlooks. Some are unusually suspicious and some are unusually naïve. One must try to envisage people between these two extremes and see what is the most damaging meaning they would put on the words … Ordinary men and women have the tendency to read between the lines, especially in matters of scandal.
When not to use Innuendo in Defamation
By contrast, if the defamatory sting is entirely contained in the words themselves, there is no need to resort to innuendo pleading.
Historically, courts described such cases as involving “false innuendo.” However, modern authority treats this simply as part of the natural and ordinary meaning of the words.
In Uren v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 680, Ferguson J explained that a false innuendo adds nothing and is unnecessary:
… a false innuendo adds nothing to the words complained of and cannot constitute a second cause of action.
He also noted that extravagant false innuendoes may be struck out, but usually they are best left to the trial judge:
… a false innuendo, sufficiently extravagant, will be struck out … the defendant is never embarrassed by a false innuendo.
In Toomey v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 291, Hunt J observed that when the words carry their defamatory sting in their natural and ordinary meaning, innuendo is not required:
… it was held … that the innuendo pleaded did not purport to enlarge the meaning of the words … the appeal proceeded upon the basis that it was a false innuendo case.
In Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Wing (2019) 271 FCR 632, the Full Court stressed that true innuendo should only be pleaded where meaning depends on extrinsic facts; otherwise, it is unnecessary:
… The requirement to prove … knowledge amongst some recipients of the publication of the extrinsic facts goes to proof of publication of the innuendo.
In Cornes v The Ten Group Pty Ltd (2012) 114 SASR 46, the Court stressed that innuendo in defamation is not needed where the defamatory sting lies in the natural and ordinary meaning of the words themselves. In such cases, the issue is whether the ordinary reasonable viewer would take the words literally or as a joke — no reliance on extrinsic facts is required, stating:
… the trial judge erred in his approach to assessing the understanding by ordinary reasonable viewers of the Molloy remark … Would ordinary reasonable viewers have understood the remark literally or in jest or was it ambiguous or equivocal?
In Cornes v The Ten Group Pty Ltd (2012) 114 SASR 46, the Court warned against strained or unreasonable meanings:
But the court should reject those meanings which can only emerge as the product of some strained, or forced, or utterly unreasonable interpretation.
In practice, this means that innuendo should not be used merely to restate natural and ordinary meaning in different words. Over-pleading can risk confusion and judicial criticism.
The prudent course is to reserve innuendo for cases involving extrinsic facts or combined publications, and to rely on ordinary meaning where the defamatory sting is inherent in the words themselves.
How Courts Analyse Innuendo Meanings
The Courts analyse the meanings using the following:
- Objective test — Courts ask what the ordinary reasonable reader/viewer would understand.
- Two types — True innuendo (extrinsic facts required) vs false innuendo.
- Proof — True innuendo requires evidence that at least some of the audience knew the extrinsic facts.
- Limits — Courts reject extravagant, strained, or forced meanings.
- Fairness — Innuendo is analysed in light of fairness and notice to the defendant.
In Uren v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 680, the Courts distinguish between true and false innuendo.
… there are two types of innuendo … I shall refer to the latter as a true innuendo and to the former as a false innuendo. When a true innuendo is pleaded … the pleading is to be read as if there were two counts, one with the innuendo and one without.
False innuendo = plaintiff’s gloss on the natural and ordinary meaning. The court treats it as part of the ordinary meaning analysis.
True innuendo = meaning extended by extrinsic facts; pleading is treated as if there were “two counts.”
In Toomey v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 291, the Courts analyse innuendo objectively, not by asking witnesses what they thought.
… the appeal proceeded upon the basis that it was a false innuendo case … the jury decides whether the words bear the meaning alleged. Witnesses’ opinions … are inadmissible as they usurp the jury’s role.
If it’s a true innuendo, extrinsic facts must be proved.
If it’s a false innuendo, the jury assesses whether the ordinary reader would adopt that interpretation.
In Cornes v The Ten Group Pty Ltd (2012) 114 SASR 46, the Courts ask whether the ordinary reasonable viewer would take the words literally, in jest, or ambiguously.
… if understood literally, the remark carried a true innuendo to those who knew that Mrs Cornes was married that she had been unfaithful and committed adultery and was thereby defamatory.
A true innuendo in defamation arises only if the audience has special knowledge (e.g., knowing Mrs Cornes was married → adultery sting).
In Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Wing (2019) 271 FCR 632, the Court emphasised fairness and practical justice — innuendo defines the boundaries of the case and alerts the defendant to the sting.
In the case of the true innuendo … the question of meaning remains an objective one … The requirement to prove … knowledge amongst some recipients … goes to proof of publication of the innuendo.
Analysis of innuendo is still an objective question of meaning, even for true innuendo.
The plaintiff must prove that some recipients actually knew the extrinsic facts.
In Coull v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2008) 23 NTLR 147, the Court applied the ordinary reasonable reader test.
The ordinary reasonable reader … can and does read between the lines … But the court should reject those meanings which can only emerge as the product of some strained, or forced, or utterly unreasonable interpretation.
Readers are assumed to “read between the lines” in light of general knowledge, but courts reject strained or unreasonable interpretations.
Innuendo in defamation is accepted if it naturally arises from how ordinary people process scandal and implication.
Pleading Innuendo in Defamation (Checklist and Drafting Tips)
Successfully pleading true innuendo requires careful attention to both legal principles and procedural detail.
This section provides a practical checklist for structuring pleadings, covering the need to particularise extrinsic facts, identify the knowledgeable audience, and set out the defamatory imputations conveyed.
It also addresses the debate between belief and truth regarding extrinsic facts.
In addition, it highlights the importance of planning an evidentiary strategy, including calling witnesses. It warns against common mistakes such as mislabelling ordinary meaning as innuendo or confusing identification issues with true innuendo.
In Uren v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 680, the court distinguished true vs false innuendo.
… there are two types of innuendo … I shall refer to the latter as a true innuendo and to the former as a false innuendo. When a true innuendo is pleaded … the pleading is to be read as if there were two counts, one with the innuendo and one without. But a false innuendo adds nothing to the words complained of and cannot constitute a second cause of action.
Extravagant false innuendoes may be struck out.
… a false innuendo, sufficiently extravagant, will be struck out … the defendant is never embarrassed by a false innuendo.
In Toomey v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 291, the court stated that a plaintiff must plead particulars of extrinsic facts if alleging a true innuendo.
… evidence from persons with knowledge of the extrinsic facts is admissible in support of a true innuendo.
Courts decide innuendo objectively, not by witness opinion.
… the jury decides whether the words bear the meaning alleged. Witnesses’ opinions … are inadmissible as they usurp the jury’s role.
In Cornes v The Ten Group Pty Ltd (2012) 114 SASR 46, the court decided that true innuendo arises where the audience knows extrinsic facts:
… if understood literally, the remark carried a true innuendo to those who knew that Mrs Cornes was married that she had been unfaithful and committed adultery and was thereby defamatory.
Otherwise, courts assess whether the ordinary reasonable viewer would take words literally, in jest, or as ambiguous — no need for innuendo.
The Court in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Wing (2019) 271 FCR 632, said that true innuendo in defamation must be pleaded where meaning depends on extrinsic facts, and the plaintiff must prove some recipients knew them.
In the case of the true innuendo … the question of meaning remains an objective one … The requirement to prove … knowledge amongst some recipients … goes to proof of publication of the innuendo.
Pleadings must be tested by fairness and practical justice, to alert the defendant to the precise sting.
… answered by an examination of the parties’ pleadings against considerations of fairness and practical justice.
In Coull v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2008) 23 NTLR 147, the court accepted that ordinary readers “read between the lines” and draw implications, especially in scandal.
The ordinary reasonable reader … can and does read between the lines … Ordinary men and women have the tendency to read between the lines, especially in matters of scandal.
But courts reject extravagant or unreasonable innuendo meanings:
… the court should reject those meanings which can only emerge as the product of some strained, or forced, or utterly unreasonable interpretation.
Evidence & Proof
A plaintiff relying on true innuendo in defamation must plan an evidentiary strategy from the outset.
This typically requires calling witnesses from the identified class of recipients to testify that:
- They held knowledge of the extrinsic facts at the time of publication, and
- By reason of that knowledge, they understood the words in the defamatory sense alleged.
Without this testimony, the causal link between the extrinsic facts and the defamatory sting may not be established.
Courts have emphasised that the plaintiff must prove the existence of the extrinsic facts independently of references to them in the publication. However, such references may be used to demonstrate how readers became aware of them.
Practical Examples of Innuendo in Defamation
Consider an article that reports a builder was “present when compliance forms were signed.”
To the general public, this may appear harmless. However, among industry insiders—such as those familiar with the Queensland Building and Construction Commission (QBCC) disciplinary processes—extrinsic knowledge of the builder’s prior licence suspensions could alter the meaning.
Within that audience, the words may convey an imputation of dishonest certification practices, amounting to a defamatory sting.
This aligns with established principles that a plaintiff must prove the existence of the extrinsic facts and show that they were known to the relevant audience at or before publication.
The High Court confirmed in Mirror Newspapers Ltd v World Hosts Pty Ltd (1979) 141 CLR 632 that liability can attach where readers bring such background knowledge to the words. Mason & Jacobs JJ said at [641]:
When read in conjunction with extrinsic facts, words may, in the law of defamation, have some special or secondary meaning additional to, or different from, their natural and ordinary meaning. This special or secondary meaning is … one which a reader acquainted with the extrinsic facts will ascribe to the matter complained of by reason of his knowledge of those facts because he will understand the words in the light of those facts. So, as Lord Devlin said in Lewis v. Daily Telegraph Ltd, ‘to say of a man that he was seen to enter a named house would contain a derogatory implication for anyone who knew that the house was a brothel but not for anyone who did not’.
Therefore, a publisher will be held responsible for the extended meanings conveyed to that audience, even if unaware of the recipients’ knowledge. In Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16, French CJ, Gummow, Kiefel and Bell JJ said at [51]:
The publisher of defamatory matter is liable for its publication with all its defamatory imputations, including those arising from facts known to the recipients, whether or not the publisher knew of the existence of those facts or that any of the recipients were aware of them.
Media Headline Example
A contrasting example arises with the headline “Fraud Squad Probe Firm.”
At first glance, a plaintiff might argue that it imputes guilt to the company chairman.
However, in Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234, the House of Lords ruled that the ordinary reasonable reader would not make that leap.
Instead, readers would understand the report to mean that the company was under investigation, not that the chairman was guilty of fraud.
The decision highlights the distinction between natural and ordinary meaning, as well as the concept of innuendo, in defamation law.
Where the defamatory sting arises directly from the words themselves, the case should proceed on ordinary meaning.
Over-pleading innuendo in such circumstances risks having imputations struck out as incapable of being conveyed.
Serial Publication Example
Defamatory meaning may also emerge when multiple related publications are read together.
For instance, a blog post that links back to earlier exposés on alleged misconduct can convey a more serious defamatory sting when considered as a package.
Courts accept that where it is apparent the defendant intended related publications to be read together, or where there are direct cross-references, the plaintiff may plead the combined meaning in one paragraph of the statement of claim.
There is no need to draft separate true-innuendo pleadings for each item.
This approach ensures the law reflects the reality of how readers engage with serial content.
A series of connected posts or articles can convey a cumulative meaning more damaging than any single publication in isolation.
Publisher Risk: Responsibility for Extended Meanings
One of the most significant risks for publishers in defamation law is liability for extended meanings conveyed by their words to readers with extrinsic knowledge, even if the publisher was entirely unaware of either the facts or the audience’s familiarity with them.
The principle is clear: once material is published, the law holds the publisher accountable for how it is reasonably understood by those who receive it, regardless of the publisher’s intention or foresight.
The High Court confirmed this broad scope of liability in Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16 at [51], where the High Court made it explicit that publishers are liable for meanings that arise because of the recipients’ special knowledge:
The publisher of defamatory matter is liable for its publication with all its defamatory imputations, including those arising from facts known to the recipients, whether or not the publisher knew of the existence of those facts or that any of the recipients were aware of them.
In Slatyer v Daily Telegraph Newspaper Co Ltd [1908] HCA 22, Griffith CJ recognised that liability may follow from words interpreted with reference to surrounding facts:
There are no words so plain that they may not be published with reference to such circumstances, and to such persons knowing these circumstances, as to convey a meaning very different from that which would be understood from the same words used under different circumstances.
Courts have repeatedly affirmed that it does not matter how readers came to know of the extrinsic facts, only that they did so at or before the time of publication.
As long as a section of the audience possessed that knowledge, and the words would reasonably convey a defamatory meaning to them, the publisher is responsible.
This ensures protection for plaintiffs in scenarios where a publication appears harmless to the general public but is devastatingly defamatory to a smaller, knowledgeable cohort.
From a risk management perspective, this rule creates a wide liability net.
Publishers cannot defend themselves by arguing ignorance of their readers’ knowledge or of the surrounding circumstances.
Once the defamatory meaning is reasonably understood by any audience with relevant knowledge, liability may follow.
Common Mistakes & How to Avoid Them
One of the biggest traps in defamation pleadings is the misuse of innuendo.
Courts have repeatedly cautioned against overcomplication, mischaracterisation, and poor particularisation.
The following are three of the most common mistakes—and how to avoid them.
In Uren v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 680, the mistake was pleading false innuendo as if it were a separate cause of action.
… a false innuendo adds nothing to the words complained of and cannot constitute a second cause of action.
Tip: Only plead true innuendo in defamation where extrinsic facts exist; otherwise, rely on ordinary meaning.
In Toomey v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 291, the mistake was the use of witness evidence to interpret how they understood the words.
… the jury decides whether the words bear the meaning alleged. Witnesses’ opinions … are inadmissible as they usurp the jury’s role.
Tip: Keep the analysis objective; don’t clutter pleadings with subjective opinions.
In Coull v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2008) 23 NTLR 147, the mistake was not testing whether words are capable of a defamatory meaning before trial.
… the first question for decision … is whether the words sued upon are capable of having the defamatory meaning alleged.
Another mistake was one-sided or incomplete reports:
… one-sided report … with material omissions … will not constitute a fair and accurate report.
Tip: Test capability first; present balanced reports; add disclaimers when repeating allegations.
In Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16, the mistake was assuming that liability is limited to the publisher’s intended meaning:
The publisher … is liable … with all its defamatory imputations, including those arising from facts known to the recipients, whether or not the publisher knew …
Tip: Always consider how the words may be extended by audience knowledge.
In Mirror Newspapers Ltd v World Hosts Pty Ltd (1979) 141 CLR 632, the mistake was relying on mistaken beliefs of readers to prove innuendo in defamation.
… extrinsic facts relied on must exist. A plaintiff cannot rely upon erroneous beliefs or mistaken assumptions of readers to establish a true innuendo.
Tip: Only plead actual extrinsic facts; avoid reliance on rumours or perceptions.
In Slatyer v Daily Telegraph Newspaper Co Ltd (1908) 6 CLR 1, the mistake was ignoring that liability can arise when innocent words take a defamatory sting from context:
… words so plain … may … convey a meaning very different … when published with reference to such circumstances.
Tip: Assess words against background facts — don’t assume plainness = safety.
In Cummings v Fairfax Digital (2018) 99 NSWLR 173, the mistake: Treating allegations in pleadings as imputations of guilt:
… incapable of conveying an imputation that that person is guilty …
Also, ignoring the republication risk.
… whether a reasonable person … should have appreciated … a significant risk of repetition …
Tip: Distinguish allegations from findings; plan for foreseeable republication.
In Summary, the mistakes in pleading include:
- Pleading false innuendo in defamation as a separate cause.
- Using witness evidence of meaning.
- Misreading jokes as defamatory without context.
- Failing to plead extrinsic facts.
- Skipping “capable meaning” test.
- One-sided reporting.
- Republishing without disavowal.
- Assuming only the intended meaning matters.
- Using mistaken beliefs as extrinsic facts.
- Assuming plain words are safe without context.
- Poorly distinguishing natural vs innuendo meanings.
- Over-reliance on prefatory averments.
- Treating civil allegations as guilt.
Key Takeaways – Innuendo in Defamation
Innuendo in defamation refers to a defamatory meaning that arises when readers bring extrinsic facts to the words, giving them a sting that is not apparent to the general public.
Courts draw a distinction between true innuendo, which requires proof of those extrinsic facts and the audience’s knowledge of them, and false innuendo, which is now treated as part of the natural and ordinary meaning of the words.
To successfully plead true innuendo, plaintiffs must particularise the background facts, identify the audience who knew them, and plan evidence to prove both the knowledge and the defamatory meaning.
Courts apply an objective test, asking what the ordinary reasonable reader or viewer would understand, and they will not accept witness opinion evidence about meaning.
Extrinsic facts relied on must actually exist; mistaken beliefs or rumours cannot support an innuendo.
Publishers face significant risk because liability can extend to defamatory meanings understood by readers with relevant knowledge, even if the publisher was unaware of those facts or the audience’s awareness.
Innuendo should be pleaded when the defamatory sting only arises from extrinsic facts or when related publications must be read together, but not when the meaning is inherent in the words themselves.
Courts also reject strained or extravagant interpretations, and they distinguish between literal meaning and jokes or banter.
The practical discipline is to avoid over-pleading, keep the case focused on precise meanings, and remain mindful of the risk of republication when reporting allegations.
FAQ with Answers – Innuendo in Defamation
Innuendo in defamation often raises complex issues about how different audiences understand words.
Many readers seek practical guidance on what constitutes innuendo, when it should be pleaded, and how courts approach these claims.
To help, we’ve compiled clear and concise answers to the most frequently asked questions.
Each FAQ explains the key principles in plain language, supported by leading cases and statutory rules, so you can understand how innuendo works in practice.
What is an innuendo in defamation?
Innuendo in defamation occurs when published words convey a defamatory meaning that extends beyond their literal sense. This happens when readers apply extrinsic facts they already know, which gives the words a damaging implication. A statement may appear harmless to the public but be defamatory to a group with special knowledge, creating liability for the publisher.
What is a true innuendo in defamation?
A true innuendo arises when the defamatory meaning of words depends on extrinsic facts known to part of the audience. Plaintiffs must plead and prove those facts, and show that some recipients actually held that knowledge. For example, words that seem neutral may become defamatory to industry insiders familiar with specific circumstances. True innuendo requires careful pleading with particulars.
What is a false innuendo in defamation?
A false innuendo, historically, referred to when plaintiffs pleaded their own interpretation of words without extrinsic facts. Modern courts now treat this as part of the natural and ordinary meaning of the publication. A false innuendo does not create a separate cause of action, but clarifies the plaintiff’s gloss on the ordinary defamatory meaning of the words themselves.
Do extrinsic facts in true innuendo need to be true?
Traditionally, courts required proof that extrinsic facts supporting a true innuendo were objectively true. However, more recent authorities have questioned this strict rule, noting that it may be sufficient if those facts existed in the belief or opinion of readers. The essential requirement is that audience members hold the relevant knowledge when they receive the publication.
Who bears the burden of proof in true innuendo?
The plaintiff bears the burden of pleading and proving a true innuendo. This includes identifying the extrinsic facts, proving their existence, and demonstrating that some readers were aware of them when reading the publication. Evidence may include witness testimony from audience members, showing how those extrinsic facts gave the words a defamatory meaning in that specific context.
Can a publisher be liable for meanings they did not intend?
Yes. A publisher can be held responsible for extended meanings conveyed to readers with relevant background knowledge, even if the publisher did not know those facts or that readers were aware of them. The law assesses the meaning objectively, from the standpoint of the ordinary reasonable reader with that knowledge, not by the publisher’s subjective intention.
What did Mirror Newspapers v World Hosts say about innuendo?
In Mirror Newspapers v World Hosts, the High Court confirmed that a true innuendo must be based on existing extrinsic facts. Readers’ erroneous beliefs cannot support liability. The Court explained that defamatory meaning may arise when readers are aware of relevant background facts. Still, publishers are not liable for imputations created solely from mistaken assumptions held by the audience.
What did Radio 2UE v Chesterton say about publisher liability?
In Radio 2UE v Chesterton, the High Court held that publishers are liable for all defamatory imputations, including those arising from facts known to recipients, regardless of whether the publisher knew of them. This ruling confirms that once material is published, liability attaches to the meanings conveyed to any audience with relevant knowledge, not only intended meanings.
What is the difference between natural and ordinary meaning and innuendo?
Natural and ordinary meaning covers defamatory meanings inherent in the words themselves, including implications and inferences an ordinary reader would reasonably draw. Innuendo, by contrast, involves meanings that only arise when extrinsic facts known to the audience are applied. If the sting comes solely from the words, it is treated as ordinary meaning, not a true innuendo.
When should innuendo be pleaded in defamation?
Innuendo should be pleaded when the defamatory sting depends on extrinsic facts known to readers, or when a meaning arises from multiple related publications read together. Without pleading innuendo, plaintiffs risk missing the defamatory implication only apparent to a knowledgeable audience. Properly pleading innuendo ensures fairness, identifies the precise meaning, and frames the boundaries of the trial.
When should innuendo not be pleaded in defamation?
Innuendo should not be pleaded where the defamatory sting lies entirely in the natural and ordinary meaning of the words. Courts caution against over-pleading, noting that extravagant or unnecessary innuendoes risk confusion and may be struck out. Where words are defamatory on their face, it is better to rely on ordinary meaning rather than adding needless complexity.
What role does fairness play in pleading innuendo?
Fairness is central to pleading innuendo because it ensures defendants know the precise case they must meet. Courts emphasise that innuendo defines the sting relied upon and frames the issues for trial. Clear pleading avoids surprise, narrows disputes, and facilitates the evaluation of potential defenses, such as truth or honest opinion. Innuendo must always be particularised with precision and fairness.
How do courts analyse innuendo meanings?
Courts analyse innuendo objectively, asking what the ordinary reasonable reader or viewer would understand in light of the pleaded extrinsic facts. True innuendo requires proof that some recipients actually held that knowledge. Courts reject strained or extravagant meanings, and they balance fairness to the defendant with the plaintiff’s need to capture the full defamatory sting.
Can jokes or banter create innuendo?
Yes, jokes or banter may create defamatory meaning if the audience applies extrinsic facts that turn the humour into a damaging implication. However, courts also recognise that the ordinary reasonable reader may take words as jest, not a literal assertion. Context is crucial in determining whether an innuendo arises from words delivered in a joking or humorous style.
How do extrinsic facts affect identification?
When extrinsic facts are used solely to establish identification of the plaintiff, the case remains within natural and ordinary meaning. For example, if readers know the plaintiff is the director of a collapsed company and a report refers to “the director,” the defamatory sting arises from the words themselves, not from the context. This is not an actual innuendo situation.
What evidence supports a true innuendo?
Proving a true innuendo usually requires witness testimony from audience members who held the relevant extrinsic knowledge. They must show that, because of those facts, they understood the words in the defamatory sense alleged. The plaintiff must prove both the existence of the facts and that at least some recipients knew them at the time of publication.
What are common mistakes in pleading innuendo?
Common mistakes include pleading false innuendo as a separate cause of action, failing to particularise extrinsic facts, and using witness opinions about meaning instead of objective analysis. Other errors include over-pleading, relying on mistaken beliefs rather than facts, and failing to consider whether words are capable of conveying a defamatory meaning. Courts warn against strained or extravagant interpretations that add confusion.
How can lawyers avoid mistakes when pleading innuendo?
Lawyers can avoid mistakes by pleading true innuendo only where extrinsic facts exist, providing full particulars, and identifying the class of recipients with knowledge. They should avoid unnecessary false innuendoes, test whether words are capable of defamatory meaning, and focus on objective interpretation. Careful planning of evidence, including witness testimony, is essential for proving the defamatory sting.
What risks do publishers face with innuendo?
Publishers face the risk that material may carry extended meanings to knowledgeable audiences, even if the publisher never foresaw them. Courts hold publishers liable for all defamatory imputations conveyed, regardless of intention. This broad scope of liability means publishers must consider not only the literal meaning but also how readers with special knowledge may interpret their words.
Why is innuendo important in defamation law?
Innuendo is crucial because it conveys defamatory meanings that only emerge when words are read in the context of background knowledge. Without pleading innuendo, plaintiffs risk leaving out the sting that most damages their reputation. For defendants and publishers, innuendo underscores the broad scope of liability and the necessity of anticipating how words may be interpreted by diverse audiences.
